Most implementations of sampling algorithms for continuous distributions use floating-point numbers, which introduce round-off errors and approximations. These errors can be difficult to analyze, and can cause security issues when used in algorithms for differential privacy. An alternative is to use exact sampling algorithms based on computable reals, which can lazily generate the digits of a continuous sample to arbitrary precision. However, these algorithms are intricate, and implementing and using them involves a combination of semantically challenging language features, such as probabilistic choice, higher-order functions, and dynamically-allocated mutable state. In this paper we present Continuous-Eris, a higher-order separation logic for verifying the correctness of exact sampling algorithms for computable distributions. To demonstrate Continuous-Eris, we verify the correctness of computable samplers for the uniform, Gaussian, and Laplace distributions, as well as a library for exact real arithmetic for working with generated samples. All of the results in this paper have been verified in the Rocq proof assistant.

Differential privacy is the standard method for privacy-preserving data analysis. The importance of having strong guarantees on the reliability of implementations of differentially private algorithms is widely recognized and has sparked fruitful research on formal methods. However, the design patterns and language features used in modern DP libraries as well as the classes of guarantees that the library designers wish to establish often fall outside of the scope of previous verification approaches. We introduce a program logic suitable for verifying differentially private implementations written in complex, general-purpose programming languages. Our logic has first-class support for reasoning about privacy budgets as a separation logic resource. The expressiveness of the logic and the target language allow our approach to handle common programming patterns used in the implementation of libraries for differential privacy, such as privacy filters and caching. While previous work has focused on developing guarantees for programs written in domain-specific languages or for privacy mechanisms in isolation, our logic can reason modularly about primitives, higher-order combinators, and interactive algorithms. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach by implementing a verified library of differential privacy mechanisms, including an online version of the Sparse Vector Technique, as well as a privacy filter inspired by the popular Python library OpenDP, which crucially relies on our ability to handle the combination of randomization, local state, and higher-order functions. We demonstrate that our specifications are general and reusable by instantiating them to verify clients of our library. All of our results have been foundationally verified in the Rocq Prover.

Traditionally, proof systems such as program logics come with two core theorems: soundness and completeness . The role of soundness is obvious: we want to be sure that arguments carried out inside the logic actually lead to correct conclusions. Completeness complements that by ensuring that the logic does not limit expressivity: in principle, any correct result can be obtained within the confines of the logic. This result typically has to be stated relative to the completeness of the assertion logic that is used to reason about pre- and postconditions. Over the past decade, the Iris framework has emerged as a widely used foundation for building separation logics. While Iris-based logics typically come with a soundness proof, none of them have had a proof of completeness. In this paper, we present the first approach for establishing completeness of Iris-based program logics, and we show the generality of our methodology by applying it to a range of different logics described in prior work, including partial and total concurrent separation logics for a higher-order ML-like language, two quantitative logics (for bounding execution time and probabilistic errors), and a relational logic for proving refinement. All our results have been mechanized in the Rocq prover.

We present Foxtrot, the first higher-order separation logic for proving contextual refinement of higher-order concurrent probabilistic programs with higher-order local state. From a high level, Foxtrot inherits various concurrency reasoning principles from standard concurrent separation logic, e.g. invariants and ghost resources, and supports advanced probabilistic reasoning principles for reasoning about complex probability distributions induced by concurrent threads, e.g. tape presampling and induction by error amplification. The integration of these strong reasoning principles is highly non-trivial due to the combination of probability and concurrency in the language and the complexity of the Foxtrot model; the soundness of the logic relies on a version of the axiom of choice within the Iris logic, which is not used in earlier work on Iris-based logics. We demonstrate the expressiveness of Foxtrot on a wide range of examples, including the adversarial von Neumann coin and the randombytes _ uniform function of the Sodium cryptography software library. All results have been mechanized in the Rocq proof assistant and the Iris separation logic framework.

