In the domain of target tracking, leveraging auxiliary modalities such as depth, thermal, and event data to enhance tracking robustness has garnered substantial attention. Due to the scarcity of visual multimodal datasets, state-of-the-art approaches primarily rely on parameter-efficient fine-tuning to adapt models. However, existing studies often neglect the adaptation of fine-tuning to specific datasets, frequently focusing only on non-RGB modalities or employing them as prompts. Additionally, current methods overly emphasize modal balance while disregarding modality adaptation to environmental conditions. To address these limitations, we propose a unified visual multimodal detection framework named IMTrack. This model incorporates LoRA (Low-Rank Adaptation) and Adapter for fine-tuning RGB and auxiliary modalities, respectively, and employs confidence-based cross-attention to strengthen feature interaction and adaptability. Furthermore, we introduce a complementary masking multi-scene optimization strategy to enhance robustness in complex environments. Extensive experiments on five datasets validate the efficacy of our model. The results demonstrate that IMTrack surpasses existing methods in many indicators, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Notably, the robustness of our model to auxiliary modes is improved by more than 2%. Our source code is available at: https://github.com/cxy-lzk/IMTrack.

We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using quantum communication can be more efficient than classical communication. We have two sets of results, revealing a surprisingly rich landscape - which looks quite different from both quantum communication in non-strategic parties, and classical communication in mechanism design. We first study the expected communication complexity of approximately optimal auctions. We give quantum auction protocols for buyers with unit-demand or combinatorial valuations that obtain an arbitrarily good approximation of the optimal revenue while running in exponentially more efficient communication compared to classical approximately optimal auctions. However, these auctions come with the caveat that they may require the seller to charge exponentially large payments from a deviating buyer. We show that this caveat is necessary - we give an exponential lower bound on the product of the expected quantum communication and the maximum payment. We then study the worst-case communication complexity of exactly optimal auctions in an extremely simple setting: additive buyer’s valuations over two items. We show the following separations: - There exists a prior where the optimal classical auction protocol requires infinitely many bits, but a one-way message of 1 qubit and 2 classical bits suffices. - There exists a prior where no finite one-way quantum auction protocol can obtain the optimal revenue. However, there is a barely-interactive revenue-optimal quantum auction protocol with the following simple structure: the seller prepares a pair of qubits in the EPR state, sends one of them to the buyer, and then the buyer sends 1 qubit and 2 classical bits. - There exists a prior where no multi-round quantum auction protocol with a finite bound on communication complexity can obtain the optimal revenue.

Given a local Hamiltonian, how difficult is it to determine the entanglement structure of its ground state? We show that this problem is computationally intractable even if one is only trying to decide if the ground state is volume-law vs near area-law entangled. We prove this by constructing strong forms of pseudoentanglement in a public-key setting, where the circuits used to prepare the states are public knowledge. In particular, we construct two families of quantum circuits which produce volume-law vs near area-law entangled states, but nonetheless the classical descriptions of the circuits are indistinguishable under the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption. Indistinguishability of the circuits then allows us to translate our construction to Hamiltonians. Our work opens new directions in Hamiltonian complexity, for example whether it is difficult to learn certain phases of matter.

Entanglement is a quantum resource, in some ways analogous to randomness in classical computation. Inspired by recent work of Gheorghiu and Hoban, we define the notion of "pseudoentanglement'', a property exhibited by ensembles of efficiently constructible quantum states which are indistinguishable from quantum states with maximal entanglement. Our construction relies on the notion of quantum pseudorandom states -- first defined by Ji, Liu and Song -- which are efficiently constructible states indistinguishable from (maximally entangled) Haar-random states. Specifically, we give a construction of pseudoentangled states with entanglement entropy arbitrarily close to $\log n$ across every cut, a tight bound providing an exponential separation between computational vs information theoretic quantum pseudorandomness. We discuss applications of this result to Matrix Product State testing, entanglement distillation, and the complexity of the AdS/CFT correspondence. As compared with a previous version of this manuscript (arXiv:2211.00747v1) this version introduces a new pseudorandom state construction, has a simpler proof of correctness, and achieves a technically stronger result of low entanglement across all cuts simultaneously.

