VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Hannes Mehnert
dblp:09/9538
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2Security and privacy · 1Theory of computation · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Program verification · 43% Software testing · 29% Requirements engineering and software design · 29% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Transport protocols and congestion control · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Logic in computer science · 100% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Transport protocols and congestion control
transport protocols |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Engineering with Logic: Rigorous Test-Oracle Specification and Validation for TCP/IP and the Sockets API · J. ACM 2019 |
Requirements engineering and software design › specification
executable specification |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Engineering with Logic: Rigorous Test-Oracle Specification and Validation for TCP/IP and the Sockets API · J. ACM 2019 |
Program verification
proof assistants |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Engineering with Logic: Rigorous Test-Oracle Specification and Validation for TCP/IP and the Sockets API · J. ACM 2019 |
Software testing
test oracle |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Engineering with Logic: Rigorous Test-Oracle Specification and Validation for TCP/IP and the Sockets API · J. ACM 2019 |
Network security › secure communication › secure communication protocol
TLS |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Not-Quite-So-Broken TLS: Lessons in Re-Engineering a Security Protocol Specification and Implementation · USENIX Security Symposium 2015 |
Program verification › code-level verification
object-oriented verification |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Object Propositions · FM 2014 |
Logic in computer science
program logic |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Object Propositions · FM 2014 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
symbolic model checking · 0.8operational semantics · 0.8monadic relational programming · 0.8object propositions · 0.4formal specification · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Engineering with Logic: Rigorous Test-Oracle Specification and Validation for TCP/IP and the Sockets APIabstractConventional computer engineering relies on test-and-debug development processes, with the behavior of common interfaces described (at best) with prose specification documents. But prose specifications cannot be used in test-and-debug development in any automated way, and prose is a poor medium for expressing complex (and loose) specifications. The TCP/IP protocols and Sockets API are a good example of this: they play a vital role in modern communication and computation, and interoperability between implementations is essential. But what exactly they are is surprisingly obscure: their original development focused on “rough consensus and running code,” augmented by prose RFC specifications that do not precisely define what it means for an implementation to be correct. Ultimately, the actual standard is the de facto one of the common implementations, including, for example, the 15 000 to 20 000 lines of the BSD implementation—optimized and multithreaded C code, time dependent, with asynchronous event handlers, intertwined with the operating system, and security critical. This article reports on work done in the Netsem project to develop lightweight mathematically rigorous techniques that can be applied to such systems: to specify their behavior precisely (but loosely enough to permit the required implementation variation) and to test whether these specifications and the implementations correspond with specifications that are executable as test oracles . We developed post hoc specifications of TCP, UDP, and the Sockets API, both of the service that they provide to applications (in terms of TCP bidirectional stream connections) and of the internal operation of the protocol (in terms of TCP segments and UDP datagrams), together with a testable abstraction function relating the two. These specifications are rigorous, detailed, readable, with broad coverage, and rather accurate. Working within a general-purpose proof assistant (HOL4), we developed language idioms (within higher-order logic) in which to write the specifications: operational semantics with nondeterminism, time, system calls, monadic relational programming, and so forth. We followed an experimental semantics approach, validating the specifications against several thousand traces captured from three implementations (FreeBSD, Linux, and WinXP). Many differences between these were identified, as were a number of bugs. Validation was done using a special-purpose symbolic model checker programmed above HOL4. Having demonstrated that our logic-based engineering techniques suffice for handling real-world protocols, we argue that similar techniques could be applied to future critical software infrastructure at design time, leading to cleaner designs and (via specification-based testing) more robust and predictable implementations. In cases where specification looseness can be controlled, this should be possible with lightweight techniques, without the need for a general-purpose proof assistant, at relatively little cost. Steve Bishop, Matthew Fairbairn, Hannes Mehnert, Michael Norrish, Tom Ridge, Peter Sewell, Michael Smith 0008, Keith Wansbrough |
J. ACM | 3 |
| 2015 | Not-Quite-So-Broken TLS: Lessons in Re-Engineering a Security Protocol Specification and Implementation
David Kaloper-Mersinjak, Hannes Mehnert, Anil Madhavapeddy, Peter Sewell |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2014 | Object Propositions
Ligia Nistor, Jonathan Aldrich, Stephanie Balzer, Hannes Mehnert |
FM | 4 |
| 2012 | Encoding Featherweight Java with assignment and immutability using the Coq proof assistantabstractWe develop a mechanized proof of Featherweight Java with Assignment and Immutability in the Coq proof assistant. This is a step towards more machine-checked proofs of a non-trivial type system. We used object immutability close to that of IGJ [9]. We describe the challenges of the mechanisation and the encoding we used inside of Coq. Julian Mackay, Hannes Mehnert, Alex Potanin, Lindsay Groves, Nicholas Cameron 0001 |
FTfJP@ECOOP | 2 |