Fitzi, Garay, Maurer, and Ostrovsky (J. Cryptology 2005) showed that in the presence of a dishonest majority, no primitive of cardinality $$n - 1$$ is complete for realizing an arbitrary n-party functionality with guaranteed output delivery. In this work, we introduce a new 2-party primitive $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ (“synchronizable fair exchange”) and show that it is complete for realizing any n-party functionality with fairness in a setting where all parties are pairwise connected by instances of $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ . In the $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ -hybrid model, the two parties load $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ with some input, and following this, either party can trigger $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ with a “witness” at a later time to receive the output from $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ . Crucially the other party also receives output from $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ when $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ is triggered. The trigger witnesses allow us to synchronize the trigger phases of multiple instances of $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ , thereby aiding in the design of fair multiparty protocols. Additionally, a pair of parties may reuse a single a priori loaded instance of $$\mathcal {F}_{\textsf{SyX}}$$ in any number of multiparty protocols (involving different sets of parties). (The authors grant IACR a non-exclusive and irrevocable license to distribute the article under the https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ ), (This work was done in part while all the authors were at MIT).

We describe a lightweight protocol for oblivious evaluation of a pseudorandom function (OPRF) in the presence of semihonest adversaries. In an OPRF protocol a receiver has an input r; the sender gets output s and the receiver gets output F(s; r), where F is a pseudorandom function and s is a random seed. Our protocol uses a novel adaptation of 1-out-of-2 OT-extension protocols, and is particularly efficient when used to generate a large batch of OPRF instances. The cost to realize m OPRF instances is roughly the cost to realize 3:5m instances of standard 1-out-of-2 OTs (using state-of-the-art OT extension). We explore in detail our protocol's application to semihonest secure private set intersection (PSI). The fastest state-of- the-art PSI protocol (Pinkas et al., Usenix 2015) is based on efficient OT extension. We observe that our OPRF can be used to remove their PSI protocol's dependence on the bit-length of the parties' items. We implemented both PSI protocol variants and found ours to be 3.1{3.6 faster than Pinkas et al. for PSI of 128-bit strings and sufficiently large sets. Concretely, ours requires only 3.8 seconds to securely compute the intersection of 220-size sets, regardless of the bitlength of the items. For very large sets, our protocol is only 4:3 slower than the insecure naive hashing approach for PSI.

Motivated by the impossibility of achieving fairness in secure computation [Cleve, STOC 1986], recent works study a model of fairness in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other party that did not receive the output. These works show how to design protocols for secure computation with penalties that guarantees that either fairness is guaranteed or that each honest party obtains a monetary penalty from the adversary. Protocols for this task are typically designed in an hybrid model where parties have access to a "claim-or-refund" transaction functionality denote FCR*.

Motivated by the impossibility of achieving fairness in secure computation [Cleve, STOC 1986], recent works study a model of fairness in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other party that did not receive the output. These works show how to design protocols for secure computation with penalties that tolerate an arbitrary number of corruptions.

Back and Bentov (arXiv 2014) and Andrychowicz et al. (Security and Privacy 2014) introduced techniques to perform secure multiparty computations on Bitcoin. Among other things, these works constructed lottery protocols that ensure that any party that aborts after learning the outcome pays a monetary penalty to all other parties. Following this, Andrychowicz et al. (Bitcoin Workshop 2014) and concurrently Bentov and Kumaresan (Crypto 2014) extended the solution to arbitrary secure function evaluation while guaranteeing fairness in the following sense: any party that aborts after learning the output pays a monetary penalty to all parties that did not learn the output. Andrychowicz et al. (Bitcoin Workshop 2014) also suggested extending to scenarios where parties receive a payoff according to the output of a secure function evaluation, and outlined a 2-party protocol for the same that in addition satisfies the notion of fairness described above. In this work, we formalize, generalize, and construct multiparty protocols for the primitive suggested by Andrychowicz et al. We call this primitive secure cash distribution with penalties. Our formulation of secure cash distribution with penalties poses it as a multistage reactive functionality (i.e., more general than secure function evaluation) that provides a way to securely implement smart contracts in a decentralized setting, and consequently suffices to capture a wide variety of stateful computations involving data and/or money, such as decentralized auctions, market, and games such as poker, etc. Our protocol realizing secure cash distribution with penalties works in a hybrid model where parties have access to a claim-or-refund transaction functionality FCR}* which can be efficiently realized in (a variant of) Bitcoin, and is otherwise independent of the Bitcoin ecosystem. We emphasize that our protocol is dropout-tolerant in the sense that any party that drops out during the protocol is forced to pay a monetary penalty to all other parties. Our formalization and construction generalize both secure computation with penalties of Bentov and Kumaresan (Crypto 2014), and secure lottery with penalties of Andrychowicz et al. (Security and Privacy 2014).

We study a model of incentivizing correct computations in a variety of cryptographic tasks. For each of these tasks we propose a formal model and design protocols satisfying our model's constraints in a hybrid model where parties have access to special ideal functionalities that enable monetary transactions. We summarize our results:

We consider the classical problem of synchronous broadcast with dishonest majority, when a public-key infrastructure and digital signatures are available. In a surprising result, Hirt and Zikas (Eurocrypt 2010) recently observed that all existing protocols for this task are insecure against an adaptive adversary who can choose which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses. Moreover, they prove an impossibility result for adaptively secure broadcast in their setting. We argue that the communication model adopted by Hirt and Zikas is unrealistically pes-simistic. We revisit the problem of adaptively secure broadcast in a more natural synchronous model (with rushing), and show that broadcast is possible in this setting for an arbitrary num-ber of corruptions. Our positive result holds under a strong, simulation-based definition in the universal-composability framework. We also study the impact of adaptive attacks on protocols for secure multi-party computation where broadcast is used as a sub-routine. 1