Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Joseph Hannon
dblp:153/5760
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Authentication and access control · 56% Web and mobile security · 44% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Web and mobile security
payment security |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards Without the PIN · CCS 2014 |
Authentication and access control › proximity-based authentication
relay attack |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards Without the PIN · CCS 2014 |
Authentication and access control › authentication › authentication attack
PIN bypass |
0.1 | 1 | 2014 | Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards Without the PIN · CCS 2014 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
protocol analysis · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards Without the PINabstractIn this paper we present an attack, which allows fraudulent transactions to be collected from EMV contactless credit and debit cards without the knowledge of the cardholder. The attack exploits a previously unreported vulnerability in EMV protocol, which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value transactions without the cardholder's PIN when the transaction is carried out in a foreign currency. For example, we have found that Visa credit cards will approve foreign currency transactions for any amount up to ∈999,999.99 without the cardholder's PIN, this side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK. This paper outlines our analysis methodology that identified the flaw in the EMV protocol, and presents a scenario in which fraudulent transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a "rogue merchant" who then uses the transaction data to take money from the victim's account. In reality, the criminals would choose a value between ∈100 and ∈200, which is low enough to be within the victim's balance and not to raise suspicion, but high enough to make each attack worthwhile. The attack is novel in that it could be operated on a large scale with multiple attackers collecting fraudulent transactions for a central rogue merchant which can be located anywhere in the world where EMV payments are accepted. Martin Emms, Budi Arief, Leo Freitas, Joseph Hannon, Aad P. A. van Moorsel |
CCS | 4 |