VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Kyle Soska
dblp:133/3572
· DBLP profile ↗
14ranked-venue papers
4as first author
7since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-9222-4962ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 8 · 2 first-author · 4 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 4 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Blockchain Address Poisoning
Taro Tsuchiya, Jin-Dong Dong, Kyle Soska, Nicolas Christin |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |
| 2024 | Ratel: MPC-extensions for Smart ContractsabstractEnhancing privacy on smart contract-enabled blockchains has garnered much attention in recent research. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) is one of the most popular approaches, however, they fail to provide full expressiveness and fine-grained privacy. To illustrate this, we underscore an underexplored type of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), called Residual Bids Extractable Value (RBEV). Residual bids highlight the vulnerability where unfulfilled bids inadvertently reveal traders' unmet demands and prospective trading strategies, thus exposing them to exploitation. ZKP-based approaches failed to address RBEV as they cannot provide post-execution privacy without some level of information disclosure. Other MEV mitigations like fair-ordering protocols also failed to address RBEV. We introduce Ratel, an innovative framework bridging a multi-party computation (MPC) prototyping framework (MP-SPDZ) and a smart contract language (Solidity), harmonizing the privacy with full expressiveness of MPC with Solidity 's on-chain programmability. This synergy empowers developers to effortlessly craft privacy-preserving decentralized applications (DApps). We demonstrate Ratel's efficacy through two distinguished decentralized finance (DeFi) applications: a decentralized exchange and a collateral auction, effectively mitigating the potential RBEV issue. Furthermore, Ratel is equipped with a lightweight crash-reset mechanism, enabling the seamless recovery of transiently benign faulty nodes. To prevent the crash-reset mechanism abused by malicious entities and ward off DoS attacks, we incorporate a cost-utility analysis anchored in the Bayesian approach. Our performance evaluation of the applications developed under the Ratel framework underscores their competency in managing real-world peak-time workloads. Yunqi Li 0002, Kyle Soska, Sylvain Bellemare, Mikerah Quintyne-Collins, Lun Wang 0001, Dawn Song, Andrew Miller 0001 |
AsiaCCS | 2 |
| 2024 | Stranger Danger? Investor Behavior and Incentives on Cryptocurrency Copy-Trading PlatformsabstractSeveral large financial trading platforms have recently begun implementing “copy trading,” a process by which a leader allows copiers to automatically mirror their trades in exchange for a share of the profits realized. While it has been shown in many contexts that platform design considerably influences user choices—users tend to disproportionately trust rankings presented to them—we would expect that here, copiers exercise due diligence given the money at stake, typically USD 500–2 000 or more. We perform a quantitative analysis of two major cryptocurrency copy-trading platforms, with different default leader ranking algorithms. One of these platforms additionally changed the information displayed during our study. In all cases, we show that the platform UI significantly influences copiers’ decisions. Besides being sub-optimal, this influence is problematic as rankings are often easily gameable by unscrupulous leaders who prey on novice copiers, and they create perverse incentives for all platform users. Daisuke Kawai, Kyle Soska, Bryan R. Routledge, Ariel Zetlin-Jones, Nicolas Christin |
CHI | 2 |
| 2023 | User Participation in Cryptocurrency Derivative Markets
Daisuke Kawai, Bryan R. Routledge, Kyle Soska, Ariel Zetlin-Jones, Nicolas Christin |
AFT | 3 |
| 2023 | Is your digital neighbor a reliable investment advisor?abstractThe web and social media platforms have drastically changed how investors produce and consume financial advice. Historically, individual investors were often relying on newsletters and related prospectus backed by the reputation and track record of their issuers. Nowadays, financial advice is frequently offered online, by anonymous or pseudonymous parties with little at stake. As such, a natural question is to investigate whether these modern financial “influencers” operate in good faith, or whether they might be misleading their followers intentionally. To start answering this question, we obtained data from a very large cryptocurrency derivatives exchange, from which we derived individual trading positions. Some of the investors on that platform elect to link to their Twitter profiles. We were thus able to compare the positions publicly espoused on Twitter with those actually taken in the market. We discovered that 1) staunchly “bullish” investors on Twitter often took much more moderate, if not outright opposite, positions in their own trades when the market was down, 2) their followers tended to align their positions with bullish Twitter outlooks, and 3) moderate voices on Twitter (and their own followers) were on the other hand far more consistent with their actual investment strategies. In other words, while social media advice may attempt to foster a sense of camaraderie among people of like-minded beliefs, the reality is that this is merely an illusion, which may result in financial losses for people blindly following advice. Daisuke Kawai, Alejandro Cuevas Villalba, Bryan R. Routledge, Kyle Soska, Ariel Zetlin-Jones, Nicolas Christin |
WWW | 4 |
| 2022 | Measurement by Proxy: On the Accuracy of Online Marketplace Measurements
Alejandro Cuevas Villalba, Fieke Miedema, Kyle Soska, Nicolas Christin, Rolf van Wegberg |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |
| 2021 | Towards Understanding Cryptocurrency Derivatives: A Case Study of BitMEXabstractSince 2018, the cryptocurrency trading landscape has evolved from a collection of spot markets (fiat for cryptocurrency) to a hybrid ecosystem featuring complex and popular derivatives products. In this paper we explore this new paradigm through a study of BitMEX, one of the first and most successful derivatives platforms for leveraged cryptocurrency trading. BitMEX trades on average over 3 billion dollars worth of volume per day, and allows users to go long or short Bitcoin with up to 100x leverage. We analyze the evolution of BitMEX products—both settled and perpetual offerings that have become the standard across other cryptocurrency derivatives platforms. We additionally utilize on-chain forensics, public liquidation events, and a site-wide chat room to describe the diverse ensemble of amateur and professional traders that forms this community. These traders range from wealthy agents running automated strategies, to individuals trading small, risky positions and focusing on very short time-frames. Finally, we discuss how derivative trading has impacted cryptocurrency asset prices, notably how it has led to dramatic price movements in the underlying spot markets. Kyle Soska, Jin-Dong Dong, Alex Khodaverdian, Ariel Zetlin-Jones, Bryan R. Routledge, Nicolas Christin |
