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Chee Meng Tey

dblp:131/3262 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
4as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 4 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Biometric security · 77% Authentication and access control · 23%

Topics — the 1 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Biometric security › behavioral biometrics
keystroke dynamics
0.212013
I can be You: Questioning the use of Keystroke Dynamics as Biometrics · NDSS 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

statistical analysis · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Keystroke biometrics: the user perspective
abstract
Usability is an important aspect of security, because poor usability motivates users to find shortcuts that bypass the system. Existing studies on keystroke biometrics evaluate the usability issue in terms of the average false rejection rate (FRR). We show in this paper that such an approach underestimates the user impact in two ways. First, the FRR of keystroke biometrics changes for the worse under a range of common conditions such as background music, exercise and even game playing. In a user study involving 111 participants, the average penalties (increases) in FRR are 0.0360 and 0.0498, respectively, for two different classifiers. Second, presenting the FRR as an average obscures the fact that not everyone is suitable for keystroke biometrics deployment. For example, using a Monte Carlo simulation, we found that 30% of users would encounter an account lockout before their 50th authentication session (given a lockout policy of 3 attempts) if they are affected by external influences 50% of the time when authenticating.
Chee Meng Tey, Payas Gupta, Kartik Muralidharan, Debin Gao
CODASPY1
2013 Keystroke Timing Analysis of on-the-fly Web Apps
Chee Meng Tey, Payas Gupta, Debin Gao
ACNS1
2013 Defending against Heap Overflow by Using Randomization in Nested Virtual Clusters
Chee Meng Tey, Debin Gao
ICICS1
2013 I can be You: Questioning the use of Keystroke Dynamics as Biometrics
Chee Meng Tey, Payas Gupta, Debin Gao
NDSS1