Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Dimitris Tsipras
dblp:168/4752
· DBLP profile ↗
19ranked-venue papers
2as first author
5since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 16 · 2 first-author · 5 since 2021Theory of computation · 3Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
15 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 59% Reinforcement learning · 9% Language models and text generation · 8% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Mathematical optimization · 77% Algorithms and data structures · 23% |
Topics — the 30 heaviest of 47, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
2.7 | 6 | 2022 | Combining Diverse Feature Priors · ICML 2022 Editing a classifier by rewriting its prediction rules · NeurIPS 2021 BREEDS: Benchmarks for Subpopulation Shift · ICLR 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
2.2 | 6 | 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features · NeurIPS 2019 Exploring the Landscape of Spatial Robustness · ICML 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
interpretability |
0.8 | 2 | 2020 | From ImageNet to Image Classification: Contextualizing Progress on Benchmarks · ICML 2020 Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Dataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and Defenses · IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Dataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and Defenses · IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack defense |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Dataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and Defenses · IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 2023 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
in-context learning |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | What Can Transformers Learn In-Context? A Case Study of Simple Function Classes · NeurIPS 2022 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › in-context learning
in-context learning theory |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | What Can Transformers Learn In-Context? A Case Study of Simple Function Classes · NeurIPS 2022 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › spurious correlation
spurious correlation robustness |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Combining Diverse Feature Priors · ICML 2022 |
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
transformer |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | What Can Transformers Learn In-Context? A Case Study of Simple Function Classes · NeurIPS 2022 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
knowledge editing |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Editing a classifier by rewriting its prediction rules · NeurIPS 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › spurious correlation
spurious correlation mitigation |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Editing a classifier by rewriting its prediction rules · NeurIPS 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › distribution shift
subpopulation shift |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | BREEDS: Benchmarks for Subpopulation Shift · ICLR 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
dataset bias |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | From ImageNet to Image Classification: Contextualizing Progress on Benchmarks · ICML 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
deep reinforcement learning |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | A Closer Look at Deep Policy Gradients · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › policy optimization
policy gradient |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | A Closer Look at Deep Policy Gradients · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
policy optimization |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Implementation Matters in Deep RL: A Case Study on PPO and TRPO · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › policy optimization
proximal policy optimization |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Implementation Matters in Deep RL: A Case Study on PPO and TRPO · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness evaluation |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Identifying Statistical Bias in Dataset Replication · ICML 2020 |
Empirical software engineering
benchmarking |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Identifying Statistical Bias in Dataset Replication · ICML 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial examples |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability
feature shaping |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
image classification |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Exploring the Landscape of Spatial Robustness · ICML 2019 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling
image generation |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
non-robust features |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › robust learning
robust classification |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial robustness › adversarially robust generalization
robustness-accuracy trade-off |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Robustness May Be at Odds with Accuracy · ICLR (Poster) 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › input transformation robustness
spatial robustness |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Exploring the Landscape of Spatial Robustness · ICML 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial robustness
adversarially robust generalization |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Adversarially Robust Generalization Requires More Data · NeurIPS 2018 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial robustness
adversarial training |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks · ICLR (Poster) 2018 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
