Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Martin Süßkraut
dblp:07/4888
· DBLP profile ↗
11ranked-venue papers
3as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 7 · 2 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 6 · 2 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 50% Systems and software security · 50% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection › attack detection
code injection attack detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Switchblade: enforcing dynamic personalized system call models · EuroSys 2008 |
Systems and software security
exploitation |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Switchblade: enforcing dynamic personalized system call models · EuroSys 2008 |
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Switchblade: enforcing dynamic personalized system call models · EuroSys 2008 |
Systems and software security › operating system security
system call interposition |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Switchblade: enforcing dynamic personalized system call models · EuroSys 2008 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
taint analysis · 0.1randomized system call models · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Reliable Control for Robotics - Hardware Resilience Powered by SoftwareabstractIndustry 4.0 is now much more than just a buzzword. However, with the advancement of automation through digitization and softwarization of dedicated hardware, applications are also becoming more susceptible to random hardware errors in the calculation. This cyber-physical demonstrator uses a robotic application to show the effects that even single bit flips can have in the real world due to hardware errors. Using the graphical user interface including the human machine interface, the audience can generate hardware errors in the form of bit flips and see their effects live on the robot. In this paper we will be showing a new technology, the SIListra Safety Transformer (SST), that makes it possible to detect those kind of random hardware errors, which can subsequently make safety-critical applications more reliable. Alexander Kropp, Mario Schwalbe, Ievgenii Tsokalo, Martin Süßkraut, Robert-Steve Schmoll, Frank H. P. Fitzek |
CCNC | 4 |
| 2011 | Boundless memory allocations for memory safety and high availabilityabstractSpatial memory errors (like buffer overflows) are still a major threat for applications written in C. Most recent work focuses on memory safety - when a memory error is detected at runtime, the application is aborted. Our goal is not only to increase the memory safety of applications but also to increase the application's availability. Therefore, we need to tolerate spatial memory errors at runtime. We have implemented a compiler extension, Boundless, that automatically adds the tolerance feature to C applications at compile time. We show that this can increase the availability of applications. Our measurements also indicate that Boundless has a lower performance overhead than SoftBound, a state-of-the-art approach to detect spatial memory errors. Our performance gains result from a novel way to represent pointers. Nevertheless, Boundless is compatible with existing C code. Additionally, Boundless provides a trade-off to reduce the runtime overhead even further: We introduce vulnerability specific patching for spatial memory errors to tolerate only known vulnerabilities. Vulnerability specific patching has an even lower runtime overhead than full tolerance. Marc Brünink, Martin Süßkraut, Christof Fetzer |
DSN | 2 |
| 2011 | Aaron: An adaptable execution environmentabstractSoftware bugs and hardware errors are the largest contributors to downtime, and can be permanent (e.g. deterministic memory violations, broken memory modules) or transient (e.g. race conditions, bitflips). Although a large variety of dependability mechanisms exist, only few are used in practice. The existing techniques do not prevail for several reasons: (1) the introduced performance overhead is often not negligible, (2) the gained coverage is not sufficient, and (3) users cannot control and adapt the mechanism. Aaron tackles these challenges by detecting hardware and software errors using automatically diversified software components. It uses these software variants only if CPU spare cycles are present in the system. In this way, Aaron increases fault coverage without incurring a perceivable performance penalty. Our evaluation shows that Aaron provides the same throughput as an execution of the original application while checking a large percentage of requests - whenever load permits. Marc Brünink, André Schmitt, Thomas Knauth, Martin Süßkraut, Ute Schiffel, Stephan Creutz, Christof Fetzer |
DSN | 4 |
| 2010 | Prospect: a compiler framework for speculative parallelizationabstractMaking efficient use of modern multi-core and future many-core CPUs is a major challenge. We describe a new compiler-based platform, Prospect, that supports the parallelization of sequential applications. The underlying approach is a generalization of an existing approach to parallelize runtime checks. The basic idea is to generate two variants of the application: (1) a fast variant having bare bone functionality, and (2) a slow variant with extra functionality. The fast variant is executed sequentially. Its execution is divided into epochs. Martin Süßkraut, Thomas Knauth, Stefan Weigert, Ute Schiffel, Martin Meinhold, Christof Fetzer |
