We develop new data structures and algorithms for checking verification queries in NetKAT, a domain-specific language for specifying the behavior of network data planes. Our results extend the techniques obtained in prior work on symbolic automata and provide a framework for building efficient and scalable verification tools. We present KATch, an implementation of these ideas in Scala, featuring an extended set of NetKAT operators that are useful for expressing network-wide specifications, and a verification engine that constructs a bisimulation or generates a counter-example showing that none exists. We evaluate the performance of our implementation on real-world and synthetic benchmarks, verifying properties such as reachability and slice isolation, typically returning a result in well under a second, which is orders of magnitude faster than previous approaches. Our advancements underscore NetKAT’s potential as a practical, declarative language for network specification and verification.

Language support for differentially private programming is both crucial and delicate. While elaborate program logics can be very expressive, type-system-based approaches using linear types tend to be more lightweight and amenable to automatic checking and inference, and in particular in the presence of higher-order programming. Since the seminal design of Fuzz , which is restricted to ϵ-differential privacy in its original design, significant progress has been made to support more advanced variants of differential privacy, like (ϵ, δ )-differential privacy. However, supporting these advanced privacy variants while also supporting higher-order programming in full has proven to be challenging. We present Jazz , a language and type system that uses linear types and latent contextual effects to support both advanced variants of differential privacy and higher-order programming. Latent contextual effects allow delaying the payment of effects for connectives such as products, sums, and functions, yielding advantages in terms of precision of the analysis and annotation burden upon elimination, as well as modularity. We formalize the core of Jazz , prove it sound for privacy via a logical relation for metric preservation, and illustrate its expressive power through a number of case studies drawn from the recent differential privacy literature.

Existing approaches for statically enforcing differential privacy in higher order languages use either linear or relational refinement types. A barrier to adoption for these approaches is the lack of support for expressing these “fancy types” in mainstream programming languages. For example, no mainstream language supports relational refinement types, and although Rust and modern versions of Haskell both employ some linear typing techniques, they are inadequate for embedding enforcement of differential privacy, which requires “full” linear types. We propose a new type system that enforces differential privacy, avoids the use of linear and relational refinement types, and can be easily embedded in richly typed programming languages like Haskell. We demonstrate such an embedding in Haskell, demonstrate its expressiveness on case studies, and prove soundness of our type-based enforcement of differential privacy.

Static program analysis tools can automatically prove many useful properties of programs. However, using static analysis to prove to a third party that a program satisfies a property requires revealing the program's source code. We introduce the concept of zero-knowledge static analysis, in which the prover constructs a zero-knowledge proof about the outcome of the static analysis without revealing the program. We present novel zero-knowledge proof schemes for intra- and inter-procedural abstract interpretation. Our schemes are significantly more efficient than the naive translation of the corresponding static analysis algorithms using existing schemes. We evaluate our approach empirically on real and synthetic programs; with a pairing-based zero knowledge proof scheme as the backend, we are able to prove the control flow analysis on a 2,000-line program in 1,738s. The proof is only 128 bytes and the verification time is 1.4ms. With a transparent zero knowledge proof scheme based on discrete-log, we generate the proof for the tainting analysis on a 12,800-line program in 406 seconds, the proof size is 282 kilobytes, and the verification time is 66 seconds.

Differential privacy enables general statistical analysis of data with formal guarantees of privacy protection at the individual level. Tools that assist data analysts with utilizing differential privacy have frequently taken the form of programming languages and libraries. However, many existing programming languages designed for compositional verification of differential privacy impose significant burden on the programmer (in the form of complex type annotations). Supplementary library support for privacy analysis built on top of existing general-purpose languages has been more usable, but incapable of pervasive end-to-end enforcement of sensitivity analysis and privacy composition. We introduce DDuo, a dynamic analysis for enforcing differential privacy. DDuo is usable by non-experts: its analysis is automatic and it requires no additional type annotations. DDuo can be implemented as a library for existing programming languages; we present a reference implementation in Python which features moderate runtime overheads on realistic workloads. We include support for several data types, distance metrics and operations which are commonly used in modern machine learning programs. We also provide initial support for tracking the sensitivity of data transformations in popular Python libraries for data analysis. We formalize the novel core of the DDuo system and prove it sound for sensitivity analysis via a logical relation for metric preservation. We also illustrate DDuo's usability and flexibility through various case studies which implement state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms.

Faceted execution is a linguistic paradigm for dynamic information-flow control with the distinguishing feature that program values may be faceted. Such values represent multiple versions or facets at once, for different security labels. This enables policy-agnostic programming: a paradigm permitting expressive privacy policies to be declared, independent of program logic. Although faceted execution prevents information leakage at runtime, it does not guarantee the absence of failure due to policy violations. By contrast with static mechanisms (such as security type systems), dynamic information-flow control permits arbitrarily expressive and dynamic privacy policies but imposes significant runtime overhead and delays discovery of any possible violations. In this paper, we present the two different abstract interpretations for faceted execution in the presence of first-class policies. We first present an abstraction which allows one to reason statically about the shape of facets at each program point. This abstraction is useful for statically proving the absence of runtime errors and eliminating runtime checks related to facets. Reasoning statically about the contents of faceted values, however, is complicated by the presence of first-class security labels, especially because abstract labels may conflate more than one runtime label. To address these issues, we also develop a more precise abstraction that relies on an analysis tracking singleton heap abstractions. We present an implementation of our coarse abstraction in Racket and demonstrate its performance on several sample programs. We conclude by showing how our precise domain can be used to verify information-flow properties.

Authorization hooks are access control checks that prevent unauthorized principals from interacting with some protected resource, and are used extensively in critical software such as operating systems, middleware, and server programs. They are often intended to mediate information flow between subjects (e.g., file owners), but typically in an ad-hoc manner. In this paper we present a static type and effect system for detecting whether authorization hooks in programs properly defend against undesired information flow between subjects. A significant novelty of our approach is an integrated abstract interpretation-based tool that guides system clients through the information flow consequences of access control policy decisions.

An oblivious computation is one that is free of direct and indirect information leaks, e.g., due to observable differences in timing and memory access patterns. This paper presents Lambda Obliv, a core language whose type system enforces obliviousness. Prior work on type-enforced oblivious computation has focused on deterministic programs. Lambda Obliv is new in its consideration of programs that implement probabilistic algorithms, such as those involved in cryptography. Lambda Obliv employs a substructural type system and a novel notion of probability region to ensure that information is not leaked via the observed distribution of visible events. Probability regions support reasoning about probabilistic correlation and independence between values, and our use of probability regions is motivated by a source of unsoundness that we discovered in the type system of ObliVM, a language for implementing state of the art oblivious algorithms. We prove that Lambda Obliv's type system enforces obliviousness and show that it is expressive enough to typecheck advanced tree-based oblivious RAMs.

Computer networks often serve as the first line of defense against malicious attacks. Although there are a growing number of tools for defining and enforcing security policies in software-defined networks (SDNs), most assume a single point of control and are unable to handle the challenges that arise in networks with multiple administrative domains. For example, consumers may want want to allow their home IoT networks to be configured by device vendors, which raises security and privacy concerns. In this paper we propose a framework called Proof-Carrying Network Code (PCNC) for specifying and enforcing security in SDNs with interacting administrative domains. Like Proof-Carrying Authorization (PCA), PCNC provides methods for managing authorization domains, and like Proof-Carrying Code (PCC), PCNC provides methods for enforcing behavioral properties of network programs. We develop theoretical foundations for PCNC and evaluate it in simulated and real network settings, including a case study that considers security in IoT networks for home health monitoring.

Abstract Galois connections are a foundational tool for structuring abstraction in semantics, and their use lies at the heart of the theory of abstract interpretation. Yet, mechanization of Galois connections using proof assistants remains limited to restricted modes of use, preventing their general application in mechanized metatheory and certified programming. This paper presents constructive Galois connections , a variant of Galois connections that is effective both on paper and in proof assistants; is complete with respect to a large subset of classical Galois connections; and enables more general reasoning principles, including the “calculational” style advocated by Cousot. To design constructive Galois connections, we identify a restricted mode of use of classical ones which is both general and amenable to mechanization in dependently typed functional programming languages. Crucial to our metatheory is the addition of monadic structure to Galois connections to control a “specification effect.” Effectful calculations may reason classically, while pure calculations have extractable computational content. Explicitly moving between the worlds of specification and implementation is enabled by our metatheory. To validate our approach, we provide two case studies in mechanizing existing proofs from the literature: the first uses calculational abstract interpretation to design a static analyzer, and the second forms a semantic basis for gradual typing. Both mechanized proofs closely follow their original paper-and-pencil counterparts, employ reasoning principles not captured by previous mechanization approaches, support the extraction of verified algorithms, and are novel.

During the past decade, differential privacy has become the gold standard for protecting the privacy of individuals. However, verifying that a particular program provides differential privacy often remains a manual task to be completed by an expert in the field. Language-based techniques have been proposed for fully automating proofs of differential privacy via type system design, however these results have lagged behind advances in differentially-private algorithms, leaving a noticeable gap in programs which can be automatically verified while also providing state-of-the-art bounds on privacy. We propose Duet, an expressive higher-order language, linear type system and tool for automatically verifying differential privacy of general-purpose higher-order programs. In addition to general purpose programming, Duet supports encoding machine learning algorithms such as stochastic gradient descent, as well as common auxiliary data analysis tasks such as clipping, normalization and hyperparameter tuning - each of which are particularly challenging to encode in a statically verified differential privacy framework. We present a core design of the Duet language and linear type system, and complete key proofs about privacy for well-typed programs. We then show how to extend Duet to support realistic machine learning applications and recent variants of differential privacy which result in improved accuracy for many practical differentially private algorithms. Finally, we implement several differentially private machine learning algorithms in Duet which have never before been automatically verified by a language-based tool, and we present experimental results which demonstrate the benefits of Duet's language design in terms of accuracy of trained machine learning models.

