Optimal stopping is a fundamental problem in optimization with applications in risk management, finance, robotics, and machine learning. We extend the standard framework to a multi-agent setting, named multi-agent optimal stopping (MAOS), where agents cooperate to make optimal stopping decisions in a finite-space, discrete-time environment. Since solving MAOS becomes computationally prohibitive as the number of agents is very large, we study the mean-field optimal stopping (MFOS) problem, obtained as the number of agents tends to infinity. We establish that MFOS provides a good approximation to MAOS and prove a dynamic programming principle (DPP) based on mean-field control theory. We then propose two deep learning approaches: one that learns optimal stopping decisions by simulating full trajectories and another that leverages the DPP to compute the value function and to learn the optimal stopping rule using backward induction. Both methods train neural networks to approximate optimal stopping policies. We demonstrate the effectiveness and the scalability of our work through numerical experiments on 6 different problems in spatial dimension up to 300. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to formalize and computationally solve MFOS in discrete time and finite space, opening new directions for scalable MAOS methods. Code is available at https://github.com/yuchen-zhu-zyc/Learning-to-Stop

We introduce Mean Field Trust Region Policy Optimization (MF-TRPO), a novel algorithm designed to compute approximate Nash equilibria for ergodic Mean Field Games (MFGs) in finite state-action spaces. Building on the well-established performance of TRPO in the reinforcement learning (RL) setting, we extend its methodology to the MFG framework, leveraging its stability and robustness in policy optimization. Under standard assumptions in the MFG literature, we provide a rigorous analysis of MF-TRPO, establishing theoretical guarantees on its convergence. Our results cover both the exact formulation of the algorithm and its sample-based counterpart, where we derive high-probability guarantees and finite sample complexity. This work advances MFG optimization by bridging RL techniques with mean-field decision-making, offering a theoretically grounded approach to solving complex multi-agent problems.

Mean field games (MFGs) have emerged as a powerful framework for modeling interactions in large-scale multi-agent systems. Despite recent advancements in reinforcement learning (RL) for MFGs, existing methods are typically limited to finite spaces or stationary models, hindering their applicability to real-world problems. This paper introduces a novel deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithm specifically designed for non-stationary continuous MFGs. The proposed approach builds upon a Fictitious Play (FP) methodology, leveraging DRL for best-response computation and supervised learning for average policy representation. Furthermore, it learns a representation of the time-dependent population distribution using a Conditional Normalizing Flow. To validate the effectiveness of our method, we evaluate it on three different examples of increasing complexity. By addressing critical limitations in scalability and density approximation, this work represents a significant advancement in applying DRL techniques to complex MFG problems, bringing the field closer to real-world multi-agent systems.

We study policy gradient for mean-field control in continuous time in a reinforcement learning setting. By considering randomised policies with entropy regularisation, we derive a gradient expectation representation of the value function, which is amenable to actor-critic type algorithms, where the value functions and the policies are learnt alternately based on observation samples of the state and model-free estimation of the population state distribution, either by offline or online learning. In the linear-quadratic mean-field framework, we obtain an exact parametrisation of the actor and critic functions defined on the Wasserstein space. Finally, we illustrate the results of our algorithms with some numerical experiments on concrete examples.

Recent techniques based on Mean Field Games (MFGs) allow the scalable analysis of multi-player games with many similar, rational agents. However, standard MFGs remain limited to homogeneous players that weakly influence each other, and cannot model major players that strongly influence other players, severely limiting the class of problems that can be handled. We propose a novel discrete time version of major-minor MFGs (M3FGs), along with a learning algorithm based on fictitious play and partitioning the probability simplex. Importantly, M3FGs generalize MFGs with common noise and can handle not only random exogeneous environment states but also major players. A key challenge is that the mean field is stochastic and not deterministic as in standard MFGs. Our theoretical investigation verifies both the M3FG model and its algorithmic solution, showing firstly the well-posedness of the M3FG model starting from a finite game of interest, and secondly convergence and approximation guarantees of the fictitious play algorithm. Then, we empirically verify the obtained theoretical results, ablating some of the theoretical assumptions made, and show successful equilibrium learning in three example problems. Overall, we establish a learning framework for a novel and broad class of tractable games.

