During the last ten years, thousands of kilometers of submarine cables have been rolled out to connect regions around the globe and improve intercontinental connectivity. However, while it is relatively easy to get information about the frequent roll-outs of these cables, it is challenging to translate these developments into network information to facilitate networking research. For example, announcements for new submarine cables typically mention landing points and not router IP addresses. With this network information, it is easier to assess the impact of a new submarine cable on end-to-end delays in the connecting regions. In this paper, we investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions to translate public announcements for submarine cables to network information that enables networking research on this topic. We also develop and evaluate a methodology to automatically extract IP-level information for deployed submarine cables and assess their impact on end-to-end performance.

Large part of the human activities has become digitalized as many of the daily activities rely on the Internet. However, this critical infrastructure is subject to disruption that can be caused by malicious actors or misconfiguration. Network operators are expected to implement community driven best-practices that contribute to the Internet's resilience. In practice many operators fail to implement them due to the high complexity of these tasks. Consequently, large-scale disruption of IP services can impact numerous customers through a cascading effect. In this work, we assess how three major Internet disruption impact their connectivity. We found that these disruptions cascade from the affected operators towards large part of their customers. However, customers that follow best practices have a short recovery time and rely on rerouted paths through a myriad of topologically close backups links.

In 2003, Wang and Gao [67] presented an algorithm to infer and characterize routing policies as this knowledge could be valuable in predicting and debugging routing paths. They used their algorithm to measure the phenomenon of selectively announced prefixes, in which, ASes would announce their prefixes to specific providers to manipulate incoming traffic. Since 2003, the Internet has evolved from a hierarchical graph, to a flat and dense structure. Despite 20 years of extensive research since that seminal work, the impact of these topological changes on routing policies is still blurred.

The DNS maps human-readable identifiers to computer-friendly identifiers and relies on a reverse tree architecture to achieve this mapping. Backed by economic incentives, the DNS has become increasingly complex with data being shared among multiple autonomous stakeholders. The diversity of autonomous stakeholders limits data collection, access and sharing to researchers. For instance, each of stakeholder controls limited parts of the DNS space, thereby limiting analysis of real-world DNS behaviour. We aim to design and develop a software framework to unify diverse and large-scale public DNS data sources. The platform will facilitate the access to public DNS data by providing an efficient way of processing and analyzing large amounts of distributed data regardless of the DNS data format. Thus, the framework will help enable reproducibility in DNS studies.

Given the increasing scarcity of IPv4 addresses, network operators are resorting to measures to expand their address pool or prolong the life of existing addresses. One such approach is Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN), where many end-users in a network share a single public IPv4 address. There is limited data about the prevalence of CGN, despite the implications on performance, security, and ultimately, the adoption of IPv6. In this work, we present passive measurement-based techniques for detecting CGN deployments across the entire Internet, without the requirement of access to machines behind a CGN. Specifically, we identify patterns in how client IP addresses are observed at M-Lab servers and at the UCSD network telescope to infer whether those clients are behind a CGN. We apply our methods on data collected from 2014 to 2016. We find that CGN deployment is increasing rapidly. Overall, we infer that 4.1K autonomous systems are deploying CGN, 6 times the number inferred by the most recent studies.

End-to-end IPv6 performance is a factor that can influence IPv6 adoption. The stability of IPv6 - both in the control and data plane - is an important determinant of end-to-end performance, as it influences packet loss, network latency, and hence application performance. In this paper we compare stability and performance measurements from the control and data plane in IPv6 and IPv4. To study control plane stability, we use BGP feeds from five dual-stacked vantage points to measure routing dynamics towards IPv4 and IPv6 destinations. To study data plane stability, we probe dual-stacked webservers in 629 target ASes to determine the availability, RTT performance and RTT stability of paths toward these targets. In both control and data plane experiments IPv6 exhibited less stability than IPv4. In the control plane, most routing dynamics were generated by a small fraction of pathological unstable prefixes. In the data-plane, episodes of unavailability were longer on IPv6 than on IPv4. We found evidence of correlated performance degradation over IPv4 and IPv6 caused by shared infrastructure.

In February 2011 the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) exhausted its free pool of IPv4 addresses, and the regional registries (RIRs) have started to run out of IPv4 addresses as well. As RIRs have started rationing allocations, IPv4 transfer markets have emerged as a new mechanism to acquire IPv4 addresses. Barring a few high-profile exceptions, IPv4 transfers have largely flown under the radar. In this work, we use the lists of transfers published by three RIRs to characterise the transfer market - the types of players involved, the sizes and characteristics of transferred address blocks, and the visibility of transferred address blocks in the routing table before and after the transfer. Next, we take first steps toward detecting address transfers using BGP data from the Routeviews and RIPE repositories from 2004-2013. We identify reasons why legitimate changes in prefix origin could be mistakenly inferred to be transfers, and implement a series of 10 filters that remove 86% of candidate transfers. Our results indicate that BGP-based detection of transfers is prone to false positives due to significant noise in BGP data, while some transfers remain undetectable as they involve non-BGP speakers. We describe some additional data sources and analysis techniques that may help reveal an opaque market for IPv4 address block transfers.