The private intersection-sum with cardinality (PIS-CA) protocol enables two parties to privately compute the cardinality of the intersection between their datasets and the sum of the values associated with these intersecting elements, while keeping all other information confidential. As a related variant of private set intersection (PSI), private set intersection with cardinality (PSI-CA) protocols compute only the intersection size without considering the associated values. Existing PIS-CA protocols attempt to reduce the amount of communication through batch encryption-based optimization, but their incomplete design and implementation hinder their practical deployment. Moreover, the shuffle proof withO(√n) communication complexity adopted in their protocol incur substantial communication overhead, further limiting their scalability. To address these problems, we propose an optimized two-sided PIS-CA protocol in the malicious model. Our scheme provides a concrete and implementable batch encryption design that achieves practical communication efficiency, together with an enhanced lightweight shuffle proof based on the Curdleproofs framework. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed protocol significantly reduces the total communication cost, making it suitable for privacy-preserving applications such as ad conversion measurement.