WWW | 1 |
| 2019 | Adversarial Matching of Dark Net Market Vendor AccountsabstractMany datasets feature seemingly disparate entries that actually refer to the same entity. Reconciling these entries, or "matching," is challenging, especially in situations where there are errors in the data. In certain contexts, the situation is even more complicated: an active adversary may have a vested interest in having the matching process fail. By leveraging eight years of data, we investigate one such adversarial context: matching different online anonymous marketplace vendor handles to unique sellers. Using a combination of random forest classifiers and hierarchical clustering on a set of features that would be hard for an adversary to forge or mimic, we manage to obtain reasonable performance (over 75% precision and recall on labels generated using heuristics), despite generally lacking any ground truth for training. Our algorithm performs particularly well for the top 30% of accounts by sales volume, and hints that 22,163 accounts with at least one confirmed sale map to 15,652 distinct sellers---of which 12,155 operate only one account, and the remainder between 2 and 11 different accounts. Case study analysis further confirms that our algorithm manages to identify non-trivial matches, as well as impersonation attempts. Xiao Hui Tai, Kyle Soska, Nicolas Christin |
KDD | 2 |
| 2018 | Plug and Prey? Measuring the Commoditization of Cybercrime via Online Anonymous Markets
Rolf van Wegberg, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Kyle Soska, Ugur Akyazi, Carlos Gañán, Bram Klievink, Nicolas Christin, Michel van Eeten |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |
| 2018 | An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero BlockchainabstractAbstract Monero is a privacy-centric cryptocurrency that allows users to obscure their transactions by including chaff coins, called “mixins,” along with the actual coins they spend. In this paper, we empirically evaluate two weaknesses in Monero’s mixin sampling strategy. First, about 62% of transaction inputs with one or more mixins are vulnerable to “chain-reaction” analysis - that is, the real input can be deduced by elimination. Second, Monero mixins are sampled in such a way that they can be easily distinguished from the real coins by their age distribution; in short, the real input is usually the “newest” input. We estimate that this heuristic can be used to guess the real input with 80% accuracy over all transactions with 1 or more mixins. Next, we turn to the Monero ecosystem and study the importance of mining pools and the former anonymous marketplace AlphaBay on the transaction volume. We find that after removing mining pool activity, there remains a large amount of potentially privacy-sensitive transactions that are affected by these weaknesses. We propose and evaluate two countermeasures that can improve the privacy of future transactions. Malte Möser, Kyle Soska, Ethan Heilman, Kevin Lee 0001, Henry Heffan, Shashvat Srivastava, Kyle Hogan, Jason Hennessey, Andrew Miller 0001, Arvind Narayanan, Nicolas Christin |
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol. | 2 |
| 2017 | Attributing HacksabstractIn this paper, we describe an algorithm for estimating the provenance of hacks on websites. That is, given properties of sites and the temporal occurrence of attacks, we are able to attribute individual attacks to joint causes and vulnerabilities, as well as estimating the evolution of these vulnerabilities over time. Specifically, we use hazard regression with a time-varying additive hazard function parameterized in a generalized linear form. The activation coefficients on each feature are continuous-time functions over time. We formulate the problem of learning these functions as a constrained variational maximum likelihood estimation problem with total variation penalty and show that the optimal solution is a 0th order spline (a piecewise constant function) with a finite number of adaptively chosen knots. This allows the inference problem to be solved efficiently and at scale by solving a finite dimensional optimization problem. Extensive experiments on real data sets show that our method significantly outperforms Cox’s proportional hazard model. We also conduct case studies and verify that the fitted functions are indeed recovering vulnerable features. Alexander J. Smola, Kyle Soska, Yu-Xiang Wang 0003 |
AISTATS | 3 |
| 2017 | Automatic Application Identification from Billions of FilesabstractUnderstanding how to group a set of binary files into the piece of software they belong to is highly desirable for software profiling, malware detection, or enterprise audits, among many other applications. Unfortunately, it is also extremely challenging: there is absolutely no uniformity in the ways different applications rely on different files, in how binaries are signed, or in the versioning schemes used across different pieces of software. In this paper, we show that, by combining information gleaned from a large number of endpoints (millions of computers), we can accomplish large-scale application identification automatically and reliably. Our approach relies on collecting metadata on billions of files every day, summarizing it into much smaller "sketches", and performing approximate k-nearest neighbor clustering on non-metric space representations derived from these sketches. We design and implement our proposed system using Apache Spark, show that it can process billions of files in a matter of hours, and thus could be used for daily processing. We further show our system manages to successfully identify which files belong to which application with very high precision, and adequate recall. Kyle Soska, Christopher Gates 0002, Kevin A. Roundy, Nicolas Christin |
KDD | 1 |
| 2015 | Measuring the Longitudinal Evolution of the Online Anonymous Marketplace Ecosystem
Kyle Soska, Nicolas Christin |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2014 | Automatically Detecting Vulnerable Websites Before They Turn Malicious
Kyle Soska, Nicolas Christin |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |