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Daniel McCarney

dblp:123/3270 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 50% Authentication and access control · 50%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet architecture and protocols · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control › certificate authority
domain validation
0.512021
Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at Let's Encrypt · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key exchange
0.512021
Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at Let's Encrypt · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Internet architecture and protocols › network security
TLS
0.112021
Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at Let's Encrypt · USENIX Security Symposium 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

multi-vantage-point validation · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at Let's Encrypt
Henry Birge-Lee, Liang Wang 0054, Daniel McCarney, Roland Shoemaker, Jennifer Rexford, Prateek Mittal
USENIX Security Symposium3
2014 Baton: certificate agility for android's decentralized signing infrastructure
abstract
Android's trust-on-first-use application signing model associates developers with a fixed code signing certificate, but lacks a mechanism to enable transparent key updates or certificate renewals. The model allows application updates to be recognized as authorized by a party with access to the original signing key. However, changing keys or certificates requires that end users manually uninstall/reinstall apps, losing all non-backed up user data. In this paper, we show that with appropriate OS support, developers can securely and without user intervention transfer signing authority to a new signing key. Our proposal, Baton, modifies Android's app installation framework enabling key agility while preserving backwards compatibility with current apps and current Android releases. Baton is designed to work consistently with current UID sharing and signature permission requirements. We discuss technical details of the Android-specific implementation, as well as the applicability of the Baton protocol to other decentralized environments.
David Barrera 0003, Daniel McCarney, Jeremy Clark, Paul C. van Oorschot
WISEC2
2012 Tapas: design, implementation, and usability evaluation of a password manager
abstract
Passwords continue to prevail on the web as the primary method for user authentication despite their well-known security and usability drawbacks. Password managers offer some improvement without requiring server-side changes. In this paper, we evaluate the security of dual-possession authentication, an authentication approach offering encrypted storage of passwords and theft-resistance without the use of a master password. We further introduce Tapas, a concrete implementation of dual-possession authentication leveraging a desktop computer and a smartphone. Tapas requires no server-side changes to websites, no master password, and protects all the stored passwords in the event either the primary or secondary device (e.g., computer or phone) is stolen. To evaluate the viability of Tapas as an alternative to traditional password managers, we perform a 30 participant user study comparing Tapas to two configurations of Firefox's built-in password manager. We found users significantly preferred Tapas. We then improve Tapas by incorporating feedback from this study, and reevaluate it with an additional 10 participants.
Daniel McCarney, David Barrera 0003, Jeremy Clark, Sonia Chiasson, Paul C. van Oorschot
ACSAC1