The virtualization of network functions is a promising technology, which can enable mobile network operators to provide more flexibility and better resilience for their infrastructure and services. Yet, virtualization comes with challenges, as 5 G operators will require a means of verifying the state of the virtualized network components (e.g., Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) or managing hypervisors) in order to fulfil security and privacy commitments. One such means is the use of attestation protocols. In this paper, we focus on Collective Remote Attestation (cRA), which is used to attest the state of a group of devices. Although cRA has been extensively studied in the context of IoT, it has not been used yet in virtualized mobile networks - a different use-case, with constraints of its own. In this paper, we propose the first protocol to efficiently and securely attest a group of Virtualized Network Functions which make up a VNF Forwarding Graph. Our protocol comes with strong and provable guarantees of: unforgeability of attestation, the linkability of attestations for related components, and the privacy of sensitive configuration details for the infrastructure provider. In particular, we are the first to formally define and analyze such properties for VNF-FG attestation. Finally, through our Proof-of-Concept implementation, we show that our construction is not only strongly secure, but also efficient.

The adoption of 5G services depends on the capacity to provide high-value services. In addition to enhanced performance, the capacity to deliver Security Service Level Agreements (SSLAs) and demonstrate their fulfillment would be a great incentive for the adoption of 5G services for critical 5G Verticals (e.g., service suppliers like Energy or Intelligent Transportation Systems) subject to specific industrial safety, security or service level rules and regulations (e.g., NIS or SEVESO Directives). Yet, responsibilities may be difficult to track and demonstrate because 5G infrastructures are interconnected and complex, which is a challenge anticipated to be exacerbated in future 6G networks. This paper describes a demonstrator and a use case that shows how 5G Service Providers can deliver SSLAs to their customers (Service Owners) by leveraging a set of network enablers developed in the INSPIRE-5Gplus project to manage their accountability, liability and trust placed in subcomponents of a service (subcontractors). The elaborated enablers are in particular a novel sTakeholder Responsibility, AccountabIity and Liability deScriptor (TRAILS), a Liability-Aware Service Management Referencing Service (LASM-RS), an anomaly detection tool (IoT-MMT), a Root Cause Analysis tool (IoT-RCA), two Remote Attestation mechanisms (Systemic and Deep Attestation), and two Security-by-Orchestration enablers (one for the 5G Core and one for the MEC).

Data protection is a rising concern for systems of drones to guarantee data integrity and privacy through the detection of drone violations in no-fly zones (NFZ). Despite their security guarantees, existing attestation frameworks present limited extensibility. This paper presents a modular attestation framework for drone systems overcoming such a barrier. The framework provides a high degree of flexibility to guarantee both data integrity within and across drones. We also propose a dedicated token-based attestation protocol to support NFZ violation detection. We implemented a proof-of-concept prototype using the OP-TEE and PX4 open environments for trusted execution and drone simulation. Evaluations show the framework guarantees strong data protection with a high level of flexibility while preserving performance and scalability.

TLS (Transport Layer Security) is a widely deployed protocol that plays a vital role in securing Internet traffic. Given the numerous known attacks for TLS 1.2, it was imperative to change and even redesign the protocol in order to address them. In August 2018, a new version of the protocol, TLS 1.3, was standardized by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force). TLS 1.3 not only benefits from stronger security guarantees, but aims to protect the identities of the server and client by encrypting messages as soon as possible during the authentication. In this paper, we model the privacy guarantees of TLS 1.3 when parties execute a full handshake or use a session resumption, covering all the handshake modes of TLS. We build our privacy models on top of the one defined by Hermans et al. for RFIDs (Radio Frequency Identification Devices) that mostly targets authentication protocols. The enhanced models share similarities to the Bellare-Rogaway AKE (Authenticated Key Exchange) security model and consider adversaries that can compromise both types of participants in the protocol. In particular, modeling session resumption is non-trivial, given that session resumption tickets are essentially a state transmitted from one session to another and such link reveals information on the parties. On the positive side, we prove that TLS 1.3 protects the privacy of its users at least against passive adversaries, contrary to TLS 1.2, and against more powerful ones.

Abstract To ensure the privacy of users in transport systems, researchers are working on new protocols providing the best security guarantees while respecting functional requirements of transport operators. In this paper1, we design a secure NFC m-ticketing protocol for public transport that preserves users’ anonymity and prevents transport operators from tracing their customers’ trips. To this end, we introduce a new practical set-membership proof that does not require provers nor verifiers (but in a specific scenario for verifiers) to perform pairing computations. It is therefore particularly suitable for our (ticketing) setting where provers hold SIM/UICC cards that do not support such costly computations. We also propose several optimizations of Boneh-Boyen type signature schemes, which are of independent interest, increasing their performance and efficiency during NFC transactions. Our m-ticketing protocol offers greater flexibility compared to previous solutions as it enables the post-payment and the off-line validation of m-tickets. By implementing a prototype using a standard NFC SIM card, we show that it fulfils the stringent functional requirement imposed by transport operators whilst using strong security parameters. In particular, a validation can be completed in 184.25ms when the mobile is switched on, and in 266.52ms when the mobile is switched off or its battery is flat.

This paper proposes a new security method for protecting signalling for Domain Name System (DNS) architecture. That is, it makes secure DNS update messages for binding a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of an IPv6 node and the IPv6 address of the node owning this FQDN. This method is based on the use of Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) and IDBased Cryptography (IBC). Combination of these two techniques allows DNS server to check the ownership of the IPv6 address and the FQDN, sent by the DNS client. In addition, this paper describes how this method has been implemented.

When mobile End Users are offloaded from a Radio Access Network (RAN) to a WLAN, current I-WLAN [1] offloaded architectures consider traffic converging to a common Security Gateway. In this paper, we propose an alternative End-to-End security (E2E) architecture based on the MOBIKE-X [2] protocol, which extends the MOBIKE [3] Mobility and Multihoming features to Multiple Interfaces and to the Transport mode of IPsec. The benefits of this E2E architecture are mostly load reduction and a better End User experience. First, E2E offloads the ISP CORE and backhaul networks, then E2E uses IPsec Transport mode instead of Tunnel mode, which removes networking and security overhead. This reduces CPU load by 20%, enhances Mobility and Multihoming operations by about 15%, and makes the system 2.9 times more reactive for detecting modifications of interfaces.

To face the huge demand on mobile traffic, ISPs are looking to offload traffic of their Radio Access Network to WLAN. Currently I-WLAN is the proposed offload architecture by 3GPP which tunnels the traffic to a Security Gateway. This paper proposes for ISPs an ISP Offload Infrastructure which minimizes the infrastructure cost deployment, and which can be deployed in a very short term. The ISP Offload Infrastructure classifies the EU traffic into 3 distinct classes and assigns each class a specific and adapted offload architecture: ForWarD Architecture (FWDA), Offload Service Architecture (OSA) and Offload Access Architecture (OAA). This paper shows how to deploy each Offload Architecture by using SCTP in conjunction to MOBIKE(-X) or only MOBIKE(-X). Then we measure how each Offload Architecture may affect the EU experience, and provide recommendations on how to deploy and implement the ISP Offload Infrastructure.