Abstract Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justification logics, which feature explicit reasons for obligations, the situation is different. Their strength depends on a constant specification and on the available set of operations for combining different reasons. We present different consistency principles in justification logic and compare their logical strength. We propose a novel semantics for which justification logics with the explicit version of axiom D, $\textbf {jd}$, are complete for arbitrary constant specifications. Consistency is sometimes formulated in terms of permission. We therefore study permission in the context of justification logic, introducing a notion of free-choice permission for the first time. We then discuss the philosophical implications with regard to some deontic paradoxes.

Epistemic logics with justification, S4LP and S4LPN, are combinations of the modal epistemic logic S4 and the Logic of Proofs LP, with some connecting principles. These logics together with the modal knowledge operator □F (F is known), contain infinitely many operators of the form t :F (t is a justification for F), where t is a term. Regarding the Realization Theorem of S4, LP is the justification counterpart of S4, in the sense that, every theorem of S4 can be transformed into a theorem of LP (by replacing all occurrences of by suitable terms), and vise versa. In this article, we first introduce a new cut-free sequent calculus LPLG for LP, and then extend it to obtain a cut-free sequent calculus for S4LP and a cut-free hypersequent calculus for S4LPN. All cut elimination theorems are proved syntactically. Moreover, these sequent systems enjoy a weak subformula property. Then, we show that theorems of S4LP can be realized in LP and theorems of S4LPN can be realized in JS5 (the justification counterpart of modal logic S5). Consequently, we prove that S4LP and S4LPN are conservative extensions of LP.