Sebastian Zimmeck

dblp:150/5253 · DBLP profile ↗
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14ranked-venue papers
9as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-2500-2681ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 10 · 9 first-author · 6 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Exercising the CCPA Opt-out Right on Android: Legally Mandated but Practically Challenging
abstract
Many mobile apps' business model is based on sharing user data with ad networks to deliver personalized ads. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) gives California residents a right to opt out. In two experiments we evaluate to which extent popular Android apps enable California residents to exercise their right. In our first experiment—manually exercising the right via app-level UIs—we find that only 48 out of 100 apps implement a respective setting, which suggests that CCPA opt-out right compliance on the Android platform is generally low. In our second experiment—automatically exercising the opt-out right by sending Global Privacy Control (GPC) signals—we find for an app dataset of 1,811 apps that GPC is largely ineffective. While we estimate with 95% confidence that 62%-81% of apps in our app dataset must respect the CCPA opt-out right, many apps do not do so. Our evaluation of disabling apps' access to the AdID—which is technically not intended for exercising the CCPA opt-out right but could be practically effective—does not change our conclusion. For example, when sending GPC signals and disabling apps' access to the AdID, 338 apps still had the ccpa status of the ad network Vungle set to opted_in while only 26 had set it to opted_out. Overall, our results suggest a compliance gap as California residents have no effective way of exercising their CCPA opt-out right on the Android platform; neither at the app- nor at the platform-level. We think that re-purposing the Android AdID setting as an opt-out right setting with legal meaning under the CCPA and other laws could close this gap and improve users' privacy on the platform significantly.
Sebastian Zimmeck, Nishant Aggarwal, Zachary Liu, Sage Altman, Konrad Kollnig
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2025 Websites' Global Privacy Control Compliance at Scale and over Time
Katherine Hausladen, Oliver Wang, Sophie Eng, Jocelyn Wang, Francisca Wijaya, Matthew May, Sebastian Zimmeck
USENIX Security Symposium7
2024 Website Data Transparency in the Browser
abstract
Data collection by websites and their integrated third parties is often not transparent. We design privacy interfaces for the browser to help people understand who is collecting which data from them. In a proof of concept browser extension, Privacy Pioneer, we implement a privacy popup, a privacy history interface, and a watchlist to notify people when their data is collected. For detecting location data collection, we develop a machine learning model based on TinyBERT, which reaches an average F1 score of 0.94. We supplement our model with deterministic methods to detect trackers, collection of personal data, and other monetization techniques. In a usability study with 100 participants 82% found Privacy Pioneer easy to understand and 90% found it useful indicating the value of privacy interfaces directly integrated in the browser.
Sebastian Zimmeck, Daniel Goldelman, Owen Kaplan, Logan Brown, Justin Casler, Judeley Jean-Charles, Joe Champeau, Hamza Harkous
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2024 Generalizable Active Privacy Choice: Designing a Graphical User Interface for Global Privacy Control
abstract
The California Consumer Privacy Act and other privacy laws give people a right to opt out of the sale and sharing of personal information. In combination with privacy preference signals, especially, Global Privacy Control (GPC), such rights have the potential to empower people to assert control over their data. However, many laws prohibit opt out settings being turned on by default. The resulting usability challenges for people to exercise their rights motivate generalizable active privacy choice --- an interface design principle to make opt out settings usable without defaults. It is based on the idea of generalizing one individual opt out choice towards a larger set of choices. For example, people may apply an opt out choice on one site towards a larger set of sites. We explore generalizable active privacy choice in the context of GPC. We design and implement nine privacy choice schemes in a browser extension and explore them in a usability study with 410 participants. We find that generalizability features tend to decrease opt out utility slightly. However, at the same time, they increase opt out efficiency and make opting out less disruptive, which was more important to most participants. For the least disruptive scheme, selecting website categories to opt out from, 98% of participants expressed not feeling disrupted, a 40% point increase over the baseline schemes. 83% of participants understood the meaning of GPC. They also made their opt out choices with intent and, thus, in a legally relevant manner. To help people exercise their opt out rights via GPC our results support the adoption of a generalizable active privacy choice interface in web browsers.
Sebastian Zimmeck, Eliza Kuller, Chunyue Ma, Bella Tassone, Joe Champeau
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2023 Usability and Enforceability of Global Privacy Control
abstract
Web tracking by ad networks and other data-driven businesses is often privacy-invasive. Privacy laws, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act, aim to give people more control over their data. In particular, they provide a right to opt out from web tracking via privacy preference signals, notably Global Privacy Control (GPC). GPC holds the promise of enabling people to exercise their opt out rights on the web. Broad adoption of GPC hinges on its usability. In a usability survey we find that 94% of the participants would turn on GPC indicating a need for such efficient and effective opt out mechanism. 81% of the participants in our survey also have a correct understanding of what GPC does ensuring that their intent is accurately represented by their choice. The effectiveness of GPC is dependent on whether websites' GPC compliance can be enforced. A site's GPC compliance can be analyzed based on privacy flags, such as the US Privacy String, which is used on many sites to indicate the opt out status of a web user. Leveraging the US Privacy String for GPC purposes we implement a proof-of-concept browser extension that successfully and correctly analyzes sites' GPC compliance at a rate of 89%. We further implement a web crawler for our browser extension demonstrating that our analysis approach is scalable. We find that many sites do not respect GPC opt out signals despite being legally obligated to do so. Only 54/464 (12%) sites with a US Privacy String opt out users after having received a GPC signal.
