Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Max Lin
dblp:04/10853
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 2 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
3 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Program synthesis and code generation · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network optimization and economics · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design |
0.8 | 2 | 2021 | Boosted Second Price Auctions: Revenue Optimization for Heterogeneous Bidders · KDD 2021 Dynamic Revenue Sharing · NIPS 2017 |
Program synthesis and code generation › DSL-based synthesis
spreadsheet formula generation |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | SpreadsheetCoder: Formula Prediction from Semi-structured Context · ICML 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
reserve price optimization |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Boosted Second Price Auctions: Revenue Optimization for Heterogeneous Bidders · KDD 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
revenue maximization |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Boosted Second Price Auctions: Revenue Optimization for Heterogeneous Bidders · KDD 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
dynamic mechanism design |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Dynamic Revenue Sharing · NIPS 2017 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › contract theory
revenue sharing |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Dynamic Revenue Sharing · NIPS 2017 |
Network optimization and economics › dynamic resource allocation
online resource allocation |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Partner tiering in display advertising · WSDM 2014 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
double auction |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | Dynamic Revenue Sharing · NIPS 2017 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
ad auction |
0.1 | 1 | 2014 | Partner tiering in display advertising · WSDM 2014 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
language model · 0.5data-driven boost optimization · 0.5BERT · 0.5online allocation · 0.4contract scheduling · 0.4revenue sharing scheme · 0.3empirical evaluation · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | SpreadsheetCoder: Formula Prediction from Semi-structured ContextabstractSpreadsheet formula prediction has been an important program synthesis problem with many real-world applications. Previous works typically utilize input-output examples as the specification for spreadsheet formula synthesis, where each input-output pair simulates a separate row in the spreadsheet. However, this formulation does not fully capture the rich context in real-world spreadsheets. First, spreadsheet data entries are organized as tables, thus rows and columns are not necessarily independent from each other. In addition, many spreadsheet tables include headers, which provide high-level descriptions of the cell data. However, previous synthesis approaches do not consider headers as part of the specification. In this work, we present the first approach for synthesizing spreadsheet formulas from tabular context, which includes both headers and semi-structured tabular data. In particular, we propose SpreadsheetCoder, a BERT-based model architecture to represent the tabular context in both row-based and column-based formats. We train our model on a large dataset of spreadsheets, and demonstrate that SpreadsheetCoder achieves top-1 prediction accuracy of 42.51%, which is a considerable improvement over baselines that do not employ rich tabular context. Compared to the rule-based system, SpreadsheetCoder assists 82% more users in composing formulas on Google Sheets. Petros Maniatis, Rishabh Singh, Charles Sutton, Hanjun Dai, Max Lin, Denny Zhou |
ICML | 6 |
| 2021 | Boosted Second Price Auctions: Revenue Optimization for Heterogeneous BiddersabstractThe second price auction has been the prevalent auction format used by advertising exchanges because of its simplicity and desirable incentive properties. However, even with an optimized choice of reserve prices, this auction is not revenue optimal when the bidders are heterogeneous and their valuation distributions differ significantly. In order to optimize the revenue of advertising exchanges, we propose an auction format called the boosted second price auction, which assigns a boost value to each bidder. The auction favors bidders with higher boost values and allocates the item to the bidder with the highest boosted bid. We propose a data-driven approach to optimize boost values using the previous bids of the bidders. Our analysis of auction data from Google's online advertising exchange shows that the boosted second price auction with data-optimized boost values outperforms the second price auction and empirical Myerson auction by up to 6% and 3%, respectively. Negin Golrezaei, Max Lin, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Hamid Nazerzadeh |
KDD | 2 |
| 2017 | Dynamic Revenue SharingabstractMany online platforms act as intermediaries between a seller and a set of buyers. Examples of such settings include online retailers (such as Ebay) selling items on behalf of sellers to buyers, or advertising exchanges (such as AdX) selling pageviews on behalf of publishers to advertisers. In such settings, revenue sharing is a central part of running such a marketplace for the intermediary, and fixed-percentage revenue sharing schemes are often used to split the revenue among the platform and the sellers. In particular, such revenue sharing schemes require the platform to (i) take at most a constant fraction \alpha of the revenue from auctions and (ii) pay the seller at least the seller declared opportunity cost c for each item sold. A straightforward way to satisfy the constraints is to set a reserve price at c / (1 - \alpha) for each item, but it is not the optimal solution on maximizing the profit of the intermediary. While previous studies (by Mirrokni and Gomes, and by Niazadeh et al) focused on revenue-sharing schemes in static double auctions, in this paper, we take advantage of the repeated nature of the auctions. In particular, we introduce dynamic revenue sharing schemes where we balance the two constraints over different auctions to achieve higher profit and seller revenue. This is directly motivated by the practice of advertising exchanges where the fixed-percentage revenue-share should be met across all auctions and not in each auction. In this paper, we characterize the optimal revenue sharing scheme that satisfies both constraints in expectation. Finally, we empirically evaluate our revenue sharing scheme on real data. Santiago R. Balseiro, Max Lin, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo |
NIPS | 2 |
| 2014 | Partner tiering in display advertisingabstractDisplay ads on the Internet are often sold by publishers to advertisers in bundles of thousands or millions of impressions over a particular time period. The ad delivery systems assign ads to pages on behalf of publishers to satisfy these contracts, and at the same time, try to maximize the overall quality of assignment. This is usually modeled in the literature as an online allocation problem, where contracts are represented by overall delivery constraints. Anand Bhalgat, Nitish Korula, Hennadiy Leontyev, Max Lin, Vahab S. Mirrokni |
WSDM | 4 |
| 2009 | An economical, precise and limited access In-Circuit Test method for pulse-width modulation (PWM) circuitsabstractA technology is introduced that tests PWM circuits using a newly-developed single high-impedance test sensor probe versus the traditional in-circuit test (ICT) methods. Test accuracy is achieved while on-board test points and fixture probes are significantly reduced. Albert Yeh, Jesse Chou, Max Lin |
ITC | 3 |