VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Masaki Inokuchi
dblp:126/7642
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Extending Attack Graphs to Represent Cyber-Attacks in Communication Protocols and Modern IT NetworksabstractAn attack graph is a method used to enumerate the possible paths that an attacker can take in the organizational network. MulVAL is a known open-source framework used to automatically generate attack graphs. MulVAL's default modeling has two main shortcomings. First, it lacks the ability to represent network protocol vulnerabilities, and thus it cannot be used to model common network attacks, such as ARP poisoning. Second, it does not support advanced types of communication, such as wireless and bus communication, and thus it cannot be used to model cyber-attacks on networks that include IoT devices or industrial components. In this article, we present an extended network security model for MulVAL that: (1) considers the physical network topology, (2) supports short-range communication protocols, (3) models vulnerabilities in the design of network protocols, and (4) models specific industrial communication architectures. Using the proposed extensions, we were able to model multiple attack techniques including: spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and denial of service attacks, as well as attacks on advanced types of communication. We demonstrate the proposed model in a testbed which implements a simplified network architecture comprised of both IT and industrial components. Orly Stan, Ron Biton, Michal Ezrets, Moran Dadon, Masaki Inokuchi, Yoshinobu Ohta, Tomohiko Yagyu, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai |
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. | 5 |
| 2021 | Heuristic Approach for Countermeasure Selection Using Attack GraphsabstractSelecting the optimal set of countermeasures to secure a network is a challenging task, since it involves various considerations and trade-offs, such as prioritizing the risks to mitigate given the mitigation costs. Previously suggested approaches are based on limited and largely manual risk assessment procedures, provide recommendations for a specific event, or don't consider the organization's constraints (e.g., limited budget). In this paper, we present an improved attack graph-based risk assessment process and apply heuristic search to select an optimal countermeasure plan for a given network and budget. The risk assessment process represents the risk in the system in such a way that incorporates the quantitative risk factors and relevant countermeasures; this allows us to assess the risk in the system under different countermeasure plans during the search, without the need to regenerate the attack graph. We also provide a detailed description of countermeasure modeling and discuss how the countermeasures can be automatically matched to the security issues discovered in the network. Orly Stan, Ron Biton, Michal Ezrets, Moran Dadon, Masaki Inokuchi, Yoshinobu Ohta, Tomohiko Yagyu, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai |
CSF | 5 |
| 2021 | A Framework for Modeling Cyber Attack Techniques from Security Vulnerability DescriptionsabstractAttack graphs are one of the main techniques used to automate the cybersecurity risk assessment process. In order to derive a relevant attack graph, up-to-date information on known cyber attack techniques should be represented as interaction rules. However, designing and creating new interaction rules is a time consuming task performed manually by security experts. We present a novel, end-to-end, automated framework for modeling new attack techniques from the textual description of security vulnerabilities. Given a description of a security vulnerability, the proposed framework first extracts the relevant attack entities required to model the attack, completes missing information on the vulnerability, and derives a new interaction rule that models the attack; this new rule is then integrated within the MulVal attack graph tool. The proposed framework implements a novel data science pipeline that includes a dedicated cybersecurity linguistic model trained on the NVD repository, a recurrent neural network model used for attack entity extraction, a logistic regression model used for completing the missing information, and a transition probability matrix for automatically generating new interaction rule. We evaluated the performance of each of the individual algorithms, as well as the complete framework, and demonstrated its effectiveness. Hodaya Binyamini, Ron Biton, Masaki Inokuchi, Tomohiko Yagyu, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai |
KDD | 3 |
| 2019 | Design Procedure of Knowledge Base for Practical Attack Graph GenerationabstractCyber security assessment is an essential activity for understanding the security risks in an enterprise environment. While many tools have been developed in order to evaluate the security risks for individual hosts, it is still a challenge to identify multi-hop cyber security risks in a large-scale environment. An attack graph, which provides a comprehensive view of attacks, assists in identifying high-risk attack paths and efficiently deploying countermeasures. Several frameworks which generate an attack graph from system information and knowledge base have also been developed in the past. Although these tools are widely adopted, their expression capabilities are insufficient. The expansion of knowledge base is needed to handle comprehensive attack scenario. In this research, we developed an attack graph generation system by extending the MulVAL framework which is widely adopted due to its high extensibility. We designed and implemented knowledge base (also known as "interaction rules" in the MulVAL framework) for practical attack graph generation. A structured design procedure is necessary to construct a knowledge base that enables comprehensive analysis, which is highly important for actual risk assessment. We describe the design procedure, design considerations and implementation of our rule set. Additionally, we demonstrate the improvement to the generated attack graph by the implemented rules in a case study. Masaki Inokuchi, Yoshinobu Ohta, Shunichi Kinoshita, Tomohiko Yagyu, Orly Stan, Ron Biton, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai |
AsiaCCS | 1 |
| 2018 | Deriving a Cost-Effective Digital Twin of an ICS to Facilitate Security Evaluation
Ron Biton, Tomer Gluck, Orly Stan, Masaki Inokuchi, Yoshinobu Ohta, Yoshiyuki Yamada, Tomohiko Yagyu, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai |
ESORICS (1) | 4 |