Research on data annotation for artificial intelligence (AI) has demonstrated that biases, power, and culture impact the ways that annotators apply labels to data and subsequently affect downstream AI systems. However, annotators can only apply labels that are available to them in the annotation classification scheme. Drawing on a 3-year ethnographic study of an R&D collaboration between medical and AI researchers, we argue that the construction of the classification schema itself -- decisions about what kinds of data can and cannot be collected, what activities can and cannot be detected in the data, what the possible annotation classes ought to be, and the rules by which an item ought to be classified into each class -- dramatically shape the annotation process, and through it, the AI. We draw on Bowker and Star's [9] classification theory to detail how the creation of a training data codebook for a computer vision algorithm in hospital intensive care units (ICUs) evolved from its original, clinically-driven goal of classifying complex clinical activities into a narrower goal of identifying physical objects and simpler activities in the ICU. This work reinforces how trade-offs and decisions made long before annotators begin labeling data are highly consequential to the resulting AI system.

Algorithms are introducing changes to individuals? jobs, but do algorithms also lead to changes in the structures of organizations themselves? Organizational structures, as often formalized into organization (org) charts, are meant to facilitate coordinated decision-making. Yet our 10-month ethnographic study of a large online retail company reveals why the organizational structures that facilitate effective decision-making by humans may be in tension with the organizational structures that facilitate effective decision-making using algorithms. Our findings show that the human decision-makers needed small, divided-up sets of decisions, and they had previously accomplished this through how they structured individuals' roles and teams in the org chart. In contrast, when data scientists developed a new algorithm and first deployed it within organizational structures meant to support human decision-making, they realized that these small divided-up decision spaces were arbitrarily constraining the algorithm's search space. When not constrained in this manner, the algorithm could identify and recommend better solutions, but those optimal solutions did not always align with the structure of roles and teams in the org chart. This study suggests that as algorithms are integrated into the workplace, organization designs may begin to more explicitly reflect the contours of those algorithms' behaviors.

By identifying the socio-technical conditions required for teams to work effectively remotely, the Distance Matters framework has been influential in CSCW since its introduction in 2000. Advances in collaboration technology and practices have since brought teams increasingly closer to achieving these conditions. This paper presents a ten-month ethnography in a remote organization, where we observed that despite exhibiting excellent remote collaboration, teams paradoxically struggled to collaborate across team boundaries. We extend the Distance Matters framework to account for inter-team collaboration, arguing that challenges analogous to those in the original intra-team framework --- common ground, collaboration readiness, collaboration technology readiness, and coupling of work --- persist but are actualized differently at the inter-team scale. Finally, we identify a fundamental tension between the intra- and inter-team layers: the collaboration technology and practices that help individual teams thrive (e.g., adopting customized collaboration software) can also prompt collaboration challenges in the inter-team layer, and conversely the technology and practices that facilitate inter-team collaboration (e.g., strong centralized IT organizations) can harm practices at the intra-team layer. The addition of the inter-team layer to the Distance Matters framework opens new opportunities for CSCW, where balancing the tension between team and organizational collaboration needs will be a critical technological, operational, and organizational challenge for remote work in the coming decades.

Was a problematic team always doomed to frustration, or could it have ended another way? In this paper, we study the consistency of team fracture: a loss of team viability so severe that the team no longer wants to work together. Understanding whether team fracture is driven by the membership of the team, or by how their collaboration unfolded, motivates the design of interventions that either identify compatible teammates or ensure effective early interactions. We introduce an online experiment that reconvenes the same team without members realizing that they have worked together before, enabling us to temporarily erase previous team dynamics. Participants in our study completed a series of tasks across multiple teams, including one reconvened team, and privately blacklisted any teams that they would not want to work with again. We identify fractured teams as those blacklisted by half the members. We find that reconvened teams are strikingly polarized by task in the consistency of their fracture outcomes. On a creative task, teams might as well have been a completely different set of people: the same teams changed their fracture outcomes at a random chance rate. On a cognitive conflict and on an intellective task, the team instead replayed the same dynamics without realizing it, rarely changing their fracture outcomes. These results indicate that, for some tasks, team fracture can be strongly influenced by interactions in the first moments of a team's collaboration, and that interventions targeting these initial moments may be critical to scaffolding long-lasting teams.

