Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Scott Heidbrink
dblp:169/9742
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 2Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Network security · 52% Authentication and access control · 26% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 22% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 100% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › secure communication › secure communication protocol
TLS |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | The Secure Socket API: TLS as an Operating System Service · USENIX Security Symposium 2018 |
Authentication and access control › cryptographic authentication
certificate-based authentication |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | TrustBase: An Architecture to Repair and Strengthen Certificate-based Authentication · USENIX Security Symposium 2017 |
Network security
email security |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | "We're on the Same Page": A Usability Study of Secure Email Using Pairs of Novice Users · CHI 2016 |
Operating systems
network stack |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | The Secure Socket API: TLS as an Operating System Service · USENIX Security Symposium 2018 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management › public key infrastructure
certificate validation |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | TrustBase: An Architecture to Repair and Strengthen Certificate-based Authentication · USENIX Security Symposium 2017 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
public key infrastructure |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | TrustBase: An Architecture to Repair and Strengthen Certificate-based Authentication · USENIX Security Symposium 2017 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure messaging
email encryption |
0.1 | 1 | 2016 | "We're on the Same Page": A Usability Study of Secure Email Using Pairs of Novice Users · CHI 2016 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
API design · 0.7architecture design · 0.3usability study · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | A Usability Study of Four Secure Email Tools Using Paired ParticipantsabstractSecure email is increasingly being touted as usable by novice users, with a push for adoption based on recent concerns about government surveillance. To determine whether secure email is ready for grassroots adoption, we employ a laboratory user study that recruits pairs of novice users to install and use several of the latest systems to exchange secure messages. We present both quantitative and qualitative results from 28 pairs of novices as they use Private WebMail (Pwm), Tutanota, and Virtru and 10 pairs of novices as they use Mailvelope. Participants report being more at ease with this type of study and better able to cope with mistakes since both participants are “on the same page.” We find that users prefer integrated solutions over depot-based solutions and that tutorials are important in helping first-time users. Finally, our results demonstrate that Pretty Good Privacy using manual key management is still unusable for novice users, with 9 of 10 participant pairs failing to complete the study. Scott Ruoti, Jeff Andersen, Luke Dickinson, Scott Heidbrink, Tyler Monson, Mark O'Neill, Ken Reese, Brad Spendlove, Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Daniel Zappala, Kent E. Seamons |
ACM Trans. Priv. Secur. | 4 |
| 2018 | The Secure Socket API: TLS as an Operating System Service
Mark O'Neill, Scott Heidbrink, Jordan Whitehead, Tanner Perdue, Luke Dickinson, Torstein Collett, Nick Bonner, Kent E. Seamons, Daniel Zappala |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2017 | Intrusion Detection with Unsupervised Heterogeneous Ensembles Using Cluster-Based NormalizationabstractOutlier detection has been shown to be a promising machine learning technique for a diverse array of felds and problem areas. However, traditional, supervised outlier detection is not well suited for problems such as network intrusion detection, where proper labelled data is scarce. This has created a focus on extending these approaches to be unsupervised, removing the need for explicit labels, but at a cost of poorer performance compared to their supervised counterparts. Recent work has explored ways of making up for this, such as creating ensembles of diverse models, or even diverse learning algorithms, to jointly classify data. While using unsupervised, heterogeneous ensembles of learning algorithms has been proposed as a viable next step for research, the implications of how these ensembles are built and used has not been explored. Scott Ruoti, Scott Heidbrink, Mark O'Neill, Eric Gustafson, Yung Ryn Choe |
ICWS | 2 |
| 2017 | Is that you, Alice? A Usability Study of the Authentication Ceremony of Secure Messaging Applications
Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Mark O'Neill, Jordan Whitehead, Scott Heidbrink, Kent E. Seamons, Daniel Zappala |
SOUPS | 5 |
| 2017 | TrustBase: An Architecture to Repair and Strengthen Certificate-based Authentication
Mark O'Neill, Scott Heidbrink, Scott Ruoti, Jordan Whitehead, Dan Bunker, Luke Dickinson, Travis Hendershot, Joshua Reynolds, Kent E. Seamons, Daniel Zappala |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2016 | "We're on the Same Page": A Usability Study of Secure Email Using Pairs of Novice UsersabstractSecure email is increasingly being touted as usable by novice users, with a push for adoption based on recent concerns about government surveillance. To determine whether secure email is ready for grassroots adoption, we employ a laboratory user study that recruits pairs of novice users to install and use several of the latest systems to exchange secure messages. We present both quantitative and qualitative results from 25 pairs of novice users as they use Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. Participants report being more at ease with this type of study and better able to cope with mistakes since both participants are "on the same page". We find that users prefer integrated solutions over depot-based solutions, and that tutorials are important in helping first-time users. Hiding the details of how a secure email system provides security can lead to a lack of trust in the system. Participants expressed a desire to use secure email, but few wanted to use it regularly and most were unsure of when they might use it. Scott Ruoti, Jeff Andersen, Scott Heidbrink, Mark O'Neill, Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Daniel Zappala, Kent E. Seamons |
CHI | 3 |