This paper studies games of voluntary disclosure in which a sender discloses evidence to a receiver who then offers an allocation and transfers. We characterize all equilibrium payoffs using information design as a tool. Our main result establishes that any payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be supported by an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Hence, our analysis suggests an equivalence between disclosure and design in this setting. We apply our results to monopoly pricing, trading financial assets, insurance markets, and policy negotiations.

In this paper, we explore a scenario where a sender provides an information policy and a receiver, upon observing a realization of this policy, decides whether to take a particular action, such as making a purchase. The sender's objective is to maximize her utility derived from the receiver's action, and she achieves this by careful selection of the information policy. Building on the work of Kleiner et al., our focus lies specifically on information policies that are associated with power diagram partitions of the underlying domain. To address this problem, we employ entropy-regularized optimal transport, which enables us to develop an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal solution. We present experimental numerical results that highlight the qualitative properties of the optimal configurations, providing valuable insights into their structure. Furthermore, we extend our numerical investigation to derive optimal information policies for monopolists dealing with multiple products, where the sender discloses information about product qualities.

In this paper, we investigate an optimal delegation model with multidimensional actions and multidimensional states of the world. The principal is responsible for taking an action, and her payoff is influenced by an unknown state of the world, which represents the agent's private information. No monetary transfers are available. Since the principal's and agent's preferences are not aligned, the agent is unwilling to simply disclose the state. The principal can employ arbitrary mechanisms, including stochastic ones, and her objective is to maximize her expected payoff.

We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The proposer cannot commit to future proposals. When players are patient, there can be equilibria with Coasian dynamics: the veto player's private information can largely nullify proposer's bargaining power. Our main result, however, is that there are also equilibria in which the proposer obtains the high payoff that he would with commitment power. The driving force is that the veto player's single-peaked preferences give the proposer an option to "leapfrog", i.e., to secure agreement from only low-surplus types early on to credibly extract surplus from high types later. Methodologically, we exploit the connection between sequential bargaining and static mechanism design.