In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to obtain a positive classification outcome from the learner’s classifier, typically assuming agents have full knowledge of the deployed classifier. In contrast, we consider a Bayesian setting where agents have a common distributional prior on the classifier being used and agents manipulate their features to maximize their expected utility according to this prior. The learner can reveal truthful, yet not necessarily complete, information about the classifier to the agents, aiming to release just enough information to shape the agents' behavior and thus maximize accuracy. We show that partial information release can counter-intuitively benefit the learner’s accuracy, allowing qualified agents to pass the classifier while preventing unqualified agents from doing so. Despite the intractability of computing the best response of an agent in the general case, we provide oracle-efficient algorithms for scenarios where the learner’s hypothesis class consists of low-dimensional linear classifiers or when the agents’ cost function satisfies a sub-modularity condition. Additionally, we address the learner’s optimization problem, offering both positive and negative results on determining the optimal information release to maximize expected accuracy, particularly in settings where an agent’s qualification can be represented by a real-valued number.

We initiate the study of strategic behavior in screening processes with multiple classifiers. We focus on two contrasting settings: a "conjunctive” setting in which an individual must satisfy all classifiers simultaneously, and a sequential setting in which an individual to succeed must satisfy classifiers one at a time. In other words, we introduce the combination of strategic classificationwith screening processes. We show that sequential screening pipelines exhibit new and surprising behavior where individuals can exploit the sequential ordering of the tests to "zig-zag” between classifiers without having to simultaneously satisfy all of them. We demonstrate an individual can obtain a positive outcome using a limited manipulation budget even when far from the intersection of the positive regions of every classifier. Finally, we consider a learner whose goal is to design a sequential screening process that is robust to such manipulations, and provide a construction for the learner that optimizes a natural objective.

We study the data deletion problem for convex models. By leveraging techniques from convex optimization and reservoir sampling, we give the first data deletion algorithms that are able to handle an arbitrarily long sequence of adversarial updates while promising both per-deletion run-time and steady-state error that do not grow with the length of the update sequence. We also introduce several new conceptual distinctions: for example, we can ask that after a deletion, the entire state maintained by the optimization algorithm is statistically indistinguishable from the state that would have resulted had we retrained, or we can ask for the weaker condition that only the observable output is statistically indistinguishable from the observable output that would have resulted from retraining. We are able to give more efficient deletion algorithms under this weaker deletion criterion.

Data deletion algorithms aim to remove the influence of deleted data points from trained models at a cheaper computational cost than fully retraining those models. However, for sequences of deletions, most prior work in the non-convex setting gives valid guarantees only for sequences that are chosen independently of the models that are published. If people choose to delete their data as a function of the published models (because they don’t like what the models reveal about them, for example), then the update sequence is adaptive. In this paper, we give a general reduction from deletion guarantees against adaptive sequences to deletion guarantees against non-adaptive sequences, using differential privacy and its connection to max information. Combined with ideas from prior work which give guarantees for non-adaptive deletion sequences, this leads to extremely flexible algorithms able to handle arbitrary model classes and training methodologies, giving strong provable deletion guarantees for adaptive deletion sequences. We show in theory how prior work for non-convex models fails against adaptive deletion sequences, and use this intuition to design a practical attack against the SISA algorithm of Bourtoule et al. [2021] on CIFAR-10, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST.

In this paper we initiate the study of financial asset design with fairness as an explicit goal. We consider a variation on the classical problem of optimal portfolio design. In our setting, an individual consumer is specified by her risk tolerance, which corresponds to the variance in returns she is willing to accept in exchange for higher expected returns. We must design a (small) collection of portfolios and assign each consumer to a portfolio at lower or approximately equal risk than her tolerance. Fairness is imposed by demanding that the portfolios designed do not discriminate (in terms of expected returns) against less wealthy clients (or other specified protected groups).

We give a new proof of the "transfer theorem" underlying adaptive data analysis: that any mechanism for answering adaptively chosen statistical queries that is differentially private and sample-accurate is also accurate out-of-sample. Our new proof is elementary and gives structural insights that we expect will be useful elsewhere. We show: 1) that differential privacy ensures that the expectation of any query on the conditional distribution on datasets induced by the transcript of the interaction is close to its true value on the data distribution, and 2) sample accuracy on its own ensures that any query answer produced by the mechanism is close to its conditional expectation with high probability. This second claim follows from a thought experiment in which we imagine that the dataset is resampled from the conditional distribution after the mechanism has committed to its answers. The transfer theorem then follows by summing these two bounds. An upshot of our new proof technique is that the concrete bounds we obtain are substantially better than the best previously known bounds.

We give a new proof of the "transfer theorem" underlying adaptive data analysis: that any mechanism for answering adaptively chosen statistical queries that is differentially private and sample-accurate is also accurate out-of-sample. Our new proof is elementary and gives structural insights that we expect will be useful elsewhere. We show: 1) that differential privacy ensures that the expectation of any query on the posterior distribution on datasets induced by the transcript of the interaction is close to its true value on the data distribution, and 2) sample accuracy on its own ensures that any query answer produced by the mechanism is close to its posterior expectation with high probability. This second claim follows from a thought experiment in which we imagine that the dataset is resampled from the posterior distribution after the mechanism has committed to its answers. The transfer theorem then follows by summing these two bounds, and in particular, avoids the "monitor argument" used to derive high probability bounds in prior work. An upshot of our new proof technique is that the concrete bounds we obtain are substantially better than the best previously known bounds, even though the improvements are in the constants, rather than the asymptotics (which are known to be tight). As we show, our new bounds outperform the naive "sample-splitting" baseline at dramatically smaller dataset sizes compared to the previous state of the art, bringing techniques from this literature closer to practicality.

We propose and analyze differentially private (DP) mechanisms for call auctions as an alternative to the complex and ad-hoc privacy efforts that are common in modern electronic markets. We prove that the number of shares cleared in the DP mechanisms compares favorably to the non-private optimal and provide a matching lower bound. We analyze the incentive properties of our mechanisms and their behavior under natural no-regret learning dynamics by market participants. We include simulation results and connections to the finance literature on market impact.

Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint of differential privacy. Our first algorithm is a private implementation of the equalized odds post-processing approach of (Hardt et al., 2016). This algorithm is appealingly simple, but must be able to use protected group membership explicitly at test time, which can be viewed as a form of “disparate treatment”. Our second algorithm is a differentially private version of the oracle-efficient in-processing approach of (Agarwal et al., 2018) which is more complex but need not have access to protected group membership at test time. We identify new tradeoffs between fairness, accuracy, and privacy that emerge only when requiring all three properties, and show that these tradeoffs can be milder if group membership may be used at test time. We conclude with a brief experimental evaluation.

We propose a new family of fairness definitions for classification problems that combine some of the best properties of both statistical and individual notions of fairness. We posit not only a distribution over individuals, but also a distribution over (or collection of) classification tasks. We then ask that standard statistics (such as error or false positive/negative rates) be (approximately) equalized across individuals, where the rate is defined as an expectation over the classification tasks. Because we are no longer averaging over coarse groups (such as race or gender), this is a semantically meaningful individual-level constraint. Given a sample of individuals and problems, we design an oracle-efficient algorithm (i.e. one that is given access to any standard, fairness-free learning heuristic) for the fair empirical risk minimization task. We also show that given sufficiently many samples, the ERM solution generalizes in two directions: both to new individuals, and to new classification tasks, drawn from their corresponding distributions. Finally we implement our algorithm and empirically verify its effectiveness.