In many tasks, human behavior is far noisier than is optimal. Yet when asked to behave randomly, people are typically too predictable. We argue that these apparently contrasting observations have the same origin: the operation of a general-purpose local sampling algorithm for probabilistic inference. This account makes distinctive predictions regarding random sequence generation, not predicted by previous accounts-which suggests that randomness is produced by inhibition of habitual behavior, striving for unpredictability. We verify these predictions in two experiments: people show the same deviations from randomness when randomly generating from non-uniform or recently-learned distributions. In addition, our data show a novel signature behavior, that people's sequences have too few changes of trajectory, which argues against the specific local sampling algorithms that have been proposed in past work with other tasks. Using computational modeling, we show that local sampling where direction is maintained across trials best explains our data, which suggests it may be used in other tasks too. While local sampling has previously explained why people are unpredictable in standard cognitive tasks, here it also explains why human random sequences are not unpredictable enough.

Human cognition is fundamentally noisy. While routinely regarded as a nuisance in experimental investigation, the few studies investigating properties of cognitive noise have found surprising structure. A first line of research has shown that inter-response-time distributions are heavy-tailed. That is, response times between subsequent trials usually change only a small amount, but with occasional large changes. A second, separate, line of research has found that participants' estimates and response times both exhibit long-range autocorrelations (i.e., 1/f noise). Thus, each judgment and response time not only depends on its immediate predecessor but also on many previous responses. These two lines of research use different tasks and have distinct theoretical explanations: models that account for heavy-tailed response times do not predict 1/f autocorrelations and vice versa. Here, we find that 1/f noise and heavy-tailed response distributions co-occur in both types of tasks. We also show that a statistical sampling algorithm, developed to deal with patchy environments, generates both heavy-tailed distributions and 1/f noise, suggesting that cognitive noise may be a functional adaptation to dealing with a complex world.

Both resources in the natural environment and concepts in a semantic space are distributed "patchily", with large gaps in between the patches. To describe people's internal and external foraging behavior, various random walk models have been proposed. In particular, internal foraging has been modeled as sampling: in order to gather relevant information for making a decision, people draw samples from a mental representation using random-walk algorithms such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). However, two common empirical observations argue against people using simple sampling algorithms such as MCMC for internal foraging. First, the distance between samples is often best described by a Levy flight distribution: the probability of the distance between two successive locations follows a power-law on the distances. Second, humans and other animals produce long-range, slowly decaying autocorrelations characterized as 1/f-like fluctuations, instead of the 1/f^2 fluctuations produced by random walks. We propose that mental sampling is not done by simple MCMC, but is instead adapted to multimodal representations and is implemented by Metropolis-coupled Markov chain Monte Carlo (MC3), one of the first algorithms developed for sampling from multimodal distributions. MC3 involves running multiple Markov chains in parallel but with target distributions of different temperatures, and it swaps the states of the chains whenever a better location is found. Heated chains more readily traverse valleys in the probability landscape to propose moves to far-away peaks, while the colder chains make the local steps that explore the current peak or patch. We show that MC3 generates distances between successive samples that follow a Levy flight distribution and produce 1/f-like autocorrelations, providing a single mechanistic account of these two puzzling empirical phenomena of internal foraging.

Many everyday estimation tasks have an inherently discrete nature, whether the task is counting objects (e.g., a number of paint buckets) or estimating discretized continuous variables (e.g., the number of paint buckets needed to paint a room). While Bayesian inference is often used for modeling estimates made along continuous scales, discrete numerical estimates have not received as much attention, despite their common everyday occurrence. Using two tasks, a numerosity task and an area estimation task, we invoke Bayesian decision theory to characterize how people learn discrete numerical distributions and make numerical estimates. Across three experiments with novel stimulus distributions we found that participants fell between two common decision functions for converting their uncertain representation into a response: drawing a sample from their posterior distribution and taking the maximum of their posterior distribution. While this was consistent with the decision function found in previous work using continuous estimation tasks, surprisingly the prior distributions learned by participants in our experiments were much more adaptive: When making continuous estimates, participants have required thousands of trials to learn bimodal priors, but in our tasks participants learned discrete bimodal and even discrete quadrimodal priors within a few hundred trials. This makes discrete numerical estimation tasks good testbeds for investigating how people learn and make estimates.

Existing models of categorization typically represent to-be-classified items as points in a multidimensional space. While from a mathematical point of view, an infinite number of basis sets can be used to represent points in this space, the choice of basis set is psychologically crucial. People generally choose the same basis dimensions, and have a strong preference to generalize along the axes of these dimensions, but not diagonally". What makes some choices of dimension special? We explore the idea that the dimensions used by people echo the natural variation in the environment. Specifically, we present a rational model that does not assume dimensions, but learns the same type of dimensional generalizations that people display. This bias is shaped by exposing the model to many categories with a structure hypothesized to be like those which children encounter. Our model can be viewed as a type of transformed Dirichlet process mixture model, where it is the learning of the base distribution of the Dirichlet process which allows dimensional generalization.The learning behaviour of our model captures the developmental shift from roughly "isotropic" for children to the axis-aligned generalization that adults show."

Many formal models of cognition implicitly use subjective probability distributions to capture the assumptions of human learners. Most applications of these models determine these distributions indirectly. We propose a method for directly determining the assumptions of human learners by sampling from subjective probability distributions. Using a correspondence between a model of human choice and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), we describe a method for sampling from the distributions over objects that people associate with different categories. In our task, subjects choose whether to accept or reject a proposed change to an object. The task is constructed so that these decisions follow an MCMC acceptance rule, defining a Markov chain for which the stationary distribution is the category distribution. We test this procedure for both artificial categories acquired in the laboratory, and natural categories acquired from experience.