This paper proposes and analyzes two neural network methods to solve the master equation for finite-state mean field games (MFGs). Solving MFGs provides approximate Nash equilibria for stochastic, differential games with finite but large populations of agents. The master equation is a partial differential equation (PDE) whose solution characterizes MFG equilibria for any possible initial distribution. The first method we propose relies on backward induction in a time component while the second method directly tackles the PDE without discretizing time. For both approaches, we prove two types of results: there exist neural networks that make the algorithms' loss functions arbitrarily small and conversely, if the losses are small, then the neural networks are good approximations of the master equation's solution. We conclude the paper with numerical experiments on benchmark problems from the literature up to dimension 15, and a comparison with solutions computed by a classical method for fixed initial distributions.

We explore the problem of imitation learning (IL) in the context of mean-field games (MFGs), where the goal is to imitate the behavior of a population of agents following a Nash equilibrium policy according to some unknown payoff function. IL in MFGs presents new challenges compared to single-agent IL, particularly when both the reward function and the transition kernel depend on the population distribution. In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap. Then we show that when only the reward depends on the population distribution, IL in MFGs can be reduced to single-agent IL with similar guarantees. However, when the dynamics is population-dependent, we provide a novel upper-bound that suggests IL is harder in this setting. To address this issue, we propose a new adversarial formulation where the reinforcement learning problem is replaced by a mean-field control (MFC) problem, suggesting progress in IL within MFGs may have to build upon MFC.

Mean Field Games (MFGs) can potentially scale multi-agent systems to extremely large populations of agents. Yet, most of the literature assumes a single initial distribution for the agents, which limits the practical applications of MFGs. Machine Learning has the potential to solve a wider diversity of MFG problems thanks to generalizations capacities. We study how to leverage these generalization properties to learn policies enabling a typical agent to behave optimally against any population distribution. In reference to the Master equation in MFGs, we coin the term “Master policies” to describe them and we prove that a single Master policy provides a Nash equilibrium, whatever the initial distribution. We propose a method to learn such Master policies. Our approach relies on three ingredients: adding the current population distribution as part of the observation, approximating Master policies with neural networks, and training via Reinforcement Learning and Fictitious Play. We illustrate on numerical examples not only the efficiency of the learned Master policy but also its generalization capabilities beyond the distributions used for training.

Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods. One limiting factor to further scale up using RL is that existing algorithms to solve MFGs require the mixing of approximated quantities such as strategies or $q$-values. This is far from being trivial in the case of non-linear function approximation that enjoy good generalization properties, e.g. neural networks. We propose two methods to address this shortcoming. The first one learns a mixed strategy from distillation of historical data into a neural network and is applied to the Fictitious Play algorithm. The second one is an online mixing method based on regularization that does not require memorizing historical data or previous estimates. It is used to extend Online Mirror Descent. We demonstrate numerically that these methods efficiently enable the use of Deep RL algorithms to solve various MFGs. In addition, we show that these methods outperform SotA baselines from the literature.

We present a method enabling a large number of agents to learn how to flock. This problem has drawn a lot of interest but requires many structural assumptions and is tractable only in small dimensions. We phrase this problem as a Mean Field Game (MFG), where each individual chooses its own acceleration depending on the population behavior. Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Normalizing Flows (NF), we obtain a tractable solution requiring only very weak assumptions. Our algorithm finds a Nash Equilibrium and the agents adapt their velocity to match the neighboring flock’s average one. We use Fictitious Play and alternate: (1) computing an approximate best response with Deep RL, and (2) estimating the next population distribution with NF. We show numerically that our algorithm can learn multi-group or high-dimensional flocking with obstacles.

