Christoph Kern 0003

dblp:08/61-3 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Web and mobile security · 50% Systems and software security · 50%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security › web security
cross-site scripting
0.512021
If It's Not Secure, It Should Not Compile: Preventing DOM-Based XSS in Large-Scale Web Development with API Hardening · ICSE 2021
Systems and software security › secure software development
secure coding
0.512021
If It's Not Secure, It Should Not Compile: Preventing DOM-Based XSS in Large-Scale Web Development with API Hardening · ICSE 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

type contracts · 0.5compile-time checking · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 If It's Not Secure, It Should Not Compile: Preventing DOM-Based XSS in Large-Scale Web Development with API Hardening
abstract
With tons of efforts spent on its mitigation, Cross-site scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent security threats on the internet. Decades of exploitation and remediation demonstrated that code inspection and testing alone does not eliminate XSS vulnerabilities in complex web applications with a high degree of confidence. This paper introduces Google's secure-by-design engineering paradigm that effectively prevents DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities in large-scale web development. Our approach, named API hardening, enforces a series of company-wide secure coding practices. We provide a set of secure APIs to replace native DOM APIs that are prone to XSS vulnerabilities. Through a combination of type contracts and appropriate validation and escaping, the secure APIs ensure that applications based thereon are free of XSS vulnerabilities. We deploy a simple yet capable compile-time checker to guarantee that developers exclusively use our hardened APIs to interact with the DOM. We make various of efforts to scale this approach to tens of thousands of engineers without significant productivity impact. By offering rigorous tooling and consultant support, we help developers adopt the secure coding practices as seamlessly as possible. We present empirical results showing how API hardening has helped reduce the occurrences of XSS vulnerabilities in Google's enormous code base over the course of two-year deployment.
Julian Bangert, Christoph Kern 0003
ICSE3