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Rajan M. Lukose

dblp:02/1096 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2008
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 4 · 2 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 3 · 1 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 77% Approximation and online algorithms · 23%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Recommender systems · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Distributed systems · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Efficient and distributed learning · 100%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 12, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Recommender systems
collaborative filtering
0.112008
One-Class Collaborative Filtering · ICDM 2008
Recommender systems › collaborative filtering
one-class collaborative filtering
0.112008
One-Class Collaborative Filtering · ICDM 2008
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
auction theory
0.112008
Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems · WWW 2008
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › bidding strategy
budget-constrained bidding
0.112008
Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems · WWW 2008
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms › online packing and covering
online knapsack
0.112008
Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems · WWW 2008
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
sponsored search auction
0.112008
Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems · WWW 2008
Distributed systems › distributed communication
decentralized communication
0.012003
SHOCK: communicating with computational messages and automatic private profiles · WWW 2003
Distributed systems
peer-to-peer systems
0.012003
SHOCK: communicating with computational messages and automatic private profiles · WWW 2003
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › model compression
low-rank approximation
0.012008
One-Class Collaborative Filtering · ICDM 2008
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design
0.012008
Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems · WWW 2008

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

weighted low-rank approximation · 0.2negative example sampling · 0.2peer-to-peer architecture · 0.1XML-encoded messages · 0.1sniping heuristic · 0.1online knapsack algorithms · 0.1competitive ratio analysis · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2008 One-Class Collaborative Filtering
abstract
Many applications of collaborative filtering (CF), such as news item recommendation and bookmark recommendation, are most naturally thought of as one-class collaborative filtering (OCCF) problems. In these problems, the training data usually consist simply of binary data reflecting a user's action or inaction, such as page visitation in the case of news item recommendation or webpage bookmarking in the bookmarking scenario. Usually this kind of data are extremely sparse (a small fraction are positive examples), therefore ambiguity arises in the interpretation of the non-positive examples. Negative examples and unlabeled positive examples are mixed together and we are typically unable to distinguish them. For example, we cannot really attribute a user not bookmarking a page to a lack of interest or lack of awareness of the page. Previous research addressing this one-class problem only considered it as a classification task. In this paper, we consider the one-class problem under the CF setting. We propose two frameworks to tackle OCCF. One is based on weighted low rank approximation; the other is based on negative example sampling. The experimental results show that our approaches significantly outperform the baselines.
Yunhong Zhou, Bin Cao 0001, Nathan Nan Liu, Rajan M. Lukose, Martin Scholz, Qiang Yang 0001
ICDM5
2008 Learning User Purchase Intent from User-Centric Data
Rajan M. Lukose, Jiye Li, Satyanarayana Raju Penmetsa
PAKDD1
2008 Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems
abstract
We consider the budget-constrained bidding optimization problem for sponsored search auctions, and model it as an online (multiple-choice) knapsack problem. We design both deterministic and randomized algorithms for the online (multiple-choice) knapsack problems achieving a provably optimal competitive ratio. This translates back to fully automatic bidding strategies maximizing either profit or revenue for the budget-constrained advertiser. Our bidding strategy for revenue maximization is oblivious (i.e., without knowledge) of other bidders' prices and/or click-through-rates for those positions. We evaluate our bidding algorithms using both synthetic data and real bidding data gathered manually, and also discuss a sniping heuristic that strictly improves bidding performance. With sniping and parameter tuning enabled, our bidding algorithms can achieve a performance ratio above 90% against the optimum by the omniscient bidder.
Yunhong Zhou, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Rajan M. Lukose
WWW3
2007 Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions
abstract
We study vindictive bidding, a strategic bidding behavior in keyword auctions where a bidder forces his competitor to pay more without affecting his own payment. We show that most Nash equilibria (NE) are vulnerable to vindictive bidding and are thus unstable. There always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if there is only one pair of vindictive players; however PSNE may not exist when there are at least three players who are all vindictive with each other. Given the set of vindictive bidding pairs, we show how to compute a PSNE if one exists. Preliminary data analysis suggests that vindictive bidding is prevalent in real-world keyword auctions. As an ongoing work, we also propose several interesting open problems related to vindictive bidding.
Yunhong Zhou, Rajan M. Lukose
ICEC2
2003 SHOCK: communicating with computational messages and automatic private profiles
abstract
A computationally enhanced message contains some embedded programmatic components that are interpreted and executed automatically upon receipt. Unlike ordinary text email or instant messages, they make possible a number of useful applications. In this paper, we describe a general and flexible messaging system called SHOCK that extends the functionality of prior computational email systems by allowing XML-encoded SHOCK messages to interact with an automatically created profile of a user. These profiles consist of information about the most common tasks users perform, such as their Web browsing behavior, their conventional email usage, etc. Since users are sensitive about such data, the system is designed with privacy as a central design goal, and employs a distributed peer-to-peer architecture to achieve it. The system is largely implemented with commodity Web technologies and provides both a Web interface as well as one that is tightly integrated with users ordinary email clients. With SHOCK, users can send highly targeted messages without violating others privacy, and engage in structured conversation appropriate to the context without disrupting their existing work practices. We describe our implementation in detail, the most useful novel applications of the system, and our experiences with the system in a pilot field test.
Rajan M. Lukose, Eytan Adar, Joshua R. Tyler, Caesar Sengupta
WWW1