In this functional pearl, we examine the use of definitional interpreters as a basis for abstract interpretation of higher-order programming languages. As it turns out, definitional interpreters, especially those written in monadic style, can provide a nice basis for a wide variety of collecting semantics, abstract interpretations, symbolic executions, and their intermixings. But the real insight of this story is a replaying of an insight from Reynold's landmark paper, Definitional Interpreters for Higher-Order Programming Languages , in which he observes definitional interpreters enable the defined-language to inherit properties of the defining-language. We show the same holds true for definitional abstract interpreters. Remarkably, we observe that abstract definitional interpreters can inherit the so-called “pushdown control flow” property, wherein function calls and returns are precisely matched in the abstract semantics, simply by virtue of the function call mechanism of the defining-language. The first approaches to achieve this property for higher-order languages appeared within the last ten years, and have since been the subject of many papers. These approaches start from a state-machine semantics and uniformly involve significant technical engineering to recover the precision of pushdown control flow. In contrast, starting from a definitional interpreter, the pushdown control flow property is inherent in the meta-language and requires no further technical mechanism to achieve.

Galois connections are a foundational tool for structuring abstraction in semantics and their use lies at the heart of the theory of abstract interpretation. Yet, mechanization of Galois connections remains limited to restricted modes of use, preventing their general application in mechanized metatheory and certified programming.

The design and implementation of static analyzers has become increasingly systematic. Yet for a given language or analysis feature, it often requires tedious and error prone work to implement an analyzer and prove it sound. In short, static analysis features and their proofs of soundness do not compose well, causing a dearth of reuse in both implementation and metatheory. We solve the problem of systematically constructing static analyzers by introducing Galois transformers: monad transformers that transport Galois connection properties. In concert with a monadic interpreter, we define a library of monad transformers that implement building blocks for classic analysis parameters like context, path, and heap (in)sensitivity. Moreover, these can be composed together independent of the language being analyzed. Significantly, a Galois transformer can be proved sound once and for all, making it a reusable analysis component. As new analysis features and abstractions are developed and mixed in, soundness proofs need not be reconstructed, as the composition of a monad transformer stack is sound by virtue of its constituents. Galois transformers provide a viable foundation for reusable and composable metatheory for program analysis. Finally, these Galois transformers shift the level of abstraction in analysis design and implementation to a level where non-specialists have the ability to synthesize sound analyzers over a number of parameters.

Recent developments in the systematic construction of abstract interpreters hinted at the possibility of a broad unification of concepts in static analysis. We deliver that unification by showing context-sensitivity, polyvariance, flow-sensitivity, reachability-pruning, heap-cloning and cardinality-bounding to be independent of any particular semantics. Monads become the unifying agent between these concepts and between semantics. For instance, by plugging the same "context-insensitivity monad" into a monadically-parameterized semantics for Java or for the lambda calculus, it yields the expected context-insensitive analysis.

Abstract Racket is a large language that is built mostly within itself. Unlike the usual approach taken by non-Lisp languages, the self-hosting of Racket is not a matter of bootstrapping one implementation through a previous implementation, but instead a matter of building a tower of languages and libraries via macros. The upper layers of the tower include a class system, a component system, pedagogic variants of Scheme, a statically typed dialect of Scheme, and more. The demands of this language-construction effort require a macro system that is substantially more expressive than previous macro systems. In particular, while conventional Scheme macro systems handle stand-alone syntactic forms adequately, they provide weak support for macros that share information or macros that use existing syntactic forms in new contexts. This paper describes and models features of the Racket macro system, including support for general compile-time bindings, sub-form expansion and analysis, and environment management. The presentation assumes a basic familiarity with Lisp-style macros, and it takes for granted the need for macros that respect lexical scope. The model, however, strips away the pattern and template system that is normally associated with Scheme macros, isolating a core that is simpler, can support pattern and template forms themselves as macros, and generalizes naturally to Racket's other extensions.

We present a functional approach to parsing unrestricted context-free grammars based on Brzozowski's derivative of regular expressions. If we consider context-free grammars as recursive regular expressions, Brzozowski's equational theory extends without modification to context-free grammars (and it generalizes to parser combinators). The supporting actors in this story are three concepts familiar to functional programmers - laziness, memoization and fixed points; these allow Brzozowski's original equations to be transliterated into purely functional code in about 30 lines spread over three functions.