We describe a tool, MatchMaps, that generates sameAs and partOf matches between spatial objects (such as shops, shopping centres, etc.) in crowd-sourced and authoritative geospatial datasets. MatchMaps uses reasoning in qualitative spatial logic, description logic and truth maintenance techniques, to produce a consistent set of matches. We report the results of an initial evaluation of MatchMaps by experts from Ordnance Survey (Great Britain’s National Mapping Authority). In both the case studies considered, MatchMaps was able to correctly match spatial objects (high precision and recall) with minimal human intervention.

In this paper a method for adding a watermark to the power consumption of intellectual property is presented. The signature can be detected by using Differential Power Analysis, a cryptographic side channel attack that uses statistical techniques to detect register transitions in power consumption data. Details are given on how to calculate the probability of correctly determining whether the watermark is there. The number of samples that will be required to detect the watermark with a given accuracy can also be calculated based on how much of a price the designer is willing to pay in terms of area.

The use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has become pervasive in a large number of communication applications. The hardware to implement AES is non trivial and as a result it has a significant overhead in its raw form. Despite the algorithm being inherently secure, side channel attacks have exposed potential weaknesses via the implementation route, particularly power analysis. As a result, much effort has been expended in identifying techniques to mask the power signature that can give away the secret key. Unfortunately, the hardware overhead is usually a significant proportion of the size of the original algorithm and in addition, the key can sometimes still be ascertained due to manufacturing differences (such as track lengths) still delivering aspects of the key in a power signature. This paper describes an approach that requires a simple modification to the implementation of the AES algorithm, without altering its basic characteristics, which provides a significantly improved strength against side channel attacks with a minimal additional hardware overhead.