Steganalysis can be characterized as detecting a weak noise signal (hidden information) in textured regions of naturally occurring images. These noise signals are typically not perceptible to human eyes, which renders steganalysis a challenging task. On the other hand, recent breakthroughs in deep learning have seen remarkable progress in many applications, ranging from object recognition and segmentation to image generations. While there were efforts to build deep learning networks to perform steganalysis, the proposed architectures exhibit some limitations and a high tendency to overfit. We propose a hybrid deep learning architecture, namely H-StegoNet, to perform spatial steganalysis in this work. Precisely, by combining two different neural networks inspired by handcrafted features and the U-Net, we design a robust architecture that outperforms the existing approaches. Moreover, the experiments we performed under more realistic assumptions, including encoding with the syndrome trellis codes and assuming no prior knowledge of the payload used, thereby defining a rigorous and standard operation procedure for evaluating any steganalysis algorithm.

In this paper, we propose new classes of trapdoor functions to solve the bounded distance decoding problem in lattices. Specifically, we construct lattices based on properties of polynomials for which the bounded distance decoding problem is hard to solve unless some trapdoor information is revealed. We thoroughly analyze the security of our proposed functions using state-of-the-art attacks and results on lattice reductions. Finally, we describe how our functions can be used to design quantum-safe encryption schemes with reasonable public key sizes. Our encryption schemes are efficient with respect to key generation, encryption and decryption.

Algebraic differential fault attack (ADFA) is an attack in which an attacker combines a differential fault attack and an algebraic technique to break a targeted cipher. In this paper, we present three attacks using three different algebraic techniques combined with a differential fault attack in the bit-flip fault model to break the SIMON block cipher. First, we introduce a new analytic method which is based on a differential trail between the correct and faulty ciphertexts. This method is able to recover the entire master key of any member of the SIMON family by injecting faults into a single round of the cipher. In our second attack, we present a simplified Grobner basis algorithm to solve the faulty system. We show that this method could totally break SIMON ciphers with only 3 to 5 faults injected. Our third attack combines a fault attack with a modern SAT solver. By guessing some key bits and with only a single fault injected at the round T - 6, where T is the number of rounds of a SIMON cipher, this combined attack could manage to recover a master key of the cipher. For the last two attacks, we perform experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks. These experiments are implemented on personal computers and run in very reasonable timing.

The ubiquitous deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) devices enhances connectivity and communication, and benefits almost every aspect of our lives from manufacturing to retail to smart homes. However, low levels of security protection in these devices due to their limited resources open opportunities for malicious users. An IoT forensics system collecting, processing, analyzing and reporting evidence of attack is required to mitigate the IoT security issues. Although such system has been studied over the past decade and solutions such as cloud-based IoT forensic were proposed, limitation still exist. In this paper, leveraging on the blockchain technology, we propose a per-missioned blockchain-based IoT forensics framework to enhance the integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation properties for the collected evidence. We formally define the system architecture, provide framework details, and propose a cryptographic-based approach to mitigate identity privacy concern.

In this paper, we point out some faulty instantiations of threshold ring signatures (TRS) based on the threshold proof-of-knowledge (TPoK) protocol. Although a TRS can be regarded as the non-interactive version of the TPoK, the computational domains of the variables should be carefully chosen. We show that by choosing some inappropriate domains, two such instantiations suffer from forgery and anonymity attacks. Our attacks rely on algebraic techniques which involve solving some particular instances of the well-known subset sum problem. While we focus our attacks on two particular instantiations of the TRS, they are generic and are applicable to other schemes with the same choice of domains or a similar structure. We believe this paper can act as an important security remark on the design of future TRS schemes.

ABSTRACT The Galois/Counter Mode of operations (GCM) is constructed by combining the counter mode encryption and the authentication component (i.e., GTAG) to provide both privacy and authenticity. GTAG can be used as a stand‐alone message authentication code. In this paper, we analyze the security of GTAG and GCM with respect to the forgery and distinguishing attacks. More precisely, We generalize the set of weak key classes proposed by Saarinen in FSE 2012 to include all subsets of nonzero keys. Hence, we remove the condition on the smoothness of 2n − 1, where n denotes the block size, for the existence of weak key classes. By considering powers of suitable field elements and linearized polynomials, we further exploit some specific weak key classes to present a universal forgery attack on GTAG. By invoking the birthday paradox arguments, we show that a chosen message attack can be used to distinguish GTAG from a random function. To relax the assumptions required in the universal forgery attack, we show that we can utilize the uniqueness of the counter mode encryption to launch a known ciphertext attack against GCM itself when the initial vector is restricted to 96 bits. The first three attacks can be applied to other Wegman–Carter polynomial message authentication codes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Message authentication codes (MACs) are widely used in communication networks for authentication purposes. In EUROCRYPT 2002, Black and Rogaway proposed a parallelizable MAC (PMAC), which is relatively efficient when a parallel environment is possible. This parallelism is achieved via constant multiplications in the underlying finite field. In order to yield a better solution, Rogaway refined PMAC in ASIACRYPT 2004 by using a powering-up construction to generate the constants. This is in contrast to the first design that uses successive words of the gray code to generate the constants. In this paper, we analyze how some unique characteristics of these constants result in weaknesses of the respective PMAC designs against forgery attacks in different ways. Thus, our analysis highlights some pitfalls that designers should be mindful of when designing schemes that exploit such constants.

In 1999, Mohammad Peyravian and Don Coppersmith from IBM proposed a structured symmetric key block cipher called CHAIN that supports variable block size, key size and number of rounds. In this paper, we initiate the study of CHAIN's security. More significantly, we show that CHAIN with various block sizes is insecure against impossible differential attack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known attack against CHAIN.

This paper proposes some simple propagation rules which give rise to new binary constant-weight codes.

In this correspondence, we present 129 new linear codes over F8and F9based on the construction by Xing and Niederreiter using algebraic function fields and places of small degrees. In addition, we construct some global function fields in which the number of rational places improves the lower bounds given by van der Geer and van der Vlugt.