Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Spencer E. Minear

dblp:145/2439 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1995
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Authentication and access control · 84% Systems and software security · 16%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
access control
0.011995
Providing Policy Control Over Object Operations in a Mach-Based System · USENIX Security Symposium 1995
Authentication and access control
access control
0.011993
Assuring Distributed Trusted Mach · S&P 1993
Authentication and access control › access control › access control mechanisms
type enforcement
0.011993
Assuring Distributed Trusted Mach · S&P 1993
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › secure operating system
secure operating system design
0.011993
Assuring Distributed Trusted Mach · S&P 1993

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

capability-based access control · 0.0threat analysis · 0.0security policy categorization · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1995 Providing Policy Control Over Object Operations in a Mach-Based System
Spencer E. Minear
USENIX Security Symposium1
1993 Assuring Distributed Trusted Mach
abstract
Distributed Trusted Mach (DTMach) is an operating system designed by Secure Computing Corporation. The goal of the project is to use the Mach 3.0 kernel as the base for a secure, distributed system. As a first step in developing the DTMach security policy, a categorization of general security concerns was constructed. Concerns that were not adequately addressed by the Mach 3.0 kernel indicated potential security vulnerabilities. The authors describe these general security concerns, the manner in which the Mach 3.0 kernel addresses each concern, and the manner in which DTMach addresses each concern. The focus is on the DTMach security policy and security mechanisms. It is first necessary to identify the general threats against which DTMach must protect. The next step is to identify control mechanisms that are sufficient to protect against each of the threats. The DTMach design makes extensive use of type enforcement in addressing the threats. The general threats and the countermeasures provided by DTMach are described, which provide more evidence of the usefulness of type enforcement in general and the high assurance provided by the DTMach type of enforcement policy.>
Todd Fine, Spencer E. Minear
S&P2