Most differentially private mechanisms are designed for the use of a single analyst. In reality, however, there are often multiple stakeholders with different and possibly conflicting priorities that must share the same privacy loss budget. This motivates the problem of equitable budget-sharing for multi-analyst differential privacy. Our previous work defined desiderata that any mechanism in this space should satisfy and introduced methods for budget-sharing in the offline case where queries are known in advance. We extend our previous work on multi-analyst differentially private query answering to the case of online query answering, where queries come in one at a time and must be answered without knowledge of the following queries. We demonstrate that the unknown ordering of queries in the online case results in a fundamental limit in the number of queries that can be answered while satisfying the desiderata. In response, we develop two mechanisms, one which satisfies the desiderata in all cases but is subject to the fundamental limitations, and another that randomizes the input order ensuring that existing online query answering mechanisms can satisfy the desiderata.

Graph centrality measures use the structure of a network to quantify central or "important" nodes, with applications in web search, social media analysis, and graphical data mining generally. Traditional centrality measures such as the well known PageRank interpret a directed edge as a vote in favor of the importance of the linked node. We study the case where nodes may belong to diverse communities or interests and investigate centrality measures that can identify nodes that are simultaneously important to many such diverse communities. We propose a family of diverse centrality measures formed as fixed point solutions to a generalized nonlinear eigenvalue problem. Our measure can be efficiently computed on large graphs by iterated best response and we study its normative properties on both random graph models and real-world data. We find that we are consistently and efficiently able to identify the most important diverse nodes of a graph, that is, those that are simultaneously central to multiple communities.

Large organizations that collect data about populations (like the US Census Bureau) release summary statistics that are used by multiple stakeholders for resource allocation and policy making problems. These organizations are also legally required to protect the privacy of individuals from whom they collect data. Differential Privacy (DP) provides a solution to release useful summary data while preserving privacy. Most DP mechanisms are designed to answer a single set of queries. In reality, there are often multiple stakeholders that use a given data release and have overlapping but not-identical queries. This introduces a novel joint optimization problem in DP where the privacy budget must be shared among different analysts. We initiate study into the problem of DP query answering across multiple analysts. To capture the competing goals and priorities of multiple analysts, we formulate three desiderata that any mechanism should satisfy in this setting - The Sharing Incentive, Non-interference, and Adaptivity - while still optimizing for overall error. We demonstrate how existing DP query answering mechanisms in the multi-analyst settings fail to satisfy at least one of the desiderata. We present novel DP algorithms that provably satisfy all our desiderata and empirically show that they incur low error on realistic tasks.

We study higher statistical moments of Distortion for randomized social choice in a metric implicit utilitarian model. The Distortion of a social choice mechanism is the expected approximation factor with respect to the optimal utilitarian social cost (OPT). The k'th moment of Distortion is the expected approximation factor with respect to the k'th power of OPT. We consider mechanisms that elicit alternatives by randomly sampling voters for their favorite alternative. We design two families of mechanisms that provide constant (with respect to the number of voters and alternatives) k'th moment of Distortion using just k samples if all voters can then participate in a vote among the proposed alternatives, or 2k-1 samples if only the sampled voters can participate. We also show that these numbers of samples are tight. Such mechanisms deviate from a constant approximation to OPT with probability that drops exponentially in the number of samples, independent of the total number of voters and alternatives. We conclude with simulations on real-world Participatory Budgeting data to qualitatively complement our theoretical insights.

We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize Distortion, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal utilities. We consider two additional desiderata: Constant sample complexity and Squared Distortion. Constant sample complexity means that the mechanism (potentially randomized) only uses a constant number of ordinal queries regardless of the number of voters and alternatives. Squared Distortion is a measure of variance of the Distortion of a randomized mechanism.Our primary contribution is the first social choice mechanism with constant sample complexity and constant Squared Distortion (which also implies constant Distortion). We call the mechanism Random Referee, because it uses a random agent to compare two alternatives that are the favorites of two other random agents. We prove that the use of a comparison query is necessary: no mechanism that only elicits the top-k preferred alternatives of voters (for constant k) can have Squared Distortion that is sublinear in the number of alternatives. We also prove that unlike any top-k only mechanism, the Distortion of Random Referee meaningfully improves on benign metric spaces, using the Euclidean plane as a canonical example. Finally, among top-1 only mechanisms, we introduce Random Oligarchy. The mechanism asks just 3 queries and is essentially optimal among the class of such mechanisms with respect to Distortion.In summary, we demonstrate the surprising power of constant sample complexity mechanisms generally, and just three random voters in particular, to provide some of the best known results in the implicit utilitarian framework.

We extend the fair machine learning literature by considering the problem of proportional centroid clustering in a metric context. For clustering n points with k centers, we define fairness as proportionality to mean that any n/k points are entitled to form their own cluster if there is another center that is closer in distance for all n/k points. We seek clustering solutions to which there are no such justified complaints from any subsets of agents, without assuming any a priori notion of protected subsets. We present and analyze algorithms to efficiently compute, optimize, and audit proportional solutions. We conclude with an empirical examination of the tradeoff between proportional solutions and the k-means objective.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across elements. Our model generalizes existing frameworks such as fair public decision making and participatory budgeting. We study a groupwise fairness notion called the core, which generalizes well-studied notions of proportionality and Pareto efficiency, and requires that each subset of agents must receive an outcome that is fair relative to its size. In contrast to the case of divisible public goods (where fractional allocations are permitted), the core is not guaranteed to exist when allocating indivisible public goods. Our primary contributions are the notion of an additive approximation to the core (with a tiny multiplicative loss), and polynomial time algorithms that achieve a small additive approximation, where the additive factor is relative to the largest utility of an agent for an element. If the feasibility constraints define a matroid, we show an additive approximation of 2. A similar approach yields a constant additive bound when the feasibility constraints define a matching. For feasibility constraints defining an arbitrary packing polytope with mild restrictions, we show an additive guarantee that is logarithmic in the width of the polytope. Our algorithms are based on the convex program for maximizing the Nash social welfare, but differ significantly from previous work in how it is used. As far as we are aware, our work is the first to approximate the core in indivisible settings.

Systems for processing big data---e.g., Hadoop, Spark, and massively parallel databases---need to run workloads on behalf of multiple tenants simultaneously. The abundant disk-based storage in these systems is usually complemented by a smaller, but much faster, cache. Cache is a precious resource: Tenants who get to use the cache can see two orders of magnitude performance improvement. Cache is also a limited and hence shared resource: Unlike a resource like a CPU core which can be used by only one tenant at a time, a cached data item can be accessed by multiple tenants at the same time. Cache, therefore, has to be shared by a multi-tenancy-aware policy across tenants, each having a unique set of priorities and workload characteristics.