Learning by experience in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is a difficult and exciting task, due to the lack of stationarity of the environment, whose dynamics evolves as the population learns. In order to design scalable algorithms for systems with a large population of interacting agents (e.g., swarms), this paper focuses on Mean Field MAS, where the number of agents is asymptotically infinite. Recently, a very active burgeoning field studies the effects of diverse reinforcement learning algorithms for agents with no prior information on a stationary Mean Field Game (MFG) and learn their policy through repeated experience. We adopt a high perspective on this problem and analyze in full generality the convergence of a fictitious iterative scheme using any single agent learning algorithm at each step. We quantify the quality of the computed approximate Nash equilibrium, in terms of the accumulated errors arising at each learning iteration step. Notably, we show for the first time convergence of model free learning algorithms towards non-stationary MFG equilibria, relying only on classical assumptions on the MFG dynamics. We illustrate our theoretical results with a numerical experiment in a continuous action-space environment, where the approximate best response of the iterative fictitious play scheme is computed with a deep RL algorithm.

In this paper, we deepen the analysis of continuous time Fictitious Play learning algorithm to the consideration of various finite state Mean Field Game settings (finite horizon, $\gamma$-discounted), allowing in particular for the introduction of an additional common noise. We first present a theoretical convergence analysis of the continuous time Fictitious Play process and prove that the induced exploitability decreases at a rate $O(\frac{1}{t})$. Such analysis emphasizes the use of exploitability as a relevant metric for evaluating the convergence towards a Nash equilibrium in the context of Mean Field Games. These theoretical contributions are supported by numerical experiments provided in either model-based or model-free settings. We provide hereby for the first time converging learning dynamics for Mean Field Games in the presence of common noise.

In two-party interactive quantum communication protocols, we study a recently defined notion of quantum information cost (QIC), which has most of the important properties of its classical analogue (IC). Notably, its link with amortized quantum communication complexity has been used to prove an (almost) tight lower bound on the bounded round quantum complexity of Disjointness. However, QIC was defined through a purification of the input state. This is valid for fully quantum inputs and tasks but difficult to interpret even for classical tasks. Also, its link with other notions of information cost that had appeared in the literature was not clear. We settle both these issues: for quantum communication with classical inputs, we characterize QIC in terms of information about the input registers, avoiding any reference to the notion of a purification of the classical input state. We provide an operational interpretation of this new characterization as the sum of the costs of revealing and of forgetting information about the inputs. To obtain this result, we prove a general Information Flow Lemma assessing the transfer of information in general interactive quantum processes. Specializing this lemma to interactive quantum protocols accomplishing classical tasks, we are able to demistify the link between QIC and other previous notions of information cost in quantum protocols. Furthermore, we clarify the link between QIC and IC by simulating quantumly classical protocols. Finally, we apply these concepts to argue that any quantum protocol that does not forget information solves Disjointness on n-bits in Omega(n) communication, completely losing the quadratic quantum speedup. Hence forgetting information is here a necessary feature in order to obtain any significant improvement over classical protocols. We also prove that QIC at 0-error is exactly n for Inner Product, and n (1 - o(1)) for a random Boolean function on n+n bits.

We present new quantum algorithms for Triangle Finding improving its best previously known quantum query complexities for both dense and sparse instances. For dense graphs on n vertices, we get a query complexity of O(n^(5/4)) without any of the extra logarithmic factors present in the previous algorithm of Le Gall [FOCS'14]. For sparse graphs with m >= n^(5/4) edges, we get a query complexity of O(n^(11/12) m^(1/6) sqrt(log n)), which is better than the one obtained by Le Gall and Nakajima [ISAAC'15] when m >= n^(3/2). We also obtain an algorithm with query complexity O(n^(5/6) (m log n)^(1/6) + d_2 sqrt(n)) where d_2 is the variance of the degree distribution. Our algorithms are designed and analyzed in a new model of learning graphs that we call extended learning graphs. In addition, we present a framework in order to easily combine and analyze them. As a consequence we get much simpler algorithms and analyses than previous algorithms of Le Gall based on the MNRS quantum walk framework [SICOMP'11].