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Adam Senft

dblp:129/5381 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1Security and privacy · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Malware analysis · 54% Network security · 46%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network measurement and analytics · 77% Internet architecture and protocols · 23%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network measurement and analytics
middlebox detection
0.212013
A method for identifying and confirming the use of URL filtering products for censorship · Internet Measurement Conference 2013
Network security
censorship
0.212013
A method for identifying and confirming the use of URL filtering products for censorship · Internet Measurement Conference 2013
Internet architecture and protocols › traffic management
ISP traffic management
0.012013
A method for identifying and confirming the use of URL filtering products for censorship · Internet Measurement Conference 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

active probing · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2015 Characterizing Web Censorship Worldwide: Another Look at the OpenNet Initiative Data
abstract
In this study, we take another look at 5 years of web censorship data gathered by the OpenNet Initiative in 77 countries using user-based testing with locally relevant content. Prior to our work, this data had been analyzed with little automation, focusing on what content had been blocked, rather than how blocking was carried out. In this study, we use more rigorous automation to obtain a longitudinal, global view of the technical means used for web censorship. We also identify blocking that had been missed in prior analyses. Our results point to considerable variability in the technologies used for web censorship, across countries, time, and types of content, and even across ISPs in the same country. In addition to characterizing web censorship in countries that, thus far, have eluded technical analysis, we also discuss the implications of our observations on the design of future network measurement platforms and circumvention technologies.
Phillipa Gill, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Jakub Dalek, Sharon Goldberg, Adam Senft, Greg Wiseman
ACM Trans. Web5
2014 Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying Politically-Motivated Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Katharine Kleemola, Adam Senft, Byron Sonne, Greg Wiseman, Phillipa Gill, Ronald J. Deibert
USENIX Security Symposium4
2013 A method for identifying and confirming the use of URL filtering products for censorship
abstract
Products used for managing network traffic and restricting access to Web content represent a dual-use technology. While they were designed to improve performance and protect users from inappropriate content, these products are also used to censor the Web by authoritarian regimes around the globe. This dual use has not gone unnoticed, with Western governments placing restrictions on their export. Our contribution is to present methods for identifying installations of URL filtering products and confirming their use for censorship. We first present a methodology for identifying externally visible installations of URL filtering products in ISPs around the globe. Further, we leverage the fact that many of these products accept user-submitted sites for blocking to confirm that a specific URL filtering product is being used for censorship. Using this method, we are able to confirm the use of McAfee SmartFilter in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Netsweeper in Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen. Our results show that these products are being used to block a range of content, including oppositional political speech, religious discussion and gay and lesbian material, speech generally protected by international human rights norms.
Jakub Dalek, Bennett Haselton, Helmi Noman, Adam Senft, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Phillipa Gill, Ronald J. Deibert
Internet Measurement Conference4