Nondeterminism makes parallel programs challenging to write and reason about. To avoid these challenges, researchers have developed techniques for internally deterministic parallel programming, in which the steps of a parallel computation proceed in a deterministic way. Internal determinism is useful because it lets a programmer reason about a program as if it executed in a sequential order. However, no verification framework exists to exploit this property and simplify formal reasoning about internally deterministic programs. To capture the essence of why internally deterministic programs should be easier to reason about, this paper defines a property called schedule-independent safety. A program satisfies schedule-independent safety, if, to show that the program is safe across all orderings, it suffices to show that one terminating execution of the program is safe. We then present a separation logic called Musketeer for proving that a program satisfies schedule-independent safety. Once a parallel program has been shown to satisfy schedule-independent safety, we can verify it with a new logic called Angelic, which allows one to dynamically select and verify just one sequential ordering of the program. Using Musketeer, we prove the soundness of MiniDet, an affine type system for enforcing internal determinism. MiniDet supports several core algorithmic primitives for internally deterministic programming that have been identified in the research literature, including a deterministic version of a concurrent hash set. Because any syntactically well-typed MiniDet program satisfies schedule-independent safety, we can apply Angelic to verify such programs. All results in this paper have been verified in Rocq using the Iris separation logic framework.

We present Parcas, a concurrent separation logic for verifying the parallel time complexity of fork-join programs. In order to abstract from the specifics of the machine, time complexity for parallel programs is given in terms of two metrics: the work, measuring the total number of operations, and the span, measuring the longest chain of sequential dependencies. Together, these two metrics determine the running time on any number of processors. For proving bounds on the work and span, Parcas is equipped with work credits and span credits, logical devices that represent permissions to incur costs. Work credits are a straightforward adaptation of time credits, a standard tool for bounding time complexity of sequential programs, and can be split additively between parallel tasks. Span credits, however, require a fundamentally different treatment. Indeed, the span of the parallel composition of two tasks is the maximum of the span of the two tasks. To account for this, we propose a rule for duplicating span credits at fork points, with each copy tagged by a logical task identifier that restricts which task may spend them. A transfer rule allows unused span credits to be forwarded across sequential compositions to subsequent tasks. The logic is expressive enough to give modular, higher-order specifications for common parallel primitives such as a parallel for loop and a tabulate function. We demonstrate Parcas on several case studies, including parallel prefix sums, parallel merge sort, and a variant of Treiber's lock-free stack that mixes concurrency with parallelism. All the presented results are mechanized in the Rocq prover using the Iris separation logic framework.

Although randomization has long been used in distributed computing, formal methods for reasoning aboutprobabilistic concurrent programs have lagged behind. No existing program logics can express specificationsabout the full distributions of outcomes resulting from programs that are both probabilistic and concurrent. To address this, we introduce Probabilistic Concurrent Outcome Logic ( pcOL ), which incorporates ideas fromconcurrent and probabilistic separation logics into Outcome Logic to introduce new compositional reasoningprinciples. At its core, pcOL reinterprets the rules of Concurrent Separation Logic in a setting where separationmodels probabilistic independence, so as to compositionally describe joint distributions over variables inconcurrent threads. Reasoning about outcomes also proves crucial, as case analysis is often necessary to deriveprecise information about threads that rely on randomized shared state. We demonstrate pcOL on a variety ofexamples, including to prove almost sure termination of unbounded loops.

Authenticated data structures allow untrusted third parties to carry out operations which produce proofs that can be used to verify an operation's output. Such data structures are challenging to develop and implement correctly. This paper gives a formal proof of security and correctness for a library that generates authenticated versions of data structures automatically. The proof is based on a new relational separation logic for reasoning about programs that use collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions. This logic provides a basis for constructing two semantic models of a type system, which are used to justify how the library makes use of type abstraction to enforce security and correctness. Using these models, we also prove the correctness of several optimizations to the library and then show how optimized, hand-written implementations of authenticated data structures can be soundly linked with automatically generated code. All of the results in this paper have been mechanized in the Rocq prover using the Iris framework.

