Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Haopei Wang
dblp:129/7094
· DBLP profile ↗
7ranked-venue papers
4as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-9756-8783ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 5 · 2 first-authorComputer networks · 2 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer networks
5 papers |
Network management and operations · 45% Software-defined and programmable networks · 28% Datacenter networks · 26% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Network security · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network management and operations › fault management
fault diagnosis |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | NetAssistant: Dialogue Based Network Diagnosis in Data Center Networks · NSDI 2024 |
Software-defined and programmable networks
SDN security |
0.4 | 2 | 2015 | A First Step Toward Network Security Virtualization: From Concept To Prototype · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2015 Poisoning Network Visibility in Software-Defined Networks: New Attacks and Countermeasures · NDSS 2015 |
Network security › routing security
topology attack |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Poisoning Network Visibility in Software-Defined Networks: New Attacks and Countermeasures · NDSS 2015 |
Network security › routing security
topology poisoning attack |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Poisoning Network Visibility in Software-Defined Networks: New Attacks and Countermeasures · NDSS 2015 |
Software-defined and programmable networks
SDN control plane |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Towards Fine-grained Network Security Forensics and Diagnosis in the SDN Era · CCS 2018 |
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud service models
infrastructure as a service |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | Bring your own controller: Enabling tenant-defined SDN apps in IaaS clouds · INFOCOM 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
SDN virtualization · 0.9dialogue systems · 0.8causal dependency analysis · 0.3software-defined networking · 0.2routing algorithms · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | NetAssistant: Dialogue Based Network Diagnosis in Data Center Networks
Haopei Wang, Anubhavnidhi Abhashkumar, Changyu Lin, Tianrong Zhang, Xiaoming Gu, Yongbin Dong, Weirong Jiang |
NSDI | 1 |
| 2018 | Towards Fine-grained Network Security Forensics and Diagnosis in the SDN EraabstractDiagnosing network security issues in traditional networks is difficult. It is even more frustrating in the emerging Software Defined Networks. The data/control plane decoupling of the SDN framework makes the traditional network troubleshooting tools unsuitable for pinpointing the root cause in the control plane. In this paper, we propose ForenGuard, which provides flow-level forensics and diagnosis functions in SDN networks. Unlike traditional forensics tools that only involve either network level or host level, ForenGuard monitors and records the runtime activities and their causal dependencies involving both the SDN control plane and data plane. Starting with a forwarding problem (e.g., disconnection) which could be caused by a security issue, ForenGuard can backtrack the previous activities in both the control and data plane through causal relationships and pinpoint the root cause of the problem. ForenGuard also provides a user-friendly interface that allows users to specify the detection point and diagnose complicated network problems. We implement a prototype system of ForenGuard on top of the Floodlight controller and use it to diagnose several real control plane attacks. We show that ForenGuard can quickly display causal relationships of activities and help to narrow down the range of suspicious activities that could be the root causes. Our performance evaluation shows that ForenGuard will add minor runtime overhead to the SDN control plane and can scale well in various network workloads. Haopei Wang, Guangliang Yang 0001, Phakpoom Chinprutthiwong, Lei Xu 0024, Yangyong Zhang, Guofei Gu |
CCS | 1 |
| 2017 | Bring your own controller: Enabling tenant-defined SDN apps in IaaS cloudsabstractThe need of customized network functions for enterprises in Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds is emerging. However, existing network functions in IaaS clouds are very limited, inflexible, and hard to control by the tenants. Recently, the introduction of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) technology brings the hope of flexible control of network flows and creation of diverse network functions. Unfortunately, enterprises lose access to the SDN controller when they move to clouds. Moreover, the cloud SDN controller is only managed by the provider administrators for security and performance reasons. To allow enterprise tenants to develop and deploy their own SDN apps in the cloud, in this paper, we introduce a new cloud usage paradigm: Bring Your Own Controller (BYOC). BYOC offers each tenant an individual SDN controller, where tenants can deploy SDN apps to manage their network. To manage these tenant SDN controllers, we propose BYOC-Visor, a new SDN-based virtualization platform. BYOC-VISOR addresses several security and performance challenges which are specific to IaaS clouds. We show that BYOC-Visor supports different controller platforms and diverse SDN security applications such as firewall, IDS, and access control. We implement a prototype system and the performance evaluation results show that our system has low overhead. Haopei Wang, Abhinav Srivastava, Lei Xu 0024, Sungmin Hong, Guofei Gu |
INFOCOM | 1 |
| 2015 | FloodGuard: A DoS Attack Prevention Extension in Software-Defined NetworksabstractThis paper addresses one serious SDN-specific attack, i.e., data-to-control plane saturation attack, which overloads the infrastructure of SDN networks. In this attack, an attacker can produce a large amount of table-miss packet_in messages to consume resources in both control plane and data plane. To mitigate this security threat, we introduce an efficient, lightweight and protocol-independent defense framework for SDN networks. Our solution, called FloodGuard, contains two new techniques/modules: proactive flow rule analyzer and packet migration. To preserve network policy enforcement, proactive flow rule analyzer dynamically derives proactive flow rules by reasoning the runtime logic of the SDN/OpenFlow controller and its applications. To protect the controller from being overloaded, packet migration temporarily caches the flooding packets and submits them to the OpenFlow controller using rate limit and round-robin scheduling. We evaluate FloodGuard through a prototype implementation tested in both software and hardware environments. The results show that FloodGuard is effective with adding only minor overhead into the entire SDN/OpenFlow infrastructure. Haopei Wang, Lei Xu 0024, Guofei Gu |
DSN | 1 |
| 2015 | Poisoning Network Visibility in Software-Defined Networks: New Attacks and Countermeasures
Sungmin Hong, Lei Xu 0024, Haopei Wang, Guofei Gu |
NDSS | 3 |
| 2015 | A First Step Toward Network Security Virtualization: From Concept To PrototypeabstractNetwork security management is becoming more and more complicated in recent years, considering the need of deploying more and more network security devices/middle-boxes at various locations inside the already complicated networks. A grand challenge in this situation is that current management is inflexible and the security resource utilization is not efficient. The flexible deployment and utilization of proper security devices at reasonable places at needed time with low management cost is extremely difficult. In this paper, we present a new concept of network security virtualization, which virtualizes security resources/functions to network administrators/users, and thus maximally utilizing existing security devices/middle-boxes. In addition, it enables security protection to desirable networks with minimal management cost. To verify this concept, we further design and implement a prototype system, NETSECVISOR, which can utilize existing pre-installed (fixed-location) security devices and leverage software-defined networking technology to virtualize network security functions. At its core, NETSECVISOR contains: 1) a simple script language to register security services and policies; 2) a set of routing algorithms to determine optimal routing paths for different security policies based on different needs; and 3) a set of security response functions/strategies to handle security incidents. We deploy NETSECVISOR in both virtual test networks and a commercial switch environment to evaluate its performance and feasibility. The evaluation results show that our prototype only adds a very small overhead while providing desired network security virtualization to network users/administrators. Seungwon Shin 0001, Haopei Wang, Guofei Gu |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 2 |
| 2014 | SRID: State Relation Based Intrusion Detection for False Data Injection Attacks in SCADA
Zhaoyan Xu, Jialong Zhang 0001, Lei Xu 0024, Haopei Wang, Guofei Gu |
ESORICS (2) | 5 |