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Akira Shibaishi

dblp:156/4197 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1985
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
digital signatures
0.011985
A Fast Signature Scheme Based on Quadratic Inequalities · S&P 1985
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
factoring-based cryptography
0.011985
A Fast Signature Scheme Based on Quadratic Inequalities · S&P 1985
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
public-key cryptography
0.011985
A Fast Signature Scheme Based on Quadratic Inequalities · S&P 1985

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

quadratic congruent inequality · 0.0one-way hash function · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1985 A Fast Signature Scheme Based on Quadratic Inequalities
abstract
A new digital signature scheme is proposed in which the computation time is several hundred times faster than the RSA scheme and in which the key length and signature length are almost comparable to those for the RSA. Moreover, the scheme can be easily implemented and is, therefore, most practical for many digital signature applications. This new scheme is based on both a quadratic congruent inequality and a one-way hash function. The secret key consists of two large prime numbers p and q, and the public key is their product, n=p2q. An inequality is used for signature verification. Although the degree of security in this scheme has not been proved, it is shown that security seems to be equivalent to the difficulty of factoring a large number.
Tatsuski Okamoto, Akira Shibaishi
S&P2