Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Naif Saleh Almakhdhub
dblp:175/4787
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 2 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Systems and software security · 80% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 20% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
3 papers |
Embedded and real-time systems · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security
memory safety |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | µRAI: Securing Embedded Systems with Return Address Integrity · NDSS 2020 |
Systems and software security › memory safety
return address protection |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | µRAI: Securing Embedded Systems with Return Address Integrity · NDSS 2020 |
Systems and software security › exploitation
control-flow hijacking |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Protecting Bare-Metal Embedded Systems with Privilege Overlays · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017 |
Cyber-physical and IoT security
embedded system security |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Protecting Bare-Metal Embedded Systems with Privilege Overlays · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017 |
Embedded and real-time systems
embedded system security |
0.2 | 2 | 2020 | µRAI: Securing Embedded Systems with Return Address Integrity · NDSS 2020 ACES: Automatic Compartments for Embedded Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2018 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
fine-grained randomization · 0.6control-flow integrity · 0.6LLVM-based compiler · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | µRAI: Securing Embedded Systems with Return Address Integrity
Naif Saleh Almakhdhub, Abraham A. Clements, Saurabh Bagchi, Mathias Payer |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2019 | BenchIoT: A Security Benchmark for the Internet of ThingsabstractAttacks against IoT systems are increasing at an alarming pace. Many IoT systems are and will be built using low-cost micro-controllers (IoT-uCs). Different security mechanisms have been proposed for IoT-uCs with different trade-offs. To guarantee a realistic and practical evaluation, the constrained resources of IoT-uCs require that defenses must be evaluated with respect to not only security, but performance, memory, and energy as well. Evaluating security mechanisms for IoT-uCs is limited by the lack of realistic benchmarks and evaluation frameworks. This burdens researchers with the task of developing not only the proposed defenses but applications on which to evaluate them. As a result, security evaluation for IoT-uCs is limited and ad-hoc. A sound benchmarking suite is essential to enable robust and comparable evaluations of security techniques on IoT-uCs. This paper introduces BenchIoT, a benchmark suite and evaluation framework to address pressing challenges and limitations for evaluating IoT-uCs security. The evaluation framework enables automatic evaluation of 14 metrics covering security, performance, memory usage, and energy consumption. The BenchIoT benchmarks provide a curated set of five real-world IoT applications that cover both IoT-uCs with and without an OS. We demonstrate BenchIoT's ability by evaluating three defense mechanisms. All benchmarks and the evaluation framework is open sourced and available to the research community. Naif Saleh Almakhdhub, Abraham A. Clements, Mathias Payer, Saurabh Bagchi |
DSN | 1 |
| 2018 | ACES: Automatic Compartments for Embedded Systems
Abraham A. Clements, Naif Saleh Almakhdhub, Saurabh Bagchi, Mathias Payer |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2017 | Protecting Bare-Metal Embedded Systems with Privilege OverlaysabstractEmbedded systems are ubiquitous in every aspect of modern life. As the Internet of Thing expands, our dependence on these systems increases. Many of these interconnected systems are and will be low cost bare-metal systems, executing without an operating system. Bare-metal systems rarely employ any security protection mechanisms and their development assumptions (unrestricted access to all memory and instructions), and constraints(runtime, energy, and memory) makes applying protections challenging. To address these challenges we present EPOXY, an LLVM-based embedded compiler. We apply a novel technique, called privilege overlaying, wherein operations requiring privileged execution are identified and only these operations execute in privileged mode. This provides the foundation on which code-integrity, adapted control-flow hijacking defenses, and protections for sensitive IO are applied. We also design fine-grained randomization schemes, that work within the constraints of bare-metal systems to provide further protection against control-flow and data corruption attacks. These defenses prevent code injection attacks and ROP attacks from scaling across large sets of devices. We evaluate the performance of our combined defense mechanisms for a suite of 75 benchmarks and 3 real-world IoT applications. Our results for the application case studies show that EPOXY has, on average, a 1.8% increase in execution time and a 0.5% increase in energy usage. Abraham A. Clements, Naif Saleh Almakhdhub, Khaled Saab 0002, Prashast Srivastava, Jinkyu Koo, Saurabh Bagchi, Mathias Payer |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 2 |