This paper studies games of voluntary disclosure in which a sender discloses evidence to a receiver who then offers an allocation and transfers. We characterize all equilibrium payoffs using information design as a tool. Our main result establishes that any payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be supported by an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Hence, our analysis suggests an equivalence between disclosure and design in this setting. We apply our results to monopoly pricing, trading financial assets, insurance markets, and policy negotiations.

We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The proposer cannot commit to future proposals. When players are patient, there can be equilibria with Coasian dynamics: the veto player's private information can largely nullify proposer's bargaining power. Our main result, however, is that there are also equilibria in which the proposer obtains the high payoff that he would with commitment power. The driving force is that the veto player's single-peaked preferences give the proposer an option to "leapfrog", i.e., to secure agreement from only low-surplus types early on to credibly extract surplus from high types later. Methodologically, we exploit the connection between sequential bargaining and static mechanism design.