Searchable encryption allows users to perform search operations on encrypted data before decrypting it first. Secret sharing is one of the most important cryptographic primitives used to design an information theoretic scheme. Nowadays cryptosys-tem designers are providing a facility to adjust the security parameters in real time to circumvent AI-enabled cyber security threats. For long term security of data which is used by various applications, proactive secret sharing allows the shares of the original secret to be dynamically adjusted during a specific interval of time. In proactive secret sharing, the updation of shares at regular intervals of time is done by the servers (participants) and not by the dealer. In this paper, we propose a novel proactive secret sharing scheme where the shares stored at servers are updated using preshared pairwise keys between servers at regular intervals of time. The direct search of words over sentences using the conjunctive search function without the generation of any index is possible using the underlying querying method.

Subterranean 2.0, a NIST second round lightweight cryptographic primitive, was introduced by Daemen et al. in 2020. It has three modes of operation: Subterranean-SAE, Subterranean-deck, and Subterranean-XOF. So far, most of the existing practical-time implementable attacks on Subterranean-SAE fall under the nonce misuse setting scenario. In this paper, we present significantly improved Differential Fault Analysis on Subterranean-SAE and Subterranean-deck. We consider a more challenging framework of unknown fault injection round, and achieve improved execution time as well as data complexity over the best known fault attack available in the literature. We utilize deep neural networks and also correlation coefficient for generation of signatures and matching them. Two general frameworks are proposed for fault location identification assuming that fault injection round is unknown. Finally, we use aSATsolver to efficiently recover the embedded encryption key with no more than 5 distinct faults. Experimental results reveal that the total time (online phase) required to mount the attack on Subterranean-SAE (Subterranean-deck) is 1234.6 (1334.6) seconds.

The aim of the paper is to obtain a DNA secret sharing scheme for general access structure that plays an important role in cryptography. Our scheme involves two very simple DNA computing techniques known as mixing and DNA sequencing. The simplicity of these two techniques and the compact nature of DNA make the system easy to implement. Moreover the scheme is perfectly secure and it has a very low error rate.