Augmented Reality (AR) System-on-Chips (SoCs) have strict power budgets and form-factor limitations for wearable, all-day use AR glasses running high-performance applications. Limited compute and memory resources that can fit within the strict industrial design area footprint of an AR SoC, however, create performance bottlenecks for demanding workloads such as Pixel Codec Avatars (PiCA) group-calling which connects multiple users with their photorealistic representations. To alleviate this unique wearables challenge, 3D integration with hybrid-bonding technology offers energy-efficient 3D stacking of more silicon resources within the same SoC footprint. Implementing such 3D architectures, however, is another challenge as current EDA tools and flows offer limited 3D design control. In this work, we present a 3D design methodology for robust 3D clock network and datapath design using current EDA tools. To validate the proposed methodology, we implemented a 3D integrated prototype AR SoC housing a 3D-stacked Machine Learning (ML) accelerator utilizing TSMC SoIC™bonding technology. Silicon measurements demonstrate that the 3D ML accelerator enables running PiCA AR group call at 30 frames-per-second (fps) by 3D-expanding its memory resources by 4× to achieve 2× better energy-efficiency when compared to a 2D baseline accelerator at iso-footprint.

In the early design phase of a Deep Neural Network (DNN) acceleration system, fast energy and latency estimation are important to evaluate the optimality of different design candidates on algorithm, hardware, and algorithm-to-hardware mapping, given the gigantic design space. This work proposes a uniform intra-layer analytical latency model for DNN accelerators that can be used to evaluate diverse architectures and dataflows. It employs a 3-step approach to systematically estimate the latency breakdown of different system components, capture the operation state of each memory component, and identify stall-induced performance bottlenecks. To achieve high accuracy, different memory attributes, operands' memory sharing scenarios, as well as dataflow implications have been taken into account. Validation against an in-house taped-out accelerator across various DNN layers has shown an average latency model accuracy of 94.3%. To showcase the capability of the proposed model, we carry out 3 case studies to assess respectively the impact of mapping, workloads, and diverse hardware architectures on latency, driving design insights for algorithm-hardware-mapping co-optimization.

The world's appetite for analyzing massive amounts of structured and unstructured data has grown dramatically. The computational demands of these abundant-data applications, such as deep learning, far exceed the capabilities of today's computing systems and are unlikely to be met with isolated improvements in transistor or memory technologies, or integrated circuit architectures alone. To achieve unprecedented functionality, speed, and energy efficiency, one must create transformative nanosystems whose architectures are based on the salient properties of the underlying nanotechnologies. Our Nano-Engineered Computing Systems Technology (N3XT) approach makes such nanosystems possible through new computing system architectures leveraging emerging device (logic and memory) nanotechnologies and their dense 3-D integration with fine-grained connectivity to immerse computing in memory and new logic devices (such as carbon nanotube field-effect transistors for implementing high-speed and low-energy logic circuits) as well as high-density nonvolatile memory (such as resistive memory), and amenable to ultradense (monolithic) 3-D integration of thin layers of logic and memory devices that are fabricated at low temperature. In addition, we explore the use of several device and integration technologies in the N3XT beyond the specific ones mentioned earlier that are also used in our main nanosystem prototypes. We also present an efficient resiliency technique to overcome endurance challenges in certain resistive memory technologies. N3XT hardware prototypes demonstrate the practicality of our architectures. We evaluate the benefits of the N3XT using a simulation framework calibrated using experimental measurements. System-level energy-delay product of common implementations of abundant-data workloads improves by three orders of magnitude in the N3XT compared with conventional architectures. These improvements impact a broad range of application workloads and architecture configurations, from embedded systems to the cloud.

There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan detection during IC testing, it is still possible for attacks to go undetected. Using a combination of new design techniques and new memory technologies, we present a new approach that detects a wide variety of hardware Trojans during IC testing and also during system operation in the field. Our approach can also prevent a wide variety of attacks during synthesis, place-and-route, and fabrication of ICs. It can be applied to any digital system, and can be tuned for both traditional and split-manufacturing methods. We demonstrate its applicability for both application-specified integrated circuits and field-programmable gate arrays. Using fabricated test chips with Trojan emulation capabilities and also using simulations, we demonstrate: 1) the area and power costs of our approach can range between 7.4%-165% and 7%-60%, respectively, depending on the design and the attacks targeted; 2) the speed impact can be minimal (close to 0%); 3) our approach can detect 99.998% of Trojans (emulated using test chips) that do not require detailed knowledge of the design being attacked; 4) our approach can prevent 99.98% of specific attacks (simulated) that utilize detailed knowledge of the design being attacked (e.g., through reverse engineering); and 5) our approach never produces any false positives, i.e., it does not report attacks when the IC operates correctly.