gradient analysis · 0.8threat categorization · 0.7semi-supervised learning · 0.6least squares estimator · 0.6lasso · 0.6gradient descent · 0.6feature priors · 0.6ensemble combination · 0.6rule rewriting · 0.5data-free editing · 0.5statistical bias correction · 0.4selection frequency remeasurement · 0.4ablation study · 0.4newton's method · 0.3laplacian system solving · 0.3interior point method · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Dataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and DefensesabstractAs machine learning systems grow in scale, so do their training data requirements, forcing practitioners to automate and outsource the curation of training data in order to achieve state-of-the-art performance. The absence of trustworthy human supervision over the data collection process exposes organizations to security vulnerabilities; training data can be manipulated to control and degrade the downstream behaviors of learned models. The goal of this work is to systematically categorize and discuss a wide range of dataset vulnerabilities and exploits, approaches for defending against these threats, and an array of open problems in this space. Micah Goldblum, Dimitris Tsipras, Chulin Xie, Avi Schwarzschild, Dawn Song, Aleksander Madry, Bo Li 0026, Tom Goldstein |
IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. | 2 |
| 2022 | Combining Diverse Feature PriorsabstractTo improve model generalization, model designers often restrict the features that their models use, either implicitly or explicitly. In this work, we explore the design space of leveraging such feature priors by viewing them as distinct perspectives on the data. Specifically, we find that models trained with diverse sets of explicit feature priors have less overlapping failure modes, and can thus be combined more effectively. Moreover, we demonstrate that jointly training such models on additional (unlabeled) data allows them to correct each other’s mistakes, which, in turn, leads to better generalization and resilience to spurious correlations. Saachi Jain, Dimitris Tsipras, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 2 |
| 2022 | What Can Transformers Learn In-Context? A Case Study of Simple Function ClassesabstractIn-context learning is the ability of a model to condition on a prompt sequence consisting of in-context examples (input-output pairs corresponding to some task) along with a new query input, and generate the corresponding output. Crucially, in-context learning happens only at inference time without any parameter updates to the model. While large language models such as GPT-3 exhibit some ability to perform in-context learning, it is unclear what the relationship is between tasks on which this succeeds and what is present in the training data. To investigate this, we consider the problem of training a model to in-context learn a function class (e.g., linear functions): given data derived from some functions in the class, can we train a model (e.g., a Transformer) to in-context learn most functions from that class? We show empirically that standard Transformers can be trained from scratch to perform in-context learning of linear functions---that is, the trained model is able to learn unseen linear functions from in-context examples with performance comparable to the optimal least squares estimator. In fact, in-context learning is possible even under two forms of distribution shift: (i) between the training data of the Transformer and inference-time prompts, and (ii) between the in-context examples and the query input during inference. We also show that we can train Transformers to in-context learn more complex function classes: sparse linear functions where the model outperforms least squares and nearly matches the performance of Lasso, and two-layer neural networks where the model performs comparably to neural networks trained on in-context examples using gradient descent. Shivam Garg 0001, Dimitris Tsipras, Percy Liang, Gregory Valiant |
NeurIPS | 2 |
| 2021 | BREEDS: Benchmarks for Subpopulation Shift
Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2021 | Editing a classifier by rewriting its prediction rulesabstractWe propose a methodology for modifying the behavior of a classifier by directly rewriting its prediction rules. Our method requires virtually no additional data collection and can be applied to a variety of settings, including adapting a model to new environments, and modifying it to ignore spurious features. Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Mahalaxmi Elango, David Bau, Antonio Torralba 0001, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 2 |
| 2020 | Implementation Matters in Deep RL: A Case Study on PPO and TRPO
Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Firdaus Janoos, Larry Rudolph, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR | 4 |
| 2020 | A Closer Look at Deep Policy Gradients
Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Firdaus Janoos, Larry Rudolph, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR | 4 |
| 2020 | Identifying Statistical Bias in Dataset ReplicationabstractDataset replication is a useful tool for assessing whether improvements in test accuracy on a specific benchmark correspond to improvements in models’ ability to generalize reliably. In this work, we present unintuitive yet significant ways in which standard approaches to dataset replication introduce statistical bias, skewing the resulting observations. We study ImageNet-v2, a replication of the ImageNet dataset on which models exhibit a significant (11-14%) drop in accuracy, even after controlling for selection frequency, a human-in-the-loop measure of data quality. We show that after remeasuring selection frequencies and correcting for statistical bias, only an estimated 3.6% of the original 11.7% accuracy drop remains unaccounted for. We conclude with concrete recommendations for recognizing and avoiding bias in dataset replication. Code for our study is publicly available: https://git.io/data-rep-analysis. Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Jacob Steinhardt, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 4 |
| 2020 | From ImageNet to Image Classification: Contextualizing Progress on BenchmarksabstractBuilding rich machine learning datasets in a scalable manner often necessitates a crowd-sourced data collection pipeline. In this work, we use human studies to investigate the consequences of employing such a pipeline, focusing on the popular ImageNet dataset. We study how specific design choices in the ImageNet creation process impact the fidelity of the resulting dataset—including the introduction of biases that state-of-the-art models exploit. Our analysis pinpoints how a noisy data collection pipeline can lead to a systematic misalignment between the resulting benchmark and the real-world task it serves as a proxy for. Finally, our findings emphasize the need to augment our current model training and evaluation toolkit to take such misalignment into account. Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 1 |
| 2019 | Robustness May Be at Odds with Accuracy
Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Alexander Turner 0001, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR (Poster) | 1 |
