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Xingbo Hu

dblp:156/0804 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Deep learning architectures and training · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.122022
Towards Security Threats of Deep Learning Systems: A Survey · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2022
DRMI: A Dataset Reduction Technology based on Mutual Information for Black-box Attacks · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
model inversion attack
0.612022
Towards Security Threats of Deep Learning Systems: A Survey · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2022
Security and privacy of machine learning
model stealing
0.612022
Towards Security Threats of Deep Learning Systems: A Survey · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2022
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack
0.612022
Towards Security Threats of Deep Learning Systems: A Survey · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2022
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
black-box attack
0.512021
DRMI: A Dataset Reduction Technology based on Mutual Information for Black-box Attacks · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
deep learning systems
0.212022
Towards Security Threats of Deep Learning Systems: A Survey · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

survey · 1.1quantitative analysis · 1.1qualitative analysis · 1.1mutual information · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Towards Security Threats of Deep Learning Systems: A Survey
abstract
Deep learning has gained tremendous success and great popularity in the past few years. However, deep learning systems are suffering several inherent weaknesses, which can threaten the security of learning models. Deep learning’s wide use further magnifies the impact and consequences. To this end, lots of research has been conducted with the purpose of exhaustively identifying intrinsic weaknesses and subsequently proposing feasible mitigation. Yet few are clear about how these weaknesses are incurred and how effective these attack approaches are in assaulting deep learning. In order to unveil the security weaknesses and aid in the development of a robust deep learning system, we undertake an investigation on attacks towards deep learning, and analyze these attacks to conclude some findings in multiple views. In particular, we focus on four types of attacks associated with security threats of deep learning: model extraction attack, model inversion attack, poisoning attack and adversarial attack. For each type of attack, we construct its essential workflow as well as adversary capabilities and attack goals. Pivot metrics are devised for comparing the attack approaches, by which we perform quantitative and qualitative analyses. From the analysis, we have identified significant and indispensable factors in an attack vector, e.g., how to reduce queries to target models, what distance should be used for measuring perturbation. We shed light on 18 findings covering these approaches’ merits and demerits, success probability, deployment complexity and prospects. Moreover, we discuss other potential security weaknesses and possible mitigation which can inspire relevant research in this area.
Yingzhe He, Guozhu Meng, Kai Chen 0012, Xingbo Hu, Jinwen He
IEEE Trans. Software Eng.4
2021 Why is Your Trojan NOT Responding? A Quantitative Analysis of Failures in Backdoor Attacks of Neural Networks
Xingbo Hu, Yibing Lan, Ruimin Gao, Guozhu Meng, Kai Chen 0012
ICA3PP (3)1
2021 DRMI: A Dataset Reduction Technology based on Mutual Information for Black-box Attacks
Yingzhe He, Guozhu Meng, Kai Chen 0012, Xingbo Hu, Jinwen He
USENIX Security Symposium4
2015 Blind joint estimation of carrier frequency offset and I/Q imbalance in OFDM systems
Weiyang Xu, Xingbo Hu
Signal Process.3