Team structures---roles, norms, and interaction patterns---define how teams work. HCI researchers have theorized ideal team structures and built systems nudging teams towards them, such as those increasing turn-taking, deliberation, and knowledge distribution. However, organizational behavior research argues against the existence of universally ideal structures. Teams are diverse and excel under different structures: while one team might flourish under hierarchical leadership and a critical culture, another will flounder. In this paper, we present DreamTeam: a system that explores a large space of possible team structures to identify effective structures for each team based on observable feedback. To avoid overwhelming teams with too many changes, DreamTeam introduces multi-armed bandits with temporal constraints: an algorithm that manages the timing of exploration--exploitation trade-offs across multiple bandits simultaneously. A field experiment demonstrated that DreamTeam teams outperformed self-managing teams by 38%, manager-led teams by 46%, and teams with unconstrained bandits by 41%. This research advances computation as a powerful partner in establishing effective teamwork.

This paper introduces flash organizations: crowds structured like organizations to achieve complex and open-ended goals. Microtask workflows, the dominant crowdsourcing structures today, only enable goals that are so simple and modular that their path can be entirely pre-defined. We present a system that organizes crowd workers into computationally-represented structures inspired by those used in organizations - roles, teams, and hierarchies - which support emergent and adaptive coordination toward open-ended goals. Our system introduces two technical contributions: 1) encoding the crowd's division of labor into de-individualized roles, much as movie crews or disaster response teams use roles to support coordination between on-demand workers who have not worked together before; and 2) reconfiguring these structures through a model inspired by version control, enabling continuous adaptation of the work and the division of labor. We report a deployment in which flash organizations successfully carried out open-ended and complex goals previously out of reach for crowdsourcing, including product design, software development, and game production. This research demonstrates digitally networked organizations that flexibly assemble and reassemble themselves from a globally distributed online workforce to accomplish complex work.

Distributed, parallel crowd workers can accomplish simple tasks through workflows, but teams of collaborating crowd workers are necessary for complex goals. Unfortunately, a fundamental condition for effective teams -- familiarity with other members -- stands in contrast to crowd work's flexible, on-demand nature. We enable effective crowd teams with Huddler, a system for workers to assemble familiar teams even under unpredictable availability and strict time constraints. Huddler utilizes a dynamic programming algorithm to optimize for highly familiar teammates when individual availability is unknown. We first present a field experiment that demonstrates the value of familiarity for crowd teams: familiar crowd teams doubled the performance of ad-hoc (unfamiliar) teams on a collaborative task. We then report a two-week field deployment wherein Huddler enabled crowd workers to convene highly familiar teams in 18 minutes on average. This research advances the goal of supporting long-term, team-based collaborations without sacrificing the flexibility of crowd work.

The dominant crowdsourcing infrastructure today is the workflow, which decomposes goals into small independent tasks. However, complex goals such as design and engineering have remained stubbornly difficult to achieve with crowdsourcing workflows. Is this due to a lack of imagination, or a more fundamental limit? This paper explores this question through in-depth case studies of 22 workers across six workflow-based crowd teams, each pursuing a complex and interdependent web development goal. We used an inductive mixed method approach to analyze behavior trace data, chat logs, survey responses and work artifacts to understand how workers enacted and adapted the crowdsourcing workflows. Our results indicate that workflows served as useful coordination artifacts, but in many cases critically inhibited crowd workers from pursuing real-time adaptations to their work plans. However, the CSCW and organizational behavior literature argues that all sufficiently complex goals require open-ended adaptation. If complex work requires adaptation but traditional static crowdsourcing workflows can't support it, our results suggest that complex work may remain a fundamental limitation of workflow-based crowdsourcing infrastructures.

We introduce flash teams, a framework for dynamically assembling and managing paid experts from the crowd. Flash teams advance a vision of expert crowd work that accomplishes complex, interdependent goals such as engineering and design. These teams consist of sequences of linked modular tasks and handoffs that can be computationally managed. Interactive systems reason about and manipulate these teams' structures: for example, flash teams can be recombined to form larger organizations and authored automatically in response to a user's request. Flash teams can also hire more people elastically in reaction to task needs, and pipeline intermediate output to accelerate completion times. To enable flash teams, we present Foundry, an end-user authoring platform and runtime manager. Foundry allows users to author modular tasks, then manages teams through handoffs of intermediate work. We demonstrate that Foundry and flash teams enable crowdsourcing of a broad class of goals including design prototyping, course development, and film animation, in half the work time of traditional self-managed teams.