Parser programs are becoming increasingly complex to accommodate intricate network packet formats and advanced protocols. Existing parser compilers incorporate predefined program rewrite rules to output the low-level parser implementation. Yet, these rules are often brittle and sensitive to how the input parser program is written. As a result, generated implementations could consume more hardware resources than necessary. In some cases, these compilers unnecessarily reject valid parser programs that could have fit within the target device parser's resource constraints.

Properties such as provable security and correctness for randomized programs are naturally expressed relationally as approximate equivalences. As a result, a number of relational program logics have been developed to reason about such approximate equivalences of probabilistic programs. However, existing approximate relational logics are mostly restricted to first-order programs without general state. In this paper we develop Approxis, a higher-order approximate relational separation logic for reasoning about approximate equivalence of programs written in an expressive ML-like language with discrete probabilistic sampling, higher-order functions, and higher-order state. The Approxis logic recasts the concept of error credits in the relational setting to reason about relational approximation, which allows for expressive notions of modularity and composition, a range of new approximate relational rules, and an internalization of a standard limiting argument for showing exact probabilistic equivalences by approximation. We also use Approxis to develop a logical relation model that quantifies over error credits, which can be used to prove exact contextual equivalence . We demonstrate the flexibility of our approach on a range of examples, including the PRP/PRF switching lemma, IND$-CPA security of an encryption scheme, and a collection of rejection samplers. All of the results have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant and the Iris separation logic framework.

We present Coneris, the first higher-order concurrent separation logic for reasoning about error probability bounds of higher-order concurrent probabilistic programs with higher-order state. To support modular reasoning about concurrent (non-probabilistic) program modules, state-of-the-art program logics internalize the classic notion of linearizability within the logic through the concept of logical atomicity . In Coneris, we extend this idea to probabilistic concurrent program modules by capturing a novel notion of randomized logical atomicity within the logic. To do so, Coneris utilizes presampling tapes and a novel probabilistic update modality to describe how state is changed probabilistically at linearization points. We demonstrate this approach by means of smaller synthetic examples and larger case studies. All of the presented results, including the meta-theory, have been mechanized in the Rocq prover and the Iris separation logic framework.

Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, but implementing it correctly has proven challenging. Prior work has focused on verifying DP at a high level, assuming either that the foundations are correct or that a perfect source of random noise is available. However, the underlying theory of differential privacy can be very complex and subtle. Flaws in basic mechanisms and random number generation have been a critical source of vulnerabilities in real-world DP systems. In this paper, we present SampCert, the first comprehensive, mechanized foundation for executable implementations of differential privacy. SampCert is written in Lean with over 12,000 lines of proof. It offers a generic and extensible notion of DP, a framework for constructing and composing DP mechanisms, and formally verified implementations of Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms. SampCert provides (1) a mechanized foundation for developing the next generation of differentially private algorithms, and (2) mechanically verified primitives that can be deployed in production systems. Indeed, SampCert’s verified algorithms power the DP offerings of Amazon Web Services, demonstrating its real-world impact. SampCert’s key innovations include: (1) A generic DP foundation that can be instantiated for various DP definitions (e.g., pure, concentrated, Rényi DP); (2) formally verified discrete Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms that avoid the pitfalls of floating-point implementations; and (3) a simple probability monad and novel proof techniques that streamline the formalization. To enable proving complex correctness properties of DP and random number generation, SampCert makes heavy use of Lean’s extensive Mathlib library, leveraging theorems in Fourier analysis, measure and probability theory, number theory, and topology.

