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Guruprasad Ganesh

dblp:153/5749 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 54% Hardware security and side channels · 46%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
ARM TrustZone
0.212014
Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World · CCS 2014
Systems and software security › operating system security
kernel protection
0.212014
Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World · CCS 2014
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.212014
Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World · CCS 2014
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.212014
Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World · CCS 2014
Systems and software security › virtualization security
hypervisor security
0.112014
Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World · CCS 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

trustzone secure world · 0.2real-time kernel protection · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2017 PrivWatcher: Non-bypassable Monitoring and Protection of Process Credentials from Memory Corruption Attacks
abstract
Commodity operating systems kernels are typically implemented using low-level unsafe languages, which leads to the inevitability of memory corruption vulnerabilities. Multiple defense techniques are widely adopted to mitigate the impact of memory corruption on executable code and control data. Nevertheless, there has not been much attention to defend against corruption of non-control data despite the fact that previous incidents of kernel exploitation showed that corrupting non-control data is a real threat.
Ahmed M. Azab, Guruprasad Ganesh, Peng Ning
AsiaCCS3
2014 Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World
abstract
TrustZone-based Real-time Kernel Protection (TZ-RKP) is a novel system that provides real-time protection of the OS kernel using the ARM TrustZone secure world. TZ-RKP is more secure than current approaches that use hypervisors to host kernel protection tools. Although hypervisors provide privilege and isolation, they face fundamental security challenges due to their growing complexity and code size. TZ-RKP puts its security monitor, which represents its entire Trusted Computing Base (TCB), in the TrustZone secure world; a safe isolated environment that is dedicated to security services. Hence, the security monitor is safe from attacks that can potentially compromise the kernel, which runs in the normal world. Using the secure world for kernel protection has been crippled by the lack of control over targets that run in the normal world. TZ-RKP solves this prominent challenge using novel techniques that deprive the normal world from the ability to control certain privileged system functions. These functions are forced to route through the secure world for inspection and approval before being executed. TZ-RKP's control of the normal world is non-bypassable. It can effectively stop attacks that aim at modifying or injecting kernel binaries. It can also stop attacks that involve modifying the system memory layout, e.g, through memory double mapping. This paper presents the implementation and evaluation of TZ-RKP, which has gone through rigorous and thorough evaluation of effectiveness and performance. It is currently deployed on the latest models of the Samsung Galaxy series smart phones and tablets, which clearly demonstrates that it is a practical real-world system.
Ahmed M. Azab, Peng Ning, Jitesh Shah, Rohan Bhutkar, Guruprasad Ganesh, Jia Ma, Wenbo Shen
CCS6