Sebastian Zimmeck, Oliver Wang, Kuba Alicki, Jocelyn Wang, Sophie Eng
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2021 PrivacyFlash Pro: Automating Privacy Policy Generation for Mobile Apps
Sebastian Zimmeck, Rafael Goldstein, David Baraka
NDSS1
2019 MAPS: Scaling Privacy Compliance Analysis to a Million Apps
abstract
Abstract The app economy is largely reliant on data collection as its primary revenue model. To comply with legal requirements, app developers are often obligated to notify users of their privacy practices in privacy policies. However, prior research has suggested that many developers are not accurately disclosing their apps’ privacy practices. Evaluating discrepancies between apps’ code and privacy policies enables the identification of potential compliance issues. In this study, we introduce the Mobile App Privacy System (MAPS) for conducting an extensive privacy census of Android apps. We designed a pipeline for retrieving and analyzing large app populations based on code analysis and machine learning techniques. In its first application, we conduct a privacy evaluation for a set of 1,035,853 Android apps from the Google Play Store. We find broad evidence of potential non-compliance. Many apps do not have a privacy policy to begin with. Policies that do exist are often silent on the practices performed by apps. For example, 12.1% of apps have at least one location-related potential compliance issue. We hope that our extensive analysis will motivate app stores, government regulators, and app developers to more effectively review apps for potential compliance issues.
Sebastian Zimmeck, Peter Story, Daniel Smullen, Abhilasha Ravichander, Ziqi Wang 0007, Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Norman M. Sadeh
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2019 Analyzing Privacy Policies at Scale: From Crowdsourcing to Automated Annotations
abstract
Website privacy policies are often long and difficult to understand. While research shows that Internet users care about their privacy, they do not have the time to understand the policies of every website they visit, and most users hardly ever read privacy policies. Some recent efforts have aimed to use a combination of crowdsourcing, machine learning, and natural language processing to interpret privacy policies at scale, thus producing annotations for use in interfaces that inform Internet users of salient policy details. However, little attention has been devoted to studying the accuracy of crowdsourced privacy policy annotations, how crowdworker productivity can be enhanced for such a task, and the levels of granularity that are feasible for automatic analysis of privacy policies. In this article, we present a trajectory of work addressing each of these topics. We include analyses of crowdworker performance, evaluation of a method to make a privacy-policy oriented task easier for crowdworkers, a coarse-grained approach to labeling segments of policy text with descriptive themes, and a fine-grained approach to identifying user choices described in policy text. Together, the results from these efforts show the effectiveness of using automated and semi-automated methods for extracting from privacy policies the data practice details that are salient to Internet users’ interests.
Shomir Wilson, Florian Schaub, Frederick Liu, Kanthashree Mysore Sathyendra, Daniel Smullen, Sebastian Zimmeck, Rohan Ramanath, Peter Story, Fei Liu 0004, Norman M. Sadeh, Noah A. Smith
ACM Trans. Web6
2017 Identifying the Provision of Choices in Privacy Policy Text
abstract
Websites' and mobile apps' privacy policies, written in natural language, tend to be long and difficult to understand. Information privacy revolves around the fundamental principle of Notice and choice, namely the idea that users should be able to make informed decisions about what information about them can be collected and how it can be used. Internet users want control over their privacy, but their choices are often hidden in long and convoluted privacy policy texts. Moreover, little (if any) prior work has been done to detect the provision of choices in text. We address this challenge of enabling user choice by automatically identifying and extracting pertinent choice language in privacy policies. In particular, we present a two-stage architecture of classification models to identify opt-out choices in privacy policy text, labelling common varieties of choices with a mean F1 score of 0.735. Our techniques enable the creation of systems to help Internet users to learn about their choices, thereby effectuating notice and choice and improving Internet privacy.
Kanthashree Mysore Sathyendra, Shomir Wilson, Florian Schaub, Sebastian Zimmeck, Norman M. Sadeh
EMNLP4
2017 Automated Analysis of Privacy Requirements for Mobile Apps
Sebastian Zimmeck, Ziqi Wang 0007, Lieyong Zou, Roger Iyengar, Bin Liu 0017, Florian Schaub, Shomir Wilson, Norman M. Sadeh, Steven M. Bellovin, Joel R. Reidenberg
NDSS1
2017 A Privacy Analysis of Cross-device Tracking
Sebastian Zimmeck, Hyungtae Kim, Steven M. Bellovin, Tony Jebara
USENIX Security Symposium1
2016 The Creation and Analysis of a Website Privacy Policy Corpus
abstract
Shomir Wilson, Florian Schaub, Aswarth Abhilash Dara, Frederick Liu, Sushain Cherivirala, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Mads Schaarup Andersen, Sebastian Zimmeck, Kanthashree Mysore Sathyendra, N. Cameron Russell, Thomas B. Norton, Eduard Hovy, Joel Reidenberg, Norman Sadeh. Proceedings of the 54th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2016.
Shomir Wilson, Florian Schaub, Aswarth Abhilash Dara, Frederick Liu, Sushain Cherivirala, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Mads Schaarup Andersen, Sebastian Zimmeck, Kanthashree Mysore Sathyendra, N. Cameron Russell, Thomas B. Norton, Eduard H. Hovy, Joel R. Reidenberg, Norman M. Sadeh
ACL (1)8
2015 "I Don't Have a Photograph, But You Can Have My Footprints" - Revealing the Demographics of Location Data
Christopher J. Riederer, Sebastian Zimmeck, Coralie Phanord, Augustin Chaintreau, Steven M. Bellovin
ICWSM2
2014 Privee: An Architecture for Automatically Analyzing Web Privacy Policies
Sebastian Zimmeck, Steven M. Bellovin
USENIX Security Symposium1