VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Willy Quach
dblp:169/9777
· DBLP profile ↗
18ranked-venue papers
6as first author
11since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-4309-6992ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 16 · 5 first-author · 11 since 2021Theory of computation · 6 · 3 first-author · 4 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | How to Use Polynomially-Hard iO: Turing Machine Obfuscation and More
Jesko Dujmovic, Yao-Ching Hsieh 0001, Abhishek Jain 0002, Willy Quach |
CRYPTO (1) | 4 |
| 2025 | Unique NIZKs and Steganography Detection
Willy Quach, LaKyah Tyner, Daniel Wichs |
EUROCRYPT (4) | 1 |
| 2024 | On Bounded Storage Key Agreement and One-Way Functions
Christopher Brzuska, Geoffroy Couteau, Christoph Egger 0001, Willy Quach |
TCC (1) | 4 |
| 2023 | A Note on Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge from CDH
Geoffroy Couteau, Abhishek Jain 0002, Zhengzhong Jin, Willy Quach |
CRYPTO (4) | 4 |
| 2023 | Speak Much, Remember Little: Cryptography in the Bounded Storage Model, Revisited
Yevgeniy Dodis, Willy Quach, Daniel Wichs |
EUROCRYPT (1) | 2 |
| 2023 | Lower Bounds on Anonymous Whistleblowing
Willy Quach, LaKyah Tyner, Daniel Wichs |
TCC (3) | 1 |
| 2022 | Authentication in the Bounded Storage Model
Yevgeniy Dodis, Willy Quach, Daniel Wichs |
EUROCRYPT (3) | 2 |
| 2022 | Post-quantum Insecurity from LWE
Alex Lombardi, Ethan Mook, Willy Quach, Daniel Wichs |
TCC (1) | 3 |
| 2021 | Does Fiat-Shamir Require a Cryptographic Hash Function?
Yilei Chen 0001, Alex Lombardi, Fermi Ma, Willy Quach |
CRYPTO (4) | 4 |
| 2021 | Targeted Lossy Functions and Applications
Willy Quach, Brent Waters, Daniel Wichs |
CRYPTO (4) | 1 |
| 2021 | Succinct LWE Sampling, Random Polynomials, and Obfuscation
Lalita Devadas, Willy Quach, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, Hoeteck Wee, Daniel Wichs |
TCC (2) | 2 |
| 2020 | Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange and Two-Seed Extractors
Fermi Ma, Willy Quach, Daniel Wichs |
CRYPTO (1) | 3 |
| 2020 | A Makespan Lower Bound for the Tiled Cholesky Factorization Based on ALAP Schedule
Olivier Beaumont, Julien Langou, Willy Quach, Alena Shilova |
Euro-Par | 3 |
| 2019 | Broadcast and Trace with N^ε Ciphertext Size from Standard Assumptions
Rishab Goyal, Willy Quach, Brent Waters, Daniel Wichs |
CRYPTO (3) | 2 |
| 2019 | New Constructions of Reusable Designated-Verifier NIZKs
Alex Lombardi, Willy Quach, Ron Rothblum, Daniel Wichs, David J. Wu 0001 |
CRYPTO (3) | 2 |
| 2019 | Reusable Designated-Verifier NIZKs for all NP from CDH
Willy Quach, Ron Rothblum, Daniel Wichs |
EUROCRYPT (2) | 1 |
| 2018 | Laconic Function Evaluation and ApplicationsabstractWe introduce a new cryptographic primitive called laconic function evaluation (LFE). Using LFE, Alice can compress a large circuit f into a small digest. Bob can encrypt some data x under this digest in a way that enables Alice to recover f(x) without learning anything else about Bob's data. For the scheme to be laconic, we require that the size of the digest, the run-time of the encryption algorithm and the size of the ciphertext should all be small, much smaller than the circuit-size of f. We construct an LFE scheme for general circuits under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, where the above parameters only grow polynomially with the depth but not the size of the circuit. We then use LFE to construct secure 2-party and multi-party computation (2PC, MPC) protocols with novel properties: We construct a 2-round 2PC protocol between Alice and Bob with respective inputs xA, xBin which Alice learns the output f(xA, xB) in the second round. This is the first such protocol which is “Bob-optimized”, meaning that Alice does all the work while Bob's computation and the total communication of the protocol are smaller than the size of the circuit f or even Alice's input xA. In contrast, prior solutions based on fully homomorphic encryption are “Alice-optimized”. . We construct an MPC protocol, which allows N parties to securely evaluate a function f(x1, ..., xN) over their respective inputs, where the total amount of computation performed by the parties during the protocol execution is smaller than that of evaluating the function itself! Each party has to individually pre-process the circuit f before the protocol starts and post-process the protocol transcript to recover the output after the protocol ends, and the cost of these steps is larger than the circuit size. However, this gives the first MPC where the computation performed by each party during the actual protocol execution, from the time the first protocol message is sent until the last protocol message is received, is smaller than the circuit size. Willy Quach, Hoeteck Wee, Daniel Wichs |
FOCS | 1 |
| 2018 | Watermarking PRFs Under Standard Assumptions: Public Marking and Security with Extraction Queries
Willy Quach, Daniel Wichs, Giorgos Zirdelis |
TCC (2) | 1 |