Jun Yajima

dblp:10/2983 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
10ranked-venue papers
4as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-5063-6937ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 8 · 3 first-author · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Taxonomy of Generative AI Applications for Risk Assessment
abstract
The superior functionality and versatility of generative AI have raised expectations for the improvement of human society and concerns about the ethical and social risks associated with the use of generative AI. Many previous studies have presented risk issues as concerns associated with the use of generative AI, but since most of these concerns are from the user's perspective, they are difficult to lead to specific countermeasures. In this study, the risk issues presented by the previous studies were broken down into more detailed elements, and risk factors and impacts were identified. In this way, we presented information that leads to countermeasure proposals for generative AI risks.
Hiroshi Tanaka, Masaru Ide, Jun Yajima, Sachiko Onodera, Kazuki Munakata, Nobukazu Yoshioka
CAIN3
2024 Toward a Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence System Considering Security, Ethics, and Quality
abstract
Recently, various risks have been pointed out in artificial intelligence (AI) systems. In particular, AI security, AI ethics, and AI quality are considerable risks. To make AI systems trustworthy against these risks, risk assessment technology is needed to identify potential AI risks and decide which risks should be dealt with in priority. We propose a risk assessment technology that assesses three kinds of risks—AI security, AI ethics, and AI quality—which have been considered separately. Our technology follows the ISO 31000 framework, consisting of four phases: risk candidate identification, impact assessment, likelihood assessment, and priority derivation for countermeasures. To realize this technology, risk candidate identification is achieved by extending AI ethics impact assessment— an identification method of AI ethics risk—to AI security and AI quality. Impact and likelihood assessments are conducted by extending assessment methods for AI security to AI ethics and AI quality. We conducted a case study using our technology and confirmed that the risks were appropriately extracted, and the priority of the risks to be dealt with was derived.
Jun Yajima, Satoko Shiga, Kyoko Ohashi, Masaru Ide, Hiroshi Tanaka, Sachiko Onodera
PRDC1
2022 A new approach for machine learning security risk assessment: work in progress
abstract
We propose a new security risk assessment approach for Machine Learning-based AI systems (ML systems). The assessment of security risks of ML systems requires expertise in ML security. So, ML system developers, who may not know much about ML security, cannot assess the security risks of their systems. By using our approach, a ML system developers can easily assess the security risks of the ML system. In performing the assessment, the ML system developer only has to answer the yes/no questions about the specification of the ML system. In our trial, we confirmed that our approach works correctly.
Jun Yajima, Maki Inui, Takanori Oikawa, Fumiyoshi Kasahara, Ikuya Morikawa, Nobukazu Yoshioka
CAIN1
2010 A Very Compact Hardware Implementation of the KASUMI Block Cipher
Dai Yamamoto, Kouichi Itoh, Jun Yajima
WISTP3
2008 A strict evaluation method on the number of conditions for the SHA-1 collision search
abstract
This paper proposes a new algorithm for evaluating the number of chaining variable conditions(CVCs) in the selecting step of a distrubance vector (DV) for the analysis of SHA-1 collision attack. The algorithm is constructed by combining the following four strategies, Strict Bit Compression, DV expansion, Precise Counting Rules in Every Step and Differential Path Confirmation for Rounds 2 to 4, that can evaluate the number of CVCs morestrictly compared with the previous approach.
Jun Yajima, Terutoshi Iwasaki, Yusuke Naito 0001, Yu Sasaki 0001, Takeshi Shimoyama, Noboru Kunihiro, Kazuo Ohta
AsiaCCS1
2008 A Very Compact Hardware Implementation of the MISTY1 Block Cipher
Dai Yamamoto, Jun Yajima, Kouichi Itoh
CHES2
2007 A New Strategy for Finding a Differential Path of SHA-1
Jun Yajima, Yu Sasaki 0001, Yusuke Naito 0001, Terutoshi Iwasaki, Takeshi Shimoyama, Noboru Kunihiro, Kazuo Ohta
ACISP1
2006 Improved Collision Search for SHA-0
Yusuke Naito 0001, Yu Sasaki 0001, Takeshi Shimoyama, Jun Yajima, Noboru Kunihiro, Kazuo Ohta
ASIACRYPT4
2002 DPA Countermeasures by Improving the Window Method
Kouichi Itoh, Jun Yajima, Masahiko Takenaka, Naoya Torii
CHES2
2001 The Block Cipher SC2000
Takeshi Shimoyama, Hitoshi Yanami, Kazuhiro Yokoyama, Masahiko Takenaka, Kouichi Itoh, Jun Yajima, Naoya Torii, Hidema Tanaka
FSE6