CGO | 1 |
| 2010 | ANB- and ANBDmem-Encoding: Detecting Hardware Errors in Software
Ute Schiffel, André Schmitt, Martin Süßkraut, Christof Fetzer |
SAFECOMP | 3 |
| 2009 | AN-Encoding Compiler: Building Safety-Critical Systems with Commodity Hardware
Christof Fetzer, Ute Schiffel, Martin Süßkraut |
SAFECOMP | 3 |
| 2009 | Speculation for Parallelizing Runtime Checks
Martin Süßkraut, Stefan Weigert, Ute Schiffel, Thomas Knauth, Martin Nowack, Diogo Becker de Brum, Christof Fetzer |
SSS | 1 |
| 2008 | Switchblade: enforcing dynamic personalized system call modelsabstractSystem call interposition is a common approach to restrict the power of applications and to detect code injections. It enforces a model that describes what system calls and/or what sequences thereof are permitted. However, there exist various issues like concurrency vulnerabilities and incomplete models that restrict the power of system call interposition approaches. We present a new system, SwitchBlade, that uses randomized and personalized fine-grained system call models to increase the probability of detecting code injections. However, using a fine-grain system call model, we cannot exclude the possibility that the model is violated during normal program executions. To cope with false positives, SwitchBlade uses on-demand taint analysis to update a system call model during runtime. Christof Fetzer, Martin Süßkraut |
EuroSys | 2 |
| 2007 | Robustness and Security Hardening of COTS Software LibrariesabstractCOTS components, like software libraries, can be used to reduce the development effort. Unfortunately, many COTS components have been developed without a focus on robust- ness and security. We propose a novel approach to harden software libraries to improve their robustness and security. Our approach is automated, general and extensible and consists of the following stages. First, we use a static analysis to prepare and guide the following fault injection. In the dynamic analysis stage, fault injection experiments execute the library functions with both usual and extreme input values. The experiments are used to derive and verify one protection hypothesis per function (for instance, function foo fails if argument 1 is a NULL pointer). In the hardening stage, a protection wrapper is generated from these hypothesis to reject unrobust input values of library functions. We evaluate our approach by hardening a library used by Apache (a web server). Martin Süßkraut, Christof Fetzer |
DSN | 1 |
| 2006 | Leader Election in the Timed Finite Average Response Time ModelabstractLeader election is one of the fundamental problems in distributed systems. A leader is a correct process that can be used to coordinate the work of a set of processes. An algorithm has to implement two properties to solve the leader election problem: (1) safety, (2) liveness. In this work we show that the stabilization property is not necessary for the leader election problem. We do this by examine the ability to solve leader election in the FAR model. The FAR model does neither assume the existence of an upper bound on the communication or computation delays nor that the system stabilizes. Instead it assumes that the system is in a certain balance: computation is not infinitely fast, the communication subsystem has rudimentary congestion control and the average response time between two correct processes is finite. Our contribution is twofold: (1) we show that leader election is not solvable in the pure FAR model and (2) that it becomes solvable with local clocks with a bounded drift rate Christof Fetzer, Martin Süßkraut |
PRDC | 2 |
| 2005 | On the Possibility of Consensus in Asynchronous Systems with Finite Average Response TimesabstractIt has long been known that the consensus problem cannot be solved deterministically in completely asynchronous distributed systems, i.e., systems (1) without assumptions on communication delays and relative speed of processes and (2) without access to real-time clocks. In this paper, we define a new asynchronous system model. Instead of assuming reliable channels with finite transmission delays, stubborn channels with a finite average response time was assumed (if neither the sender nor the receiver crashes), and it is assumed that there exists some unknown physical bound on how fast an integer can be incremented. Note that there is no limit on how slow a program can be executed or how fast other statements can be executed. Also, there exists no upper or lower bound on the transmission delay of messages or the relative speed of processes. The are no additional assumptions about clocks, failure detectors, etc. that would aid in solving consensus either. It is shown that consensus can nevertheless be solved deterministically in this asynchronous system model Christof Fetzer, Ulrich Schmid 0001, Martin Süßkraut |
ICDCS | 3 |