Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Spencer E. Minear
dblp:145/2439
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1995
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Authentication and access control · 84% Systems and software security · 16% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Operating systems · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1995 | Providing Policy Control Over Object Operations in a Mach-Based System · USENIX Security Symposium 1995 |
Authentication and access control
access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1993 | Assuring Distributed Trusted Mach · S&P 1993 |
Authentication and access control › access control › access control mechanisms
type enforcement |
0.0 | 1 | 1993 | Assuring Distributed Trusted Mach · S&P 1993 |
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › secure operating system
secure operating system design |
0.0 | 1 | 1993 | Assuring Distributed Trusted Mach · S&P 1993 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
capability-based access control · 0.0threat analysis · 0.0security policy categorization · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1995 | Providing Policy Control Over Object Operations in a Mach-Based System
Spencer E. Minear |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 1993 | Assuring Distributed Trusted MachabstractDistributed Trusted Mach (DTMach) is an operating system designed by Secure Computing Corporation. The goal of the project is to use the Mach 3.0 kernel as the base for a secure, distributed system. As a first step in developing the DTMach security policy, a categorization of general security concerns was constructed. Concerns that were not adequately addressed by the Mach 3.0 kernel indicated potential security vulnerabilities. The authors describe these general security concerns, the manner in which the Mach 3.0 kernel addresses each concern, and the manner in which DTMach addresses each concern. The focus is on the DTMach security policy and security mechanisms. It is first necessary to identify the general threats against which DTMach must protect. The next step is to identify control mechanisms that are sufficient to protect against each of the threats. The DTMach design makes extensive use of type enforcement in addressing the threats. The general threats and the countermeasures provided by DTMach are described, which provide more evidence of the usefulness of type enforcement in general and the high assurance provided by the DTMach type of enforcement policy.> Todd Fine, Spencer E. Minear |
S&P | 2 |