| 2019 | Exploring the Landscape of Spatial RobustnessabstractThe study of adversarial robustness has so far largely focused on perturbations bound in $\ell_p$-norms. However, state-of-the-art models turn out to be also vulnerable to other, more natural classes of perturbations such as translations and rotations. In this work, we thoroughly investigate the vulnerability of neural network–based classifiers to rotations and translations. While data augmentation offers relatively small robustness, we use ideas from robust optimization and test-time input aggregation to significantly improve robustness. Finally we find that, in contrast to the $\ell_p$-norm case, first-order methods cannot reliably find worst-case perturbations. This highlights spatial robustness as a fundamentally different setting requiring additional study. Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, Dimitris Tsipras, Ludwig Schmidt, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 3 |
| 2019 | Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are FeaturesabstractAdversarial examples have attracted significant attention in machine learning, but the reasons for their existence and pervasiveness remain unclear. We demonstrate that adversarial examples can be directly attributed to the presence of non-robust features: features (derived from patterns in the data distribution) that are highly predictive, yet brittle and (thus) incomprehensible to humans. After capturing these features within a theoretical framework, we establish their widespread existence in standard datasets. Finally, we present a simple setting where we can rigorously tie the phenomena we observe in practice to a {\em misalignment} between the (human-specified) notion of robustness and the inherent geometry of the data. Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) ClassifierabstractWe show that the basic classification framework alone can be used to tackle some of the most challenging tasks in image synthesis. In contrast to other state-of-the-art approaches, the toolkit we develop is rather minimal: it uses a single, off-the-shelf classifier for all these tasks. The crux of our approach is that we train this classifier to be adversarially robust. It turns out that adversarial robustness is precisely what we need to directly manipulate salient features of the input. Overall, our findings demonstrate the utility of robustness in the broader machine learning context. Shibani Santurkar, Andrew Ilyas, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2018 | Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks
Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, Adrian Vladu |
ICLR (Poster) | 4 |
| 2018 | How Does Batch Normalization Help Optimization?abstractBatch Normalization (BatchNorm) is a widely adopted technique that enables faster and more stable training of deep neural networks (DNNs). Despite its pervasiveness, the exact reasons for BatchNorm's effectiveness are still poorly understood. The popular belief is that this effectiveness stems from controlling the change of the layers' input distributions during training to reduce the so-called "internal covariate shift". In this work, we demonstrate that such distributional stability of layer inputs has little to do with the success of BatchNorm. Instead, we uncover a more fundamental impact of BatchNorm on the training process: it makes the optimization landscape significantly smoother. This smoothness induces a more predictive and stable behavior of the gradients, allowing for faster training. Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 2 |
| 2018 | Adversarially Robust Generalization Requires More DataabstractMachine learning models are often susceptible to adversarial perturbations of their inputs. Even small perturbations can cause state-of-the-art classifiers with high "standard" accuracy to produce an incorrect prediction with high confidence. To better understand this phenomenon, we study adversarially robust learning from the viewpoint of generalization. We show that already in a simple natural data model, the sample complexity of robust learning can be significantly larger than that of "standard" learning. This gap is information theoretic and holds irrespective of the training algorithm or the model family. We complement our theoretical results with experiments on popular image classification datasets and show that a similar gap exists here as well. We postulate that the difficulty of training robust classifiers stems, at least partially, from this inherently larger sample complexity. Ludwig Schmidt, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Kunal Talwar, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2017 | Matrix Scaling and Balancing via Box Constrained Newton's Method and Interior Point MethodsabstractIn this paper1, we study matrix scaling and balancing, which are fundamental problems in scientific computing, with a long line of work on them that dates back to the 1960s. We provide algorithms for both these problems that, ignoring logarithmic factors involving the dimension of the input matrix and the size of its entries, both run in time Õ(m log κ log2(1/ε)) where ε is the amount of error we are willing to tolerate. Here, κ represents the ratio between the largest and the smallest entries of the optimal scalings. This implies that our algorithms run in nearly-linear time whenever κ is quasi-polynomial, which includes, in particular, the case of strictly positive matrices. We complement our results by providing a separate algorithm that uses an interior-point method and runs in time Õ(m3/2log(1/ε)). In order to establish these results, we develop a new secondorder optimization framework that enables us to treat both problems in a unified and principled manner. This framework identifies a certain generalization of linear system solving that we can use to efficiently minimize a broad class of functions, which we call second-order robust. We then show that in the context of the specific functions capturing matrix scaling and balancing, we can leverage and generalize the work on Laplacian system solving to make the algorithms obtained via this framework very efficient. Michael B. Cohen, Aleksander Madry, Dimitris Tsipras, Adrian Vladu |
FOCS | 3 |
| 2016 | Efficient Money Burning in General Domains
Dimitris Fotakis 0001, Dimitris Tsipras, Christos Tzamos, Manolis Zampetakis |
Theory Comput. Syst. | 2 |
| 2015 | Efficient Money Burning in General Domains
Dimitris Fotakis 0001, Dimitris Tsipras, Christos Tzamos, Manolis Zampetakis |
SAGT | 2 |