In this work, we investigate the online learning problem of revenue maximization in ad auctions, where the seller needs to learn the click-through rates (CTRs) of each ad candidate and charge the price of the winner through a pay-per-click manner. We focus on two models of the advertisers’ strategic behaviors. First, we assume that the advertiser is completely myopic; i.e. in each round, they aim to maximize their utility only for the current round. In this setting, we develop an online mechanism based on upper-confidence bounds that achieves a tight $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret in the worst-case and negative regret when the values are static across all the auctions and there is a gap between the highest expected value (i.e. value multiplied by their CTR) and second highest expected value ad. Next, we assume that the advertiser is non-myopic and cares about their long term utility. This setting is much more complex since an advertiser is incentivized to influence the mechanism by bidding strategically in earlier rounds. In this setting, we provide an algorithm to achieve negative regret for the static valuation setting (with a positive gap), which is in sharp contrast with the prior work that shows $O(T^{2/3})$ regret when the valuation is generated by adversary.

We introduce locality: a new property of multi-bidder auctions that formally separates the simplicity of optimal single-dimensional multi-bidder auctions from the complexity of optimal multi-dimensional multi-bidder auctions. Specifically, consider the revenue-optimal, Bayesian Incentive Compatible auction for buyers with valuations drawn from D-> :=xi Di, where each distribution has support-size n. This auction takes as input a valuation profile v-> and produces as output an allocation of the items and prices to charge, Opt D-> (v->). When each Di is single-dimensional, this mapping is locally-implementable: defining each input vi requires Θ(log n) bits, and Opt D-> (v->) can be fully determined using just Θ(log n) bits from each Di. This follows immediately from Myerson's virtual value theory [36].

In this paper, we study Combinatorial Semi-Bandits (CSB) that is an extension of classic Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) under Differential Privacy (DP) and stronger Local Differential Privacy (LDP) setting. Since the server receives more information from users in CSB, it usually causes additional dependence on the dimension of data, which is a notorious side-effect for privacy preserving learning. However for CSB under two common smoothness assumptions, we show it is possible to remove this side-effect. In detail, for $B_{\infty}$-bounded smooth CSB under either $\varepsilon$-LDP or $\varepsilon$-DP, we prove the optimal regret bound is $\Theta(\frac{mB^2_{\infty}\ln T } {\Delta\varepsilon^2})$ or $\tilde{\Theta}(\frac{mB^2_{\infty}\ln T} { \Delta\varepsilon})$ respectively, where $T$ is time period, $\Delta$ is the gap of rewards and $m$ is the number of base arms, by proposing novel algorithms and matching lower bounds. For $B_1$-bounded smooth CSB under $\varepsilon$-DP, we also prove the optimal regret bound is $\tilde{\Theta}(\frac{mKB^2_1\ln T} {\Delta\varepsilon})$ with both upper bound and lower bound, where $K$ is the maximum number of feedback in each round. All above results nearly match corresponding non-private optimal rates, which imply there is no additional price for (locally) differentially private CSB in above common settings.

The design of voting rules is traditionally guided by desirable axioms. Recent work shows that, surprisingly, the axiomatic approach can also support the generation of explanations for voting outcomes. However, no bounds on the size of these explanations is given; for all we know, they may be unbearably tedious. We prove, however, that outcomes of the important Borda rule can be explained using $O(m^2)$ steps, where $m$ is the number of alternatives. Our main technical result is a general lower bound that, in particular, implies that the foregoing bound is asymptotically tight. We discuss the significance of our results for AI and machine learning, including their potential to bolster an emerging paradigm of automated decision making called virtual democracy.