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Anna Krasnova

dblp:130/9358 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 54% Network security · 46%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › anonymity networks
censorship circumvention
0.212013
Elligator: elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings · CCS 2013
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
elliptic curve cryptography
0.212013
Elligator: elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings · CCS 2013
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography › elliptic curve cryptography
point compression
0.212013
Elligator: elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings · CCS 2013
Network security › traffic analysis
traffic obfuscation
0.212013
Elligator: elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings · CCS 2013
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › provable security
indistinguishability
0.012013
Elligator: elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings · CCS 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

uniform random string mapping · 0.2elligator encoding · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2017 cMix: Mixing with Minimal Real-Time Asymmetric Cryptographic Operations
David Chaum, Debajyoti Das 0001, Farid Javani, Aniket Kate, Anna Krasnova, Joeri de Ruiter, Alan T. Sherman
ACNS5
2013 Elligator: elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings
abstract
Censorship-circumvention tools are in an arms race against censors. The censors study all traffic passing into and out of their controlled sphere, and try to disable censorship-circumvention tools without completely shutting down the Internet. Tools aim to shape their traffic patterns to match unblocked programs, so that simple traffic profiling cannot identify the tools within a reasonable number of traces; the censors respond by deploying firewalls with increasingly sophisticated deep-packet inspection. Cryptography hides patterns in user data but does not evade censorship if the censor can recognize patterns in the cryptography itself. In particular, elliptic-curve cryptography often transmits points on known elliptic curves, and those points are easily distinguishable from uniform random strings of bits.
Daniel J. Bernstein, Michael Hamburg, Anna Krasnova, Tanja Lange 0001
CCS3