Programs increasingly rely on randomization in applications such as cryptography and machine learning. Analyzing randomized programs has been a fruitful research direction, but there is a gap when programs also exploit nondeterminism(for concurrency, efficiency, or algorithmic design). In this paper, we introduce Demonic Outcome Logic for reasoning about programs that exploit both randomization and nondeterminism. The logic includes several novel features, such as reasoning about multiple executions in tandem and manipulating pre- and postconditions using familiar equational laws—including the distributive law of probabilistic choices over nondeterministic ones. We also give rules for loops that both establish termination and quantify the distribution of final outcomes from a single premise. We illustrate the reasoning capabilities of Demonic Outcome Logic through several case studies, including the Monty Hall problem, an adversarial protocol for simulating fair coins, and a heuristic based probabilistic SAT solver.

Parfait is a framework for proving that an implementation of a hardware security module (HSM) leaks nothing more than what is mandated by an application specification. Parfait proofs cover the software and the hardware of an HSM, which catches bugs above the cycle-level digital circuit abstraction, including timing side channels. Parfait's contribution is a scalable approach to proving security and non-leakage by using intermediate levels of abstraction and relating them with transitive information-preserving refinement. This enables Parfait to use different techniques to verify the implementation at different levels of abstraction, reuse existing verified components such as CompCert, and automate parts of the proof, while still providing end-to-end guarantees. We use Parfait to verify four HSMs, including an ECDSA certificate-signing HSM and a password-hashing HSM, on top of the OpenTitan Ibex and PicoRV32 processors. Parfait provides strong guarantees for these HSMs: for instance, it proves that the ECDSA-on-Ibex HSM implementation---2,300 lines of code and 13,500 lines of Verilog---leaks nothing more than what is allowed by a 40-line specification of its behavior.

Probabilistic programs often trade accuracy for efficiency, and thus may, with a small probability, return an incorrect result. It is important to obtain precise bounds for the probability of these errors, but existing verification approaches have limitations that lead to error probability bounds that are excessively coarse, or only apply to first-order programs. In this paper we present Eris, a higher-order separation logic for proving error probability bounds for probabilistic programs written in an expressive higher-order language. Our key novelty is the introduction of error credits , a separation logic resource that tracks an upper bound on the probability that a program returns an erroneous result. By representing error bounds as a resource, we recover the benefits of separation logic, including compositionality, modularity, and dependency between errors and program terms, allowing for more precise specifications. Moreover, we enable novel reasoning principles such as expectation-preserving error composition, amortized error reasoning, and error induction. We illustrate the advantages of our approach by proving amortized error bounds on a range of examples, including collision probabilities in hash functions, which allow us to write more modular specifications for data structures that use them as clients. We also use our logic to prove correctness and almost-sure termination of rejection sampling algorithms. All of our results have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant using the Iris separation logic framework and the Coquelicot real analysis library.

Almost-sure termination is an important correctness property for probabilistic programs, and a number of program logics have been developed for establishing it. However, these logics have mostly been developed for first-order programs written in languages with specific syntactic patterns for looping. In this paper, we consider almost-sure termination for higher-order probabilistic programs with general references. This combination of features allows for recursion and looping to be encoded through a variety of patterns. Therefore, rather than developing proof rules for reasoning about particular recursion patterns, we instead propose an approach based on proving refinement between a higher-order program and a simpler probabilistic model, in such a way that the refinement preserves termination behavior. By proving a refinement, almost-sure termination behavior of the program can then be established by analyzing the simpler model. We present this approach in the form of Caliper , a higher-order separation logic for proving terminationpreserving refinements. Caliper uses probabilistic couplings to carry out relational reasoning between a program and a model. To handle the range of recursion patterns found in higher-order programs, Caliper uses guarded recursion, in particular the principle of Löb induction. A technical novelty is that Caliper does not require the use of transfinite step indexing or other technical restrictions found in prior work on guarded recursion for termination-preservation refinement. We demonstrate the flexibility of this approach by proving almost-sure termination of several examples, including first-order loop constructs, a random list generator, treaps, and a sampler for Galton-Watson trees that uses higher-order store. All the results have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant.

