Zewei Lin

dblp:141/6662 · DBLP profile ↗
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7ranked-venue papers
5as first author
7since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 4 · 3 first-author · 4 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Definition and Detection of Centralization Defects in Smart Contracts
abstract
In recent years, security incidents stemming from centralization defects in smart contracts have led to substantial financial losses. A centralization defect refers to any error, flaw, or fault in a smart contract's design or development stage that introduces a single point of failure. Such defects allow a specific account or user to disrupt the normal operations of smart contracts, potentially causing malfunctions or even complete project shutdowns. Despite the significance of this issue, most current smart contract analyses overlook centralization defects, focusing primarily on other types of defects. To address this gap, our paper introduces six types of centralization defects in smart contracts by manually analyzing 597 Stack Exchange posts and 117 audit reports. For each defect, we provide a detailed description and code examples to illustrate its characteristics and potential impacts. Additionally, we introduce a tool named CDRipper (Centralization Defects Ripper) designed to identify the defined centralization defects. Specifically, CDRipper constructs a permission dependency graph (PDG) and extracts the permission dependencies of functions from the source code of smart contracts. It then detects the sensitive operations in functions and identifies centralization defects based on predefined patterns. We conduct a large-scale experiment using CDRipper on 244,424 real-world smart contracts and evaluate the results based on a manually labeled dataset. Our findings reveal that 82,446 contracts contain at least one of the six centralization defects, with our tool achieving an overall precision of 93.7%.
Zewei Lin, Jiachi Chen, Jiajing Wu, Weizhe Zhang, Zibin Zheng
ICSE1
2025 SSR: Safeguarding Staking Rewards by Defining and Detecting Logical Defects in DeFi Staking
abstract
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) staking is one of the most prominent applications within the DeFi ecosystem, where DeFi projects enable users to stake tokens on the platform and reward participants with additional tokens. However, logical defects in DeFi staking could enable attackers to claim unwarranted rewards by manipulating reward amounts, repeatedly claiming rewards, or engaging in other malicious actions. To mitigate these threats, we conducted the first study focused on defining and detecting logical defects in DeFi staking. Through the analysis of 64 security incidents and 144 audit reports, we identified six distinct types of logical defects, each accompanied by detailed descriptions and code examples. Building on this empirical research, we developed SSR (Safeguarding Staking Reward), a static analysis tool designed to detect logical defects in DeFi staking contracts. SSR utilizes a large language model (LLM) to extract fundamental information about staking logic and constructs a DeFi staking model. It then identifies logical defects by analyzing the model and the associated semantic features. We constructed a ground truth dataset based on known security incidents and audit reports to evaluate the effectiveness of SSR. The results indicate that SSR achieves an overall precision of 92.31%, a recall of 87.92%, and an F1-score of 88.85%. Additionally, to assess the prevalence of logical defects in real-world smart contracts, we compiled a large-scale dataset of 15,992 DeFi staking contracts. SSR detected that 3,557 (22.24%) of these contracts contained at least one logical defect.
Zewei Lin, Jiachi Chen, Zexu Wang, Yuming Feng 0002, Weizhe Zhang, Zibin Zheng
ASE1
2025 Finding Insecure State Dependency in DApps via Multi-Source Tracing and Semantic Enrichment
abstract
Decentralized Applications (DApps) serve as the gateway to utilizing blockchain technology. As their prevalence continues to grow, DApps are becoming increasingly interconnected. For instance, a DApp does not need to manage the prices of various tokens internally, as it can retrieve this information from other DApps that provide more up-to-date data. However, such deep reliance also introduces more attack surfaces, posing greater risks to both DApps and their users. In this paper, we refer to the security threat arising from the interdependence of DApps as Insecure State Dependency (ISD). Public reports indicate that ISD has led to losses exceeding 340 million USD.Existing ISDs are mostly found by extensive manual auditing and lucky incidents, as automated discovery of such issues is extremely difficult. More specifically, it is by no means trivial to (1) achieve precise data tracking in the intertwined and invisible interactions of DApps, (2) obtain fine-grained semantic information in low semantic bytecode. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, called InsFinder, for detecting ISD in DApps. Specifically, InsFinder consists of three unique modules to overcome the aforementioned challenges. (1) InsFinder employs dynamic cross-DApp taint analysis to achieve accurate multi-source data tracking in heavily coupled DApp interactions. (2) InsFinder uses source mapping to map bytecode identifiers into meaningful source code, such as variable names or statements, enabling a deeper understanding of bytecode. (3) InsFinder implements fine-grained access control and static analysis for ISD entry point detection. Evaluation on a manually annotated dataset with 93 real-world ISDs shows that InsFinder successfully detects 72 of them, achieving a precision of 84.7% and a recall of 77.4%. Furthermore, InsFinder successfully uncovers 165 previously unreported ISDs across 122 DApp projects. These ISDs collectively impact over 2 million USD.
