The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends expanding the set of allowed ad formats---to include a variety of sizes, decorations, and other distinguishing features---have raised critical problems for GSP-based platforms. Alternatives such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction raise different complications because they fundamentally change the way prices are computed. In this paper we report on our efforts to redesign a search ad selling system from the ground up in this new context, proposing a mechanism that optimizes an entire slate of ads globally and computes prices that achieve properties analogous to those held by GSP in the original, simpler setting of uniform ads. A careful algorithmic coupling of allocation-optimization and pricing-computation allows our auction to operate within the strict timing constraints inherent in real-time ad auctions. We report performance results of the auction in Yahoo's Gemini Search platform.

We study the impact of display advertising on user search behavior using a field experiment. In such an experiment, the treatment group users are exposed to some display advertising campaign, while the control group users are not. During the campaign and the post-campaign period we monitor the user search queries and we label them as relevant or irrelevant to the campaign using techniques that leverage the bipartite query-URL click graph. Our results indicate that users who are exposed to the advertising campaign submit 5% to 25% more queries that are relevant to it compared to the unexposed users.