We present a new construction of two-party, threshold ECDSA, building on a 2017 scheme of Lindell and improving his scheme in several ways.

Recent attacks have shown that SIKE is not secure and should not be used in its current state. However, this work was completed before these attacks were discovered and might be beneficial to other cryptosystems such as SQISign. The primary downside of SIKE is its performance. However, this work achieves new SIKE speed records even using less resources than the state-of-the-art. Our approach entails designing and optimizing a new field multiplier, SIKE-optimized Keccak unit, and high-level controller. On a Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA, this architecture performs the NIST Level 1 SIKE scheme key encapsulation and key decapsulation functions in 2.23 and 2.39 ms, respectively. The combined key encapsulation and decapsulation time is 4.62 ms, which outperforms the next best Virtex-7 implementation by nearly 2 ms. Our implementation achieves speed records for the NIST Level 1, 2, and 3 parameter sets. Only our NIST Level 5 parameter set was beat by an all-out performance implementation. Our implementations also efficiently utilize the FPGA resources, achieving new records in area-time product metrics for all parameter sets. Overall, this work continues to push the bar for accelerating SIKE computations to make a stronger case for SIKE standardization.

In this work, we present a fast and area-efficient software-hardware implementation of the supersingular isogeny key encapsulation (SIKE) mechanism. Our software-hardware design achieves both the flexibility of software as well as the efficient performance of intense computations of hardware. In particular, our implementation takes advantage of new and highly optimized hardware modules for addition, multiplication, and hardware-software control, targeted at Xilinx FPGAs. In conjunction with a small RISC-V processor, we can support all four SIKE parameter sets. On a Virtex-7 FPGA, this implementation occupies 3,492 slices, 78 DSPs, and 29 BRAMs, to perform encapsulation and decapsulation over SIKEp434, SIKEp503, SIKEp610, and SIKEp751 in 14.5, 19.2, 29.8, and 42.7 ms, respectively. Despite supporting all four parameter sets, this design has the best area-time product of all isogeny accelerators in the literature.

In this work, we present a high-performance and scalable architecture for isogeny-based cryptosystems. In particular, we use the architecture in a fast, constant-time FPGA implementation of the quantum-resistant supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange protocol. On a Virtex-7 FPGA, we show that our architecture is scalable by implementing at 83, 124, 168, and 252-bit quantum security levels. This is the first SIDH implementation at close to the 256-bit quantum security level to appear in literature. Further, our implementation completes the SIDH protocol 2 times faster than performance-optimized software implementations and 1.34 times faster than the previous best FPGA implementation, both running a similar set of formulas. Our implementation employs inversion-free projective isogeny formulas. By replicating multipliers and utilizing an efficient scheduling methodology, we can heavily parallelize quadratic extension field arithmetic and the isogeny evaluation stage of the large-degree isogeny computation. For a constant-time implementation of 124-bit quantum security SIDH on a Virtex-7 FPGA, we generate ephemeral public keys in 8.0 and 8.6 ms and generate the shared secret key in 7.1 and 7.9 ms for Alice and Bob, respectively. Finally, we show that this architecture could also be used to efficiently generate undeniable and digital signatures based on supersingular isogenies.