Sparse Convolution (SC) is widely used for processing 3D point clouds that are inherently sparse. Different from dense convolution, SC preserves the sparsity of the input point cloud by only allowing outputs to specific locations. To efficiently compute SC, prior SC engines first use hash tables to build a kernel map that stores the necessary General Matrix Multiplication (GEMM) operations to be executed (Map step), and then use a Gather-GEMM-Scatter process to execute these GEMM operations (GMaS step). In this work, we analyze the shortcomings of prior state-of-the-art SC engines, and propose Minuet, a novel memory-efficient SC engine tailored for modern GPUs. Minuet proposes to (i) replace the hash tables used in the Map step with a novel segmented sorting double-traversed binary search algorithm that highly utilizes the on-chip memory hierarchy of GPUs, (ii) use a lightweight scheme to autotune the tile size in the Gather and Scatter operations of the GMaS step, such that to adapt the execution to the particular characteristics of each SC layer, dataset, and GPU architecture, and (iii) employ a padding-efficient GEMM grouping approach that reduces both memory padding and kernel launching overheads. Our evaluations show that Minuet significantly outperforms prior SC engines by on average 1.74× (up to 2.22×) for end-to-end point cloud network executions. Our novel segmented sorting double-traversed binary search algorithm achieves superior speedups by 15.8× on average (up to 26.8×) over prior SC engines in the Map step. The source code of Minuet is publicly available at https://github.com/UofT-EcoSystem/Minuet.

General purpose GPU (GPGPU) computing in virtualized environments leverages PCI passthrough to achieve GPU performance comparable to bare-metal execution. However, GPU passthrough prevents service administrators from performing virtual machine migration between physical hosts.

Smartphones and tablets are easily lost or stolen. This makes them susceptible to an inexpensive class of memory attacks, such as cold-boot attacks, using a bus monitor to observe the memory bus, and DMA attacks. This paper describes Sentry, a system that allows applications and OS components to store their code and data on the System-on-Chip (SoC) rather than in DRAM. We use ARM-specific mechanisms originally designed for embedded systems, but still present in today's mobile devices, to protect applications and OS subsystems from memory attacks.