Matt Luckcuck

dblp:152/5899 · also Matthew Luckcuck · DBLP profile ↗
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11ranked-venue papers
3as first author
7since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-6444-9312ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 9 · 2 first-author · 6 since 2021Theory of computation · 6 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Sharper Specs for Smarter Drones: Formalising Requirements with FRET
Oisín Sheridan, Leandro Buss Becker, Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Rosemary Monahan
REFSQ4
2025 Eliciting Explainability Requirements for Safety-Critical Systems: A Nuclear Case Study
Hazel M. Taylor, Matt Luckcuck, Marie Farrell, Caroline Jay, Angelo Cangelosi, Louise A. Dennis
REFSQ2
2024 Adventures in FRET and Specification
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Rosemary Monahan, Conor Reynolds, Oisín Sheridan
ISoLA (3)2
2024 FRETting and Formal Modelling: A Mechanical Lung Ventilator
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Rosemary Monahan, Conor Reynolds, Oisín Sheridan
ABZ2
2022 A Requirements-Driven Methodology: Formal Modelling and Verification of an Aircraft Engine Controller
Oisín Sheridan, Rosemary Monahan, Matt Luckcuck
IFM3
2022 FRETting About Requirements: Formalised Requirements for an Aircraft Engine Controller
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Oisín Sheridan, Rosemary Monahan
REFSQ2
2021 Bridging the gap between single- and multi-model predictive runtime verification
abstract
Abstract This paper presents an extension of the Predictive Runtime Verification (PRV) paradigm to consider multiple models of the System Under Analysis (SUA). We call this extension Multi-Model PRV. Typically, PRV attempts to predict the satisfaction or violation of a property based on a trace and a (single) formal model of the SUA. However, contemporary node- or component-based systems (e.g. robotic systems) may benefit from monitoring based on a model of each component. We show how a Multi-Model PRV approach can be applied in either a centralised or a compositional way (where the property is compositional), as best suits the SUA. Crucially, our approach is formalism-agnostic. We demonstrate our approach using an illustrative example of a Mars Curiosity rover simulation and evaluate our contribution via a prototype implementation.
Angelo Ferrando 0001, Rafael C. Cardoso 0001, Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Fabio Papacchini, Michael Fisher 0001, Viviana Mascardi
Formal Methods Syst. Des.4
2019 A Summary of Formal Specification and Verification of Autonomous Robotic Systems
Matt Luckcuck, Marie Farrell, Louise A. Dennis, Clare Dixon, Michael Fisher 0001
IFM1
2018 Robotics and Integrated Formal Methods: Necessity Meets Opportunity
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Michael Fisher 0001
IFM2
2017 Safety-Critical Java: level 2 in practice
abstract
Summary Safety‐Critical Java (SCJ) is a profile of the Real‐Time Specification for Java that brings to the safety‐critical industry the possibility of using Java. SCJ defines three compliance levels: Level 0, Level 1 and Level 2. The SCJ specification is clear on what constitutes a Level 2 application in terms of its use of the defined API but not the occasions on which it should be used. This paper broadly classifies the features that are only available at Level 2 into three groups: nested mission sequencers, managed threads and global scheduling across multiple processors. We explore the first two groups to elicit programming requirements that they support. We identify several areas where the SCJ specification needs modifications to support these requirements fully; these include the following: support for terminating managed threads, the ability to set a deadline on the transition between missions and augmentation of the mission sequencer concept to support composibility of timing constraints. We also propose simplifications to the termination protocol of missions and their mission sequencers. To illustrate the benefit of our changes, we present excerpts from a formal model of SCJ Level 2 written inCircus, a state‐rich process algebra for refinement. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Matt Luckcuck, Andy J. Wellings, Ana Cavalcanti 0001
Concurr. Comput. Pract. Exp.1
2016 A Formal Model of the Safety-Critical Java Level 2 Paradigm
Matt Luckcuck, Ana Cavalcanti 0001, Andy J. Wellings
IFM1