Due to a constantly increasing amount of speech data that is stored in different types of databases, voice privacy has become a major concern. To respond to such concern, speech researchers have developed various methods for speaker de-identification. The state-of-the-art solutions utilize deep learning solutions which can be effective but might be unavailable or impractical to apply for, for example, under-resourced languages. Formant modification is a simpler, yet effective method for speaker de-identification which requires no training data. Still, remaining intonational patterns in formant-anonymized speech may contain speaker-dependent cues. This study introduces a novel speaker de-identification method, which, in addition to simple formant shifts, manipulates f0 trajectories based on functional data analysis. The proposed speaker de-identification method will conceal plausibly identifying pitch characteristics in a phonetically controllable manner and improve formant-based speaker de-identification up to 25%.

Voice anti-spoofing aims at classifying a given utterance either as a bonafide human sample, or a spoofing attack (e.g. synthetic or replayed sample). Many anti-spoofing methods have been proposed but most of them fail to generalize across domains (corpora) -- and we do not know \emph{why}. We outline a novel interpretative framework for gauging the impact of data quality upon anti-spoofing performance. Our within- and between-domain experiments pool data from seven public corpora and three anti-spoofing methods based on Gaussian mixture and convolutive neural network models. We assess the impacts of long-term spectral information, speaker population (through x-vector speaker embeddings), signal-to-noise ratio, and selected voice quality features.

Modern automatic speaker verification (ASV) relies heavily on machine learning implemented through deep neural networks. It can be difficult to interpret the output of these black boxes. In line with interpretative machine learning, we model the dependency of ASV detection score upon acoustic mismatch of the enrollment and test utterances. We aim to identify mismatch factors that explain target speaker misses (false rejections). We use distance in the first- and second-order statistics of selected acoustic features as the predictors in a linear mixed effects model, while a standard Kaldi x-vector system forms our ASV black-box. Our results on the VoxCeleb data reveal the most prominent mismatch factor to be in F0 mean, followed by mismatches associated with formant frequencies. Our findings indicate that x-vector systems lack robustness to intra-speaker variations.

Speaker comparison by listening is a valuable resource, for instance, in human voice discrimination studies, and voice conversion (VC) systems evaluations. Usually, listeners are provided with application-neutral guidelines that encourage retaining overall high speaker discrimination accuracy. Nonetheless, listeners are subject to misses (declaring same-speaker trial as different-speaker) and false alarms (vice versa) with possibly non-symmetric outcomes. In automatic speaker verification (ASV) applications, the consequences of a miss and a false alarm are rarely equal, and decision making policy is adjusted towards a given application with a desired miss/false alarm trade-off. We study whether listener decisions could similarly be controlled to provoke more accept (or reject) decisions, by framing the voice comparison task in different ways. Our neutral, forensic, user-convenient bank and secure bank scenarios are played by disjoint panels (through Amazon's Mechanical Turk), all judging the same speaker trials originated from RedDots and 2018 Voice Conversion Challenge (VCC 2018) data. Our results indicate that listener decisions can be influenced by modifying the task framing. As a subjective task, the challenge is how to drive the panel decisions to the desired direction (to reduce miss or false alarm rate). Our preliminary results suggest potential for novel, application-directed speaker discrimination designs.

We consider technology-assisted mimicry attacks in the context of automatic speaker verification (ASV). We use ASV itself to select targeted speakers to be attacked by human-based mimicry. We recorded 6 naive mimics for whom we select target celebrities from VoxCeleb1 and VoxCeleb2 corpora (7,365 potential targets) using an i-vector system. The attacker attempts to mimic the selected target, with the utterances subjected to ASV tests using an independently developed x-vector system. Our main finding is negative: even if some of the attacker scores against the target speakers were slightly increased, our mimics did not succeed in spoofing the x-vector system. Interestingly, however, the relative ordering of the selected targets (closest, furthest, median) are consistent between the systems, which suggests some level of transferability between the systems.

