The 2015 SPSM (Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices) workshop is designed to bring together researchers focusing on smartphones. It is a single day workshop co-located with ACM CCS (Conference on Computer and Communications Security) 2015, designed to provide a venue for interested researchers and practitioners to get together and exchange ideas.

We consider the problem of malicious modification of digital objects. We present a protection mechanism designed to protect against unauthorized replacement or modification of digital objects while still allowing authorized updates transparently. We use digital signatures without requiring any centralized public key infrastructure. To explore the viability of our proposal, we apply the approach to file-system binaries, implementing a prototype in Linux which protects operating system and application binaries on disk. To test the prototype and related kernel modifications, we show that it protects against various rootkits currently available while incurring minimal overhead costs. The general approach can be used to restrict updates to general digital objects.

We address the problem of restricting root's ability to change arbitrary files on disk, in order to prevent abuse on most current desktop operating systems. The approach first involves recognizing and separating out the ability to configure a system from the ability to use the system to perform tasks. The permission to modify configuration of the system is then further subdivided in order to restrict applications from modifying the file-system objects of other applications. We explore the division of root's current ability to change arbitrary files on disk and discuss a prototype that proves out the viability of the approach for designated system-wide file-system objects. Our architecture exposes a control point available for use to enforce policies that prevent one application from modifying another's file-system objects. In addition, we review in detail the permissions given to current installers, and alternative approaches for secure software installation.

Unrestricted information flows are a key security weakness of current web design. Cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, and other attacks typically require that information be sent or retrieved from arbitrary, often malicious, web servers. In this paper we propose Same Origin Mutual Approval (SOMA), a new policy for controlling information flows that prevents common web vulnerabilities. By requiring site operators to specify approved external domains for sending or receiving information, and by requiring those external domains to also approve interactions, we prevent page content from being retrieved from malicious servers and sensitive information from being communicated to an attacker. SOMA is compatible with current web applications and is incrementally deployable, providing immediate benefits for clients and servers that implement it. SOMA has an overhead of one additional HTTP request per domain accessed and can be implemented with minimal effort by application and web browser developers. To evaluate our proposal, we have developed a Firefox SOMA add-on.

We argue that application developers, while often viewed as allies in the effort to create software with fewer security vulnerabilities, are not reliable allies. They have varying skill sets which often do not include security. Moreover, we argue that it is inefficient and unrealistic to expect to be able to successfully teach all of the world's population of software developers to be security experts. We suggest more efficient and effective alternatives, focusing on those developers who produce core functionality used by other developers (e.g. those who develop popular APIs -- Application Programming Interfaces). We discuss the benefits of designing APIs which can be easily used in a secure fashion to encourage security. We also introduce two straw-man proposals which integrate security into the work- ow of an application developer. Data tagging and unsuppressible warnings provide the basis for further work where the most natural use (path of least resistance) results in secure code. We believe there are benefits to co-opting developers into programming securely.

Self-checking software tamper resistance mechanisms employing checksums, including advanced systems as recently proposed by Chang and Atallah (2002) and Horne et al. (2002) have been promoted as an alternative to other software integrity verification techniques. Appealing aspects include the promise of being able to verify the integrity of software independent of the external support environment, as well as the ability to automatically integrate checksumming code during program compilation or linking. In this paper we show that the rich functionality of many modern processors, including UltraSparc and x86-compatible processors, facilitates automated attacks which defeat such checksumming by self-checking programs.

Self-hashing has been proposed as a technique for verifying software integrity. Appealing aspects of this approach to software tamper resistance include the promise of being able to verify the integrity of software independent of the external support environment, as well as the ability to integrate code protection mechanisms automatically. In this paper, we show that the rich functionality of most modern general-purpose processors (including UltraSparc, x86, PowerPC, AMD64, Alpha, and ARM) facilitate an automated, generic attack which defeats such self-hashing. We present a general description of the attack strategy and multiple attack implementations that exploit different processor features. Each of these implementations is generic in that it can defeat self-hashing employed by any user-space program on a single platform. Together, these implementations defeat self-hashing on most modern general-purpose processors. The generality and efficiency of our attack suggests that self-hashing is not a viable strategy for high-security tamper resistance on modern computer systems.