Probabilistic couplings are the foundation for many probabilistic relational program logics and arise when relating random sampling statements across two programs. In relational program logics, this manifests as dedicated coupling rules that, e.g ., say we may reason as if two sampling statements return the same value. However, this approach fundamentally requires aligning or “synchronizing” the sampling statements of the two programs which is not always possible. In this paper, we develop Clutch, a higher-order probabilistic relational separation logic that addresses this issue by supporting asynchronous probabilistic couplings. We use Clutch to develop a logical step-indexed logical relation to reason about contextual refinement and equivalence of higher-order programs written in a rich language with a probabilistic choice operator, higher-order local state, and impredicative polymorphism. Finally, we demonstrate our approach on a number of case studies. All the results that appear in the paper have been formalized in the Coq proof assistant using the Coquelicot library and the Iris separation logic framework.

We present Tachis, a higher-order separation logic to reason about the expected cost of probabilistic programs. Inspired by the uses of time credits for reasoning about the running time of deterministic programs, we introduce a novel notion of probabilistic cost credit. Probabilistic cost credits are a separation logic resource that can be used to pay for the cost of operations in programs, and that can be distributed across all possible branches of sampling instructions according to their weight, thus enabling us to reason about expected cost. The representation of cost credits as separation logic resources gives Tachis a great deal of flexibility and expressivity. In particular, it permits reasoning about amortized expected cost by storing excess credits as potential into data structures to pay for future operations. Tachis further supports a range of cost models, including running time and entropy usage. We showcase the versatility of this approach by applying our techniques to prove upper bounds on the expected cost of a variety of probabilistic algorithms and data structures, including randomized quicksort, hash tables, and meldable heaps. All of our results have been mechanized using Coq, Iris, and the Coquelicot real analysis library.

Grove is a concurrent separation logic library for verifying distributed systems. Grove is the first to handle time-based leases, including their interaction with reconfiguration, crash recovery, thread-level concurrency, and unreliable networks. This paper uses Grove to verify several distributed system components written in Go, including vKV, a realistic distributed multi-threaded key-value store. vKV supports reconfiguration, primary/backup replication, and crash recovery, and uses leases to execute read-only requests on any replica. vKV achieves high performance (67--73% of Redis on a single core), scales with more cores and more backup replicas (achieving about 2× the throughput when going from 1 to 3 servers), and can safely execute reads while reconfiguring.

This paper presents ProbCompCert, a compiler for a subset of the Stan probabilistic programming language (PPL), in which several key compiler passes have been formally verified using the Coq proof assistant. Because of the probabilistic nature of PPLs, bugs in their compilers can be difficult to detect and fix, making verification an interesting possibility. However, proving correctness of PPL compilation requires new techniques because certain transformations performed by compilers for PPLs are quite different from other kinds of languages. This paper describes techniques for verifying such transformations and their application in ProbCompCert. In the course of verifying ProbCompCert, we found an error in the Stan language reference manual related to the semantics and implementation of a key language construct.

Formal reasoning about hashing-based probabilistic data structures often requires reasoning about random variables where when one variable gets larger (such as the number of elements hashed into one bucket), the others tend to be smaller (like the number of elements hashed into the other buckets). This is an example of negative dependence , a generalization of probabilistic independence that has recently found interesting applications in algorithm design and machine learning. Despite the usefulness of negative dependence for the analyses of probabilistic data structures, existing verification methods cannot establish this property for randomized programs. To fill this gap, we design LINA, a probabilistic separation logic for reasoning about negative dependence. Following recent works on probabilistic separation logic using separating conjunction to reason about the probabilistic independence of random variables, we use separating conjunction to reason about negative dependence. Our assertion logic features two separating conjunctions, one for independence and one for negative dependence. We generalize the logic of bunched implications (BI) to support multiple separating conjunctions, and provide a sound and complete proof system. Notably, the semantics for separating conjunction relies on a non-deterministic , rather than partial, operation for combining resources. By drawing on closure properties for negative dependence, our program logic supports a Frame-like rule for negative dependence and monotone operations. We demonstrate how LINA can verify probabilistic properties of hash-based data structures and balls-into-bins processes.