While having a wide range of applications, automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in particular, replay attacks that are effective and easy to implement. Most prior work on detecting replay attacks uses audio from a single acoustic microphone only, leading to difficulties in detecting high-end replay attacks close to indistinguishable from live human speech. In this paper, we study the use of a special body-conducted sensor, throat microphone (TM), for combined voice liveness detection (VLD) and ASV in order to improve both robustness and security of ASV against replay attacks. We first investigate the possibility and methods of attacking a TM-based ASV system, followed by a pilot data collection. Second, we study the use of spectral features for VLD using both single-channel and dual-channel ASV systems. We carry out speaker verification experiments using Gaussian mixture model with universal background model (GMM-UBM) and i-vector based systems on a dataset of 38 speakers collected by us. We have achieved considerable improvement in recognition accuracy, with the use of dual-microphone setup. In experiments with noisy test speech, the false acceptance rate (FAR) of the dual-microphone GMM-UBM based system for recorded speech reduces from 69.69% to 18.75%. The FAR of replay condition further drops to 0% when this dual-channel ASV system is integrated with the new dual-channel voice liveness detector.

This paper describes a new database for the assessment of automatic speaker verification (ASV) vulnerabilities to spoofing attacks. In contrast to other recent data collection efforts, the new database has been designed to support the development of replay spoofing countermeasures tailored towards the protection of text-dependent ASV systems from replay attacks in the face of variable recording and playback conditions. Derived from the re-recording of the original RedDots database, the effort is aligned with that in text-dependent ASV and thus well positioned for future assessments of replay spoofing countermeasures, not just in isolation, but in integration with ASV. The paper describes the database design and re-recording, a protocol and some early spoofing detection results. The new “RedDots Replayed” database is publicly available through a creative commons license.

Accuracy of automatic speaker recognition (ASV) systems degrades severely in the presence of background noise. In this paper, we study the use of additional side information provided by a body-conducted sensor, throat microphone. Throat microphone signal is much less affected by background noise in comparison to acoustic microphone signal. This makes throat microphones potentially useful for feature extraction or speech activity detection. This paper, firstly, proposes a new prototype system for simultaneous data-acquisition of acoustic and throat microphone signals. Secondly, we study the use of this additional information for both speech activity detection, feature extraction and fusion of the acoustic and throat microphone signals. We collect a pilot database consisting of 38 subjects including both clean and noisy sessions. We carry out speaker verification experiments using Gaussian mixture model with universal background model (GMM-UBM) and i-vector based system. We have achieved considerable improvement in recognition accuracy even in highly degraded conditions.

Human judgment is the final authority in forensic speaker recognition, but the use of modern speaker verification systems with accurate algorithms to perform the task under various circumstances has a huge potential to help the expert. The ultimate goal is to improve the accuracy of automatic systems when challenging data is provided and find a methodology for human-aided speaker recognition systems. This work presents an evaluation of speaker recognition carried out by human listeners and a gender dependent i-vector recognizer with a strategy for fusion of the decision process. Our experiments with HASR 2010 and HASR 2012 data indicate complementarity in

Voice imitation is mimicry of another speaker’s voice characteristics and speech behavior. Professional voice mimicry can create entertaining, yet realistic sounding target speaker renditions. As mimicry tends to exaggerate prosodic, idiosyncratic and lexical behavior, it is unclear how modern spectral-feature automatic speaker verification systems respond to mimicry “attacks”. We study the vulnerability of two well-known speaker recognition systems, traditional Gaussian mixture model – universal background model (GMM-UBM) and a state-of-the-art i-vector classifier with cosine scoring. The material consists of one professional Finnish imitator impersonating five wellknown Finnish public figures. In a carefully controlled setting, mimicry attack does slightly increase the false acceptance rate for the i-vector system, but generally this is not alarmingly large in comparison to voice conversion or playback attacks. Index Terms: Voice imitation, speaker recognition, mimicry attack

I4U is a joint entry of nine research Institutes and Universities across 4 continents to NIST SRE 2012. It started with a brief discussion during the Odyssey 2012 workshop in Singapore. An online discussion group was soon set up, providing a discussion platform for different issues surrounding NIST SRE’12. Noisy test segments, uneven multi-session training, variable enrollment duration, and the issue of open-set identification were actively discussed leading to various solutions integrated to the I4U submission. The joint submission and several of its 17 sub-systems were among top-performing systems. We summarize the lessons learnt from this large-scale effort.