Yuhong Nan, Wei Li 0121, Kaiwen Ning, Zewei Lin, Zitong Yao, Yuming Feng 0002, Weizhe Zhang, Zibin Zheng
ASE5
2025 To healthier Ethereum: a comprehensive and iterative smart contract weakness enumeration
abstract
With the increasing popularity of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies, smart contracts have become a prominent feature in developing decentralized applications. However, these smart contracts are susceptible to vulnerabilities that hackers can exploit, resulting in significant financial losses. In response to this growing concern, various initiatives have emerged. Notably, the Smart Contract Weakness Classification (SWC) list plays an important role in raising awareness and understanding of smart contract weaknesses. However, the SWC list lacks maintenance and has not been updated with new vulnerabilities since 2020. To address this gap, this paper introduces the Smart Contract Weakness Enumeration (SWE), a comprehensive and practical vulnerability list up until 2023. We collect 273 vulnerability descriptions from 86 top conference papers and journal papers, employing the open card-sorting method to deduplicate and categorize these descriptions. This process results in the identification of 40 common contract weaknesses, which are further classified into 20 sub-research fields through thorough discussion and analysis. The SWE provides a systematic and comprehensive list of smart contract vulnerabilities, covering existing and emerging vulnerabilities in the last few years. Moreover, the SWE is a scalable and continuously iterative program. We propose two update mechanisms for the maintenance of the SWE. Regular updates involve the inclusion of new vulnerabilities from future top papers, while irregular updates enable individuals to report new weaknesses for review and potential addition to the SWE.
Jiachi Chen, Mingyuan Huang, Zewei Lin, Peilin Zheng, Zibin Zheng
Blockchain Res. Appl.3
2024 CRPWarner: Warning the Risk of Contract-Related Rug Pull in DeFi Smart Contracts
abstract
In recent years, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has grown rapidly due to the development of blockchain technology and smart contracts. As of March 2023, the estimated global cryptocurrency market cap has reached approximately $949 billion. However, security incidents continue to plague the DeFi ecosystem, and one of the most notorious examples is the “Rug Pull” scam. This type of cryptocurrency scam occurs when the developer of a particular token project intentionally abandons the project and disappears with investors’ funds. Despite only emerging in recent years, Rug Pull events have already caused significant financial losses. In this work, we manually collected and analyzed 103 real-world rug pull events, categorizing them based on their scam methods. Two primary categories were identified:Contract-relatedRug Pull (through malicious functions in smart contracts) andTransaction-relatedRug Pull (through cryptocurrency trading without utilizing malicious functions). Based on the analysis of rug pull events, we propose CRPWarner (short forContract-relatedRugPull RiskWarner) to identify malicious functions in smart contracts and issue warnings regarding potential rug pulls. We evaluated CRPWarner on 69 open-source smart contracts related to rug pull events and achieved a 91.8% precision, 85.9% recall, and 88.7% F1-score. Additionally, when evaluating CRPWarner on 13,484 real-world token contracts on Ethereum, it successfully detected 4168 smart contracts with malicious functions, including zero-day examples. The precision of large-scale experiments reaches 84.9%.
Zewei Lin, Jiachi Chen, Jiajing Wu, Weizhe Zhang, Yongjuan Wang, Zibin Zheng
IEEE Trans. Software Eng.1
2023 MLF-DET: Multi-Level Fusion for Cross-Modal 3D Object Detection
Zewei Lin, Yanqing Shen, Sanping Zhou, Shi-tao Chen, Nanning Zheng 0001
ICANN (7)1
2023 Collaborative knowledge-aware recommendation based on neighborhood negative sampling
Zewei Lin, Liping Qu
Inf. Syst.1