As sixth-generation (6G) networks advance to enable massive connectivity and intelligent services, energy efficiency becomes a vital concern, particularly for battery- and edge-powered devices. Building on previous work in task-oriented semantic communication using deep reinforcement learning, this paper proposes an energy-efficient semantic communication framework based on an enhanced Twin-Delayed Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (TD3) algorithm integrated with an Adaptive Semantic Compression Policy (ASCP). In the proposed framework, we incorporate a predictive channel-aware semantic forecasting (PCSF) module, which leverages lightweight long short-term memory (LSTM) learning models to predict short-term fluctuations in channel conditions. By proactively anticipating variations in signal quality, the agent adjusts semantic compression levels and transmission strategies in advance, enhancing both energy efficiency and the preservation of task-relevant semantic information, particularly under rapidly changing network dynamics. Simulation results show that our energy-aware TD3-ASCP framework, enhanced with PCSF, significantly improves transmission efficiency and accuracy by up to 32% and 26%, respectively, compared to state-of-the-art algorithms.

Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user's data. Previous research has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write requests issued to the memory can correlate them with the application to learn its sensitive data. However, information leakage through only the write access patterns is less obvious and not well studied in the current literature. In this work, we demonstrate an actual attack on power-side-channel resistant Montgomery's ladder based modular exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public key cryptography. We infer the complete 512-bit secret exponent in ~ 3.5 minutes by virtue of just the write access patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. In order to learn the victim algorithm's write access patterns under realistic settings, we exploit a compromised DMA device to take frequent snapshots of the application's address space, and then run a simple differential analysis on these snapshots to find the write access sequence. The attack has been shown on an Intel Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz processor based system. We further discuss a possible attack on McEliece public-key cryptosystem that also exploits the write-access patterns to learn the secret key.

Over the past decade, Hardware Trojans (HTs) research community has made significant progress towards developing effective countermeasures for various types of HTs, yet these countermeasures are shown to be circumvented by sophisticated HTs designed subsequently. Therefore, instead of guaranteeing a certain (low) false negative rate for a smallconstantset of publicly known HTs, a rigorous security framework of HTs should provide an effective algorithm to detect any HT from anexponentially largeclass (exponential in number of wires in IP core) of HTs with negligible false negative rate. In this work, we present HaTCh, the first rigorous algorithm of HT detection within the paradigm of pre-silicon logic testing based tools. HaTCh detects any HT from$H_D$, a huge class of deterministic HTs which is orders of magnitude larger than the small subclass (e.g., TrustHub) considered in the current literature. We prove that HaTCh offers negligible false negative rate and controllable false positive rate for the class$H_D$. Given certain global characteristics regarding the stealthiness of the HT within$H_D$, the computational complexity of HaTCh for practical HTs scales polynomially with the number of wires in the IP core. We implement and test HaTCh on TrustHub and other sophisticated HTs.

PathORAM is a popular security primitive for obfuscating memory access patterns from a secure processor to an insecure main memory. Emerging throughput multicore and GPU processors provide immense memory bandwidth via multiple on-chip memory controllers. PathORAM translates a single off-chip cache line access into ~100 cache lines, thereby stressing the available memory bandwidth. However, current PathORAM scheme shows degradation of bandwidth utilization with an increase in the number of memory controllers. This deprivation in bandwidth utilization is primarily due to the fact that PathORAM falls short in proportionate distribution of memory accesses among all available on-chip memory controllers. This paper presents a novel ORAM path distribution scheme that ensures balanced load distribution among parallel on-chip memory controllers, and consequently improves secure processor performance by ~24% over state-of-the-art PathORAM scheme.

The transactional conflict problem arises in transactional systems whenever two or more concurrent transactions clash on a data item. While the standard solution to such conflicts is to immediately abort one of the transactions, some practical systems consider the alternative of delaying conflict resolution for a short interval, which may allow one of the transactions to commit. The challenge in the transactional conflict problem is to choose the optimal length of this delay interval so as to minimize the overall running time penalty for the conflicting transactions. In this paper, we propose a family of optimal online algorithms for the transactional conflict problem. Specifically, we consider variants of this problem which arise in different implementations of transactional systems, namely "requestor wins'' and "requestor aborts'' implementations: in the former, the recipient of a coherence request is aborted, whereas in the latter, it is the requestor which has to abort. Both strategies are implemented by real systems. We show that the requestor aborts case can be reduced to a classic instance of the ski rental problem, while the requestor wins case leads to a new version of this classical problem, for which we derive optimal deterministic and randomized algorithms. Moreover, we prove that, under a simplified adversarial model, our algorithms are constant-competitive with the offline optimum in terms of throughput. We validate our algorithmic results empirically through a hardware simulation of hardware transactional memory (HTM), showing that our algorithms can lead to non-trivial performance improvements for classic concurrent data structures.

Critical resource sharing among multiple entities in a processing system is inevitable, which in turn calls for the presence of appropriate authentication and access control mechanisms. Generally speaking, these mechanisms are implemented via trusted software "policy checkers" that enforce certain high level application-specific "rules" to enforce a policy. Whether implemented as operating system modules or embedded inside the application ad hoc, these policy checkers expose additional attack surface in addition to the application logic. In order to protect application software from an adversary, modern secure processing platforms, such as Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), employ principled hardware isolation to offer secure software containers or enclaves to execute trusted sensitive code with some integrity and privacy guarantees against a privileged software adversary. We extend this model further and propose using these hardware isolation mechanisms to shield the authentication and access control logic essential to policy checker software. While relying on the fundamental features of modern secure processors, our framework introduces productive software design guidelines which enable a guarded environment to execute sensitive policy checking code - hence enforcing application control flow integrity - and afford flexibility to the application designer to construct appropriate high-level policies to customize policy checker software.

High memory contention is generally agreed to be a worst-case scenario for concurrent data structures. There has been a significant amount of research effort spent investigating designs which minimize contention, and several programming techniques have been proposed to mitigate its effects. However, there are currently few architectural mechanisms to allow scaling contended data structures at high thread counts.

The challenges faced in securing embedded computing systems against multifaceted memory safety vulnerabilities have prompted great interest in the development of memory safety countermeasures. These countermeasures either provide protection only against their corresponding type of vulnerabilities, or incur substantial architectural modifications and overheads in order to provide complete safety, which makes them infeasible for embedded systems. In this paper, we propose M-MAP: a comprehensive system based on multi-factor memory authentication for complete memory safety. We examine certain crucial implications of composing memory integrity verification and bounds checking schemes in a comprehensive system. Based on these implications, we implement M-MAP with hardware based memory integrity verification and software based bounds checking to achieve a balance between hardware modifications and performance. We demonstrate that M-MAP implemented on top of a lightweight out-of-order processor delivers complete memory safety with only 32% performance overhead on average, while incurring minimal hardware modifications, and area overhead.

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is an established technique to hide the access pattern to an untrusted storage system. With ORAM, a curious adversary cannot tell what address the user is accessing when observing the bits moving between the user and the storage system. All existing ORAM schemes achieve obliviousness by adding redundancy to the storage system, i.e., each access is turned into multiple random accesses. Such redundancy incurs a large performance overhead.