In the past two decades, step-indexed logical relations and separation logics have both come to play a major role in semantics and verification research. More recently, they have been married together in the form of step-indexed separation logics like VST, iCAP, and Iris, which provide powerful tools for (among other things) building semantic models of richly typed languages like Rust. In these logics, propositions are given semantics using a step-indexed model, and step-indexed reasoning is reflected into the logic through the so-called “later” modality. On the one hand, this modality provides an elegant, high-level account of step-indexed reasoning; on the other hand, when used in sufficiently sophisticated ways, it can become a nuisance, turning perfectly natural proof strategies into dead ends. In this work, we introduce later credits , a new technique for escaping later-modality quagmires. By leveraging the second ancestor of these logics—separation logic—later credits turn “the right to eliminate a later” into an ownable resource, which is subject to all the traditional modular reasoning principles of separation logic. We develop the theory of later credits in the context of Iris, and present several challenging examples of proofs and proof patterns which were previously not possible in Iris but are now possible due to later credits.

We present a formal proof in Lean of probably approximately correct (PAC) learnability of the concept class of decision stumps. This classic result in machine learning theory derives a bound on error probabilities for a simple type of classifier. Though such a proof appears simple on paper, analytic and measure-theoretic subtleties arise when carrying it out fully formally. Our proof is structured so as to separate reasoning about deterministic properties of a learning function from proofs of measurability and analysis of probabilities.

Step-indexed separation logic has proven to be a powerful tool for modular reasoning about higher-order stateful programs. However, it has only been used to reason about safety properties, never liveness properties. In this paper, we observe that the inability of step-indexed separation logic to support liveness properties stems fundamentally from its failure to validate the existential property, connecting the meaning of existential quantification inside and outside the logic. We show how to validate the existential property—and thus enable liveness reasoning—by moving from finite step-indices (natural numbers) to transfinite step-indices (ordinals). Concretely, we transform the Coq-based step-indexed logic Iris to Transfinite Iris, and demonstrate its effectiveness in proving termination and termination-preserving refinement for higher-order stateful programs.

We introduce Rabia, a simple and high performance framework for implementing state-machine replication (SMR) within a datacenter. The main innovation of Rabia is in using randomization to simplify the design. Rabia provides the following two features: (i) It does not need any fail-over protocol and supports trivial auxiliary protocols like log compaction, snapshotting, and reconfiguration, components that are often considered the most challenging when developing SMR systems; and (ii) It provides high performance, up to 1.5x higher throughput than the closest competitor (i.e., EPaxos) in a favorable setup (same availability zone with three replicas) and is comparable with a larger number of replicas or when deployed in multiple availability zones.

Recent work has explored transforming data sets into smaller, approximate summaries in order to scale Bayesian inference. We examine a related problem in which the parameters of a Bayesian model are very large and expensive to store in memory, and propose more compact representations of parameter values that can be used during inference. We focus on a class of graphical models that we refer to as latent Dirichlet-Categorical models, and show how a combination of two sketching algorithms known as count-min sketch and approximate counters provide an efficient representation for them. We show that this sketch combination – which, despite having been used before in NLP applications, has not been previously analyzed – enjoys desirable properties. We prove that for this class of models, when the sketches are used during Markov Chain Monte Carlo inference, the equilibrium of sketched MCMC converges to that of the exact chain as sketch parameters are tuned to reduce the error rate.

Storage systems make persistence guarantees even if the system crashes at any time, which they achieve using recovery procedures that run after a crash. We present Argosy, a framework for machine-checked proofs of storage systems that supports layered recovery implementations with modular proofs. Reasoning about layered recovery procedures is especially challenging because the system can crash in the middle of a more abstract layer’s recovery procedure and must start over with the lowest-level recovery procedure.

This paper introduces Perennial, a framework for verifying concurrent, crash-safe systems. Perennial extends the Iris concurrency framework with three techniques to enable crash-safety reasoning: recovery leases, recovery helping, and versioned memory. To ease development and deployment of applications, Perennial provides Goose, a subset of Go and a translator from that subset to a model in Perennial with support for reasoning about Go threads, data structures, and file-system primitives. We implemented and verified a crash-safe, concurrent mail server using Perennial and Goose that achieves speedup on multiple cores. Both Perennial and Iris use the Coq proof assistant, and the mail server and the framework's proofs are machine checked.

We present Polaris, a concurrent separation logic with support for probabilistic reasoning. As part of our logic, we extend the idea of coupling, which underlies recent work on probabilistic relational logics, to the setting of programs with both probabilistic and non-deterministic choice. To demonstrate Polaris, we verify a variant of a randomized concurrent counter algorithm and a two-level concurrent skip list. All of our results have been mechanized in Coq.

A number of tools have been developed for carrying out separation-logic proofs mechanically using an interactive proof assistant. One of the most advanced such tools is the Iris Proof Mode (IPM) for Coq, which offers a rich set of tactics for making separation-logic proofs look and feel like ordinary Coq proofs. However, IPM is tied to a particular separation logic (namely, Iris), thus limiting its applicability. In this paper, we propose MoSeL, a general and extensible Coq framework that brings the benefits of IPM to a much larger class of separation logics. Unlike IPM, MoSeL is applicable to both affine and linear separation logics (and combinations thereof), and provides generic tactics that can be easily extended to account for the bespoke connectives of the logics with which it is instantiated. To demonstrate the effectiveness of MoSeL, we have instantiated it to provide effective tactical support for interactive and semi-automated proofs in six very different separation logics.

We introduce Mean-for-Mode estimation, a variant of an uncollapsed Gibbs sampler that we use to train LDA on a GPU. The algorithm combines benefits of both uncollapsed and collapsed Gibbs samplers. Like a collapsed Gibbs sampler — and unlike an uncollapsed Gibbs sampler — it has good statistical performance, and can use sampling complexity reduction techniques such as sparsity. Meanwhile, like an uncollapsed Gibbs sampler — and unlike a collapsed Gibbs sampler — it is embarrassingly parallel, and can use approximate counters.

Read-Copy-Update (RCU) is a technique for letting multiple readers safely access a data structure while a writer concurrently modifies it. It is used heavily in the Linux kernel in situations where fast reads are important and writes are infrequent. Optimized implementations rely only on the weaker memory orderings provided by modern hardware, avoiding the need for expensive synchronization instructions (such as memory barriers) as much as possible. Using GPS, a recently developed program logic for the C/C++11 memory model, we verify an implementation of RCU for a singly-linked list assuming "release-acquire" semantics. Although release-acquire synchronization is stronger than what is required by real RCU implementations, it is nonetheless significantly weaker than the assumption of sequential consistency made in prior work on RCU verification. Ours is the first formal proof of correctness for an implementation of RCU under a weak memory model.

Software-based fault isolation (SFI), as used in Google's Native Client (NaCl), relies upon a conceptually simple machine-code analysis to enforce a security policy. But for complicated architectures such as the x86, it is all too easy to get the details of the analysis wrong. We have built a new checker that is smaller, faster, and has a much reduced trusted computing base when compared to Google's original analysis. The key to our approach is automatically generating the bulk of the analysis from a declarative description which we relate to a formal model of a subset of the x86 instruction set architecture. The x86 model, developed in Coq, is of independent interest and should be usable